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1. General Introduction 
An intensive debate in the economic literature concerns the impact of market structure 
and market power on the incentives of firms to engage in innovative activities. This 
longstanding but indecisive discussion has been triggered by the conflicting views of 
Joseph Schumpeter and Kenneth Arrow. On the one hand, in one of his well-known 
hypotheses,  Schumpeter  (1942)  argues  that  market  imperfections,  such  as 
concentrated markets and market power, provide better incentives for firms to invest 
in innovative activities compared to perfect competition. On the other hand, Arrow 
(1962) claims that a monopolistic environment provides less incentives to invest in 
research and development (R&D) compared to a competitive scenario. After all, the 
gains resulting from an innovation for the monopolist equal the difference between 
the  value  of  the  innovation  and  his  current  profits  whereas  the  gains  for  the 
competitive firm equal the full value of the innovation.  
 
Subsequent theoretical studies have further illustrated this ambiguity. Overviews of 
this  rich  literature  stream  are  provided  by  Tirole  (1988),  Reinganum  (1989),  Van 
Cayseele (1998) and Gilbert (2006). Moreover, also empirical studies yield diverging 
answers  on  the  question  whether  market  power  encourages  or  inhibits  innovative 
activity. For example, Malerba and Orsenigo (1999) provide evidence on the intense 
R&D activity by market leaders. Based on EU patent data, they show that, in general, 
a  significant  part  of  total  innovative  activity  can  be  attributed  to  some  large  and 
persistent innovators, thereby supporting Schumpeter. However, Czarnitzki and Kraft 
(2004) find that challengers invest more in R&D than incumbents, which is then again 
in line of Arrow.  
 
This  thesis  further  contributes  to  the  Schumpetarian  discussion  by  analyzing  the 
impact of market power and market structure on innovative incentives in three related 
studies. One specific topic of interest is the role played by spillovers in this analysis. 
In what follows, a more detailed introduction to these three studies is provided. 
   2 
Study 1: Strategic investments of leaders and followers 
The focus of the first study is on the incentives of leading and following firms to 
invest in R&D. A strategic investment model is set up in which leaders (innovators) 
invest in cost-reducing R&D before the followers (imitators). Moreover, it is assumed 
that  the  leaders  also  choose  their  output  levels  before  the  followers  (Stackelberg 
competition). In other words, the role of a leader concerns both the technology as well 
as the market side. This assumption can be justified by the observation that, in some 
industries, the market leader is also often the first to innovate. For example, in the 
dredging industry, the big market players are usually also the innovators. Dependent 
on the exact sequence of the stages, two different settings are analyzed, i.e. an early 
and a late entrance setting.  
 
To  continue,  the  model  also  takes  into  account  the  presence  of  technological 
spillovers, which are known to be an important characteristic of the R&D process. 
Indeed, as was stated by Arrow (1962), the output of the R&D process is knowledge – 
about a new product, service or production process – and knowledge is a public good, 
as  it  is  both  non-exclusive  and  non-rivalrous  in  its  use
1.  Consequently,  R&D 
knowledge may spill over from one firm to another. Channels through which these 
spillovers may take place are for example company visits, personnel mobility and 
reverse engineering.  
 
In this study, there may be spillovers among leaders, among followers and between 
these two groups of players. We furthermore allow the spillovers to be asymmetric, 
which  is  due  to  the  assumed  heterogeneity  between  firms,  i.e.  leading  versus 
following.  For  example,  it  is  no  illusion  to  believe  that  leading  firms  may  have 
different  learning  capabilities  or  absorptive  capacities  compared  to  followers 
supporting our reasoning that spillovers among leaders can be different compared to 
the spillovers among the followers.  
 
It is furthermore assumed that leaders and followers are allowed to cooperate in R&D. 
After all, it is well-known that, due to the spillovers, firms are less willing to invest in 
                                                 
1  A  large  body  of  literature  has  provided  empirical  evidence  on  the  existence  of  technological 
spillovers. Overviews of this literature can be found in Griliches (1995), Geroski (1995), Kaiser (2002) 
and Sena (2004).   3 
R&D as rivals can free ride on their innovative efforts. Consequently, firms may not 
invest sufficiently in R&D from a social welfare point of view
2. This problem of 
underinvestment in R&D by private firms has urged policy makers to come up with 
instruments to enhance firm’s incentives to invest in R&D. A well-known instrument, 
next to patents and R&D subsidies, is the allowance for R&D cooperation
3.  
 
The  prevalence  of  R&D  cooperatives
4  has  been  the  breeding  ground  for  a  large 
number  of  studies  on  the  effectiveness  of  R&D  cooperation.  In  this  regard,  the 
Industrial  Organization  (IO)  literature  provides  rich  game  theoretical  models 
analyzing  the  impact  of  R&D  cooperation.  Pioneering  studies  in  this  field  are 
attributable to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992), who 
consider a two stage model in which firms, producing homogeneous goods, invest 
simultaneously  in  cost-reducing  R&D  in  the  presence  of  symmetric  technological 
spillovers before competing (à la Cournot) on the output market. Several extensions 
of these seminal papers have emerged and have been reviewed (De Bondt, 1997; 
Veugelers,  1998;  Sena,  2004;  Motta,  2004).  However,  most  of  these  extensions 
analyzing  R&D  cooperation  do  not  consider  firm  heterogeneity  (leading  versus 
following  firms)  and  spillover  asymmetry.  Consequently,  by  introducing  R&D 
cooperation  among  leaders  or  followers,  further  insights  into  the  effectiveness  of 
R&D cooperation as an R&D encouraging policy instrument can be obtained.  
 
All  in  all,  a  four  stage  strategic  investment  setting  with  leaders  and  followers  is 
analyzed. Spillovers can be symmetric or asymmetric and R&D cooperation among 
                                                 
2 Apart from spillovers, financial constraints and uncertainty may also contribute to the wedge between 
private and social incentives. It may indeed be difficult for firms to gather the necessary financial 
resources because of the high cost of external capital (Himmelberg and Peterson, 1994; Hall, 2002). 
Moreover, the R&D process is characterized by a high level of uncertainty. Especially at the beginning 
of a new research project, there is high uncertainty about its technological feasibility. In addition, even 
if the new product has been developed successfully, there is also uncertainty about the size of the 
market for a new product or service, which is called market uncertainty. It happens frequently that the 
size of the market for an innovation is under- or overestimated. And finally, there is also competitive 
uncertainty. One firm could complete the development of a new product ahead of a rival firm, which 
could result in pre-emption of the slower firm by the faster firm (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982). The 
distinction between these three different types of uncertainty stems from Hinloopen (1997a).  
3 For more on the effectiveness of patents, see for example the recent and comprehensive work of 
Bessen and Meurer (2008). Aerts and Schmidt (2008) and Hinloopen (1997a, 1997b and 2000) analyze 
the effectiveness of R&D subsidies on firms’ incentives to invest in R&D. 
4 Since the 1960s, there has been a growth in R&D partnerships and this growth has accelerated since 
the (late) 1980s (Hagedoorn, 2002). Especially, a lot of R&D partnerships can be observed in the ICT 
and biotechnology sector.   4 
leaders  or  followers  is  allowed  for.  The  main  research  questions  are  then  the 
following. Firstly, the impact of changes in the symmetric or asymmetric spillovers on 
leaders’ and followers’ R&D investments is analyzed and compared with the impact 
of (symmetric) spillovers in the two stage game settings in which an increase in the 
spillover  diminishes  efforts  of  R&D  competing  firms  but  encourages  R&D 
expenditures of R&D cooperating firms.  
 
Secondly, it is analyzed whether followers sometimes invest more than leaders, and if 
so, under which conditions this so-called technological leapfrogging is most likely to 
take  place.  The  main  point  of  attention  here  is  the  role  played  by  spillovers. 
Furthermore,  as  leaders  and  followers  can  cooperate  in  R&D,  it  can  be  assessed 
whether R&D cooperation among leaders or followers may enhance or discourage 
leapfrogging opportunities. By doing so, additional insights into the impact of market 
power and structure on innovate incentives are gathered.  
 
Finally, the impact of R&D cooperation on economic performance, in terms of R&D 
investments, profitability and welfare is analyzed and compared with settings with 
simultaneous moves. After all, in these two stage game settings, R&D cooperation, 
defined as the coordination of R&D strategies, yields higher R&D investments if and 
only if the symmetric spillover exceeds a certain threshold value, called the critical 
spillover. The same applies to consumer surplus and total welfare. Producer surplus is 
always higher with R&D cooperation (d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et 
al., 1992). It is thus analyzed whether these tendencies also take place in the four 
stage game setting.    
Study  2:  Leadership  persistence  and  technological 
leapfrogging in patent races without winner-takes-all. 
Note that the model in the first study is static, as firms invest only once in R&D. 
However, in reality, competition for the market is more dynamic as firms tend to 
invest in R&D over time and continue investing until the innovation (a new product or 
a  new  technology)  is  found.  At  that  moment  in  time,  a  prize  is  awarded  to  the 
innovator and all firms stop investing in R&D. This dynamic competition for the 
market is the topic of the second study of this thesis. More specifically, dynamic   5 
competition for the market is modelled by patent races, in which firms invest in R&D 
continuously over time and in which the probability of successful innovation depends 
on firms’ R&D investments.  
 
Patent races with one incumbent monopolist and one or more entrants are considered. 
The incumbent can be seen as the patent holder of a current technology, having a head 
start over its potential competitors in the race for the next innovation. For example, in 
the 1970s, EMI had a patent on the CAT brain scanner, but other firms, like GE and 
Technicare also searched for the next technology in the CAT scanner market, being 
the full body scanner.  
 
So far, these patent races have only been analyzed under the assumption that the 
winner of the race is rewarded with the full value of the innovation, which is called 
winner-takes-all. In other words, when the prize for the winner is a patent on the 
innovation,  current  studies  on  patent  races  (with  an  incumbent  and  one  or  more 
entrants) have assumed that patents work perfectly. In that case, a patent provides the 
innovator with the exclusive right to its innovation for a certain period of time, by 
which a temporary monopoly position is granted on the new product, the new service 
or the new production technology.  
 
However, despite the popularity
5 of patents, they may not always work perfectly, as 
has for example been illustrated by Mansfield et al. (1981). Based on a sample of 48 
product innovations in the chemical, drug, electronics and machinery industries, they 
show  that  60%  of  all  patented  innovations  are  legally  imitated  within  4  years. 
Moreover, imitations costs are in general (far) less than the R&D costs for the original 
innovator. For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, about 70% of total R&D costs 
of the innovator are incurred during the clinical tests. Generic drug manufacturers, 
however, are not required to repeat these tests, by which their (imitation) costs are 
lower than the innovator’s R&D costs (DiMasi et al., 2003). Exemplifying the flaws 
in the patent system is the observation that large European industrial firms apply for 
patents  on  only  36%  of  their  product  innovations  and  25%  of  their  process 
                                                 
5 Since the first modern patent was granted in 1474 in Venice, its use has been growing steadily over 
the years. Illustrative of this trend is the current number of patent applications: in 2006, there were 
approximately 208 000 patent applications at the European Patent Office, 400 000 at the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and more than 400 000 at the Japan Patent Office.   6 
innovations (Arundel and Kabla, 1998). Moreover, the patent holder does not always 
observe  infringements  and,  moreover,  if  the  patent  holder  would  observe  the 
infringement and the infringer, the company may lack legal expertise or financial 
resources to fight the infringement (Crampes and Langinier, 2002).  
 
The result of all this is that, in patent races, losers can also reap some rewards of the 
innovation.  It  thus  turns  out  to  be  interesting  to  analyze  patent  races  in  which 
rewards are shared between the winner and the losers of the race. Several reward 
sharing scenarios are looked at. Moreover, both exogenous and endogenous entry 
are analyzed. After all, it has been shown that, with winner-takes-all, assumptions 
regarding entry have dramatic consequences for the comparison of incumbent’s and 
entrants’ efforts when there is no sharing of rewards. Indeed, the entrants invest 
more than the incumbent when there is exogenous entry (Reinganum, 1985), but 
this result is reversed with endogenous entry (Etro, 2004). In other words, when 
there is winner-takes-all, technological leapfrogging is more likely in races with 
exogenous entry while  monopoly persistence  tends to be the rule in races  with 
endogenous entry.  
 
In this second study, it is then questioned whether and when sharing of rewards can 
alter  the  predictions  of  Reinganum  (1985)  and  Etro  (2004).  Consequently,  more 
insights are obtained into the role played by reward sharing (and thus the degree of 
patent  effectiveness)  in  the  process  of  leadership  persistence  or  technological 
leapfrogging,  both  with  exogenous  and  endogenous  entry.  Furthermore,  also 
tendencies  of  expected  profits  are  shortly  dealt  with.  Finally,  incumbent’s  and 
entrants’ R&D investments are compared with the socially optimal investments.  
Study  3:  Cournot  versus  Bertrand  competition  with  cost-
reducing R&D and input spillovers 
In the third study, the focus is on the impact of the mode of market competition on 
the incentives to invest in R&D and the concomitant implications for consumer 
surplus and welfare. More specifically, quantity (Cournot) competition is compared 
with price (Bertrand) competition when the market competition stage is preceded 
by a stage of investments in cost-reducing R&D by which production costs are   7 
lowered  and,  hence,  market  structure  is  endogenous.  If  market  structure  is 
exogenous, it is well known that consumer surplus and static welfare are higher 
with price competition than with quantity competition (Singh and Vives, 1984). 
 
However, this standard finding may be altered when firms invest in R&D before they 
compete on the market. More specifically, static welfare can be higher with Cournot 
competition than with Bertrand competition when firms invest in product R&D to 
enhance product quality (Symeonidis, 2003). With cost-reducing process R&D, Qiu 
(1997) shows that static welfare can sometimes be higher when firms compete à la 
Cournot but consumer surplus is always higher with Bertrand competition.  
 
In  this  third  study,  a  further  analysis  of  the  economic  performance  of  Cournot 
versus Bertrand markets is presented. A familiar two-stage model is considered. In 
the first stage of the game, two firms, producing substitutable products, invest in 
cost-reducing R&D in the presence of technological spillovers, followed by market 
competition (Cournot or Bertrand) in the second stage. Although this model is very 
similar to the model of Qiu (1997), two important differences need to be stressed. 
Firstly, in the analysis presented here, spillovers are considered to occur during the 
R&D process while Qiu (1997) assumes that R&D output spills over (thus when the 
R&D process is finished). In other words, input rather than output spillovers are 
considered. Secondly, the study presented here is the first to analyze the impact of 
R&D cooperation on the comparison of Cournot versus Bertrand competition when 
there is a precompetitive stage of R&D.  
 
It  is  then  analyzed  which  type  of  market  competition  mode  yields  the  highest 
incentives to invest in R&D by which more light is shed on the impact of competition 
intensity  on  firms’  R&D  investment  incentives.  Furthermore,  consumer  and  static 
welfare are compared under Cournot and Bertrand competition. Especially, the aim of 
the study is to see whether it is possible that less intense types of market competition 
(here  Cournot) can  sometimes  result  in  higher  welfare  for  consumers and  society 
compared to more intense types of market competition (Bertrand). 
 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two, three and four deal 
with these three studies in the same order as presented here. In chapter five, the main   8 
conclusions of the research are summarized in brief and some possibilities for further 
research are provided.    9 
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2. Strategic investments of leaders and followers 
          Joint Work with Professor Raymond De Bondt 
 
The focus of the first study is on a four stage strategic investment game in which 
leaders and followers invest competitively or cooperatively in cost-reducing R&D in 
the presence of symmetric or asymmetric spillovers. In brief, the main findings are the 
following. When the followers can free ride to a large extent on the R&D investments 
of  the  leaders,  it  is  likely  that  the  former  invest  more  than  the  latter.  Such 
leapfrogging  opportunities  can  be  discouraged  by  R&D  cooperation  among  the 
leaders or stimulated by R&D cooperation among the followers. Furthermore, R&D 
cooperation  has  analogous  effects  on  the  level  of  R&D  investments  of  leaders 
(followers) as in the more familiar two stage models with simultaneous moves. Thus, 
if the spillover is large enough, R&D cooperation among leaders (followers) results in 
higher  investments  than  R&D  competition.  Finally,  the  study  points  out  that,  in 
industries with a small number of leading firms, society is better off when followers 
cooperate in R&D.   
2.1. Introduction 
Firms  tend  to  be  frequently  involved  in  strategic  investments  in  their  attempt  to 
achieve or maintain sustainable competitive advantages. Strategic investments may 
take  many  forms,  such  as  expenditures  to  increase  business  and  technological 
knowledge  accumulation,  advertising  or  service  outlays  to  develop  or  maintain 
goodwill in the market, and investments directed at modifying product characteristics, 
production  processes  or  features  of  the  internal  organization  and/or  the  external 
institutional environment. 
 
A number of the main characteristics of these investments is fairly well understood 
and is helpful in inspiring competitive analysis. Strategic investments, for example, 
tend  to  change  the  parameters  of  the  market  rivalry  outcomes,  they  may  hurt  or 
benefit rivals and firms may have an incentive to temper or exaggerate efforts for 
strategic  reasons.  Some  investments  may  involve  special  features.  Knowledge 
spillovers and R&D cooperation between some or all of the players involved, for 
example, will influence strategic efforts in research and development.   14 
 
Most of the existing studies focus on settings in which firms decide simultaneously on 
their innovative investments. In the seminal studies of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin 
(1988) and Kamien et al. (1992), it is shown that, in these simultaneous two stage 
models,  knowledge  spillovers  discourage  competitive  R&D  efforts  and  stimulate 
cooperative  R&D  choices.  Moreover,  R&D  cooperation  results  in  higher  efforts 
compared to R&D competition provided that the spillover exceeds a critical value
6. 
The impact of R&D cooperation on firms’ profits, total output and welfare is driven 
by the same critical spillover value
7. 
 
However, it is well known that innovative firms tend to be heterogeneous and thus 
may  work  with  different  business  models  and  strategies  (Röller  and  Sinclair-
Desgagné,  1996), which indicates that R&D decisions may be taken sequentially. 
After all, some players may attempt to be technological leaders to exploit so called 
first-mover or lead-time advantages. Others may use a second mover approach and 
pursue an imitative strategy by relying on their ability to quickly adopt what other 
firms demonstrate as valuable (Barney, 2002; Schnaars, 1994). Three examples from 
different industries illustrate this heterogeneity and point to the importance of taking 
sequential innovative decisions into account.  
 
In the microprocessor industry, which is roughly characterized by a duopoly structure, 
Intel  Corporation  has  usually  been  playing  the  role  of  technology  leader  and 
Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) the role of follower
8. Especially in the early 1980s, 
AMD explicitly pursued a strategy of imitation. After all, for the two first product 
generations, the 8086 and the 80286, AMD waited until Intel released its processors 
before developing its own products. Worthwhile to mention is the fact that, for these 
two product generations, AMD had easy access to Intel’s technology due to a cross-
license agreement with Intel. But despite these high spillovers from Intel to AMD, the 
latter  could  only  introduce  its  product  a  few  years  later.  For  example,  AMD 
introduced its version of the 80286 in 1984, two years later than Intel. Since then, 
                                                 
6  In  case  of  homogeneous  products,  this  critical  spillover  equals  ½.  The  more  products  are 
differentiated, the lower this critical spillover is (De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991) 
7 Overviews of this rich literature are provided by Rosenkranz (1996), De Bondt (1997), Sena (2004) 
and Motta (2004). 
8 Smaller rivals only have very small market shares, and can be ignored in this illustration.   15 
Intel has continued to be the market leader. Exemplifying Intel’s dominant position is 
its  2006  market  share  of  approximately  73%  (Pacheco-de-Almeida  and  Zemsky, 
2008; Business Week (2008); The Economist (1998); The New York Times (2006)).  
 
Another  illustration  of  the  heterogeneity  of  innovative  behaviour  of  firms  can  be 
found in the automobile industry and more specifically in the European market for 
multi-purpose vehicles (MPV’s or simply mini-vans). In this market, Renault can be 
seen as both the technological and market leader. After all, this French automobile 
constructor was the first to develop an MPV, namely the Espace. Moreover, Renault 
also marketed its mini-van firstly, in 1985, which clearly resulted in a first mover 
advantage.  Other  firms,  like  Chrysler,  Mitsubishi,  Nissan,  Peugeot,  Fiat,  Toyota, 
Volkswagen and Ford can be considered as followers in the European MPV market. 
Reminiscent  of  Renault’s  market  leadership  is  the  Espace  market  share  (in  the 
European Community) of more than 20% in 2004. Important to remark is that some 
followers have been cooperating in R&D in order to try to catch up with Renault. For 
example,  Ford  and  Volkswagen  formed  a  joint  venture  (AutoEuropa)  and  also 
Peugeot and Fiat combined R&D forces (Sevel) (The New York Times (1990); The 
New York Times (1993); Commission, 1990).  
 
A third example relates to the dredging industry. In this industry, the four biggest 
firms, which are De Nul, DEME, Boskalis and Van Oord, control 65% of the market. 
Smaller firms share the remaining part of the market. Moreover, the big firms are 
typically leading the innovation process as well. These big firms invest continuously 
in process innovations, such as the construction of larger ships and the search for the 
optimal design of the vessels, in order to reduce operating costs. Smaller firms may 
try to copy some of these innovations (provided that they have sufficient financial 
resources). 
 
These three examples illustrate that firms do not always take their R&D decisions 
simultaneously.  More  specifically,  some  firms  (the  technological  leaders)  move 
before the other firms (the technological followers) in the R&D process. The market 
shares of Intel, Renault and the four big dredging companies further indicate that 
these firms are also the market leaders. Moreover, it is possible that these market 
leadership positions can persist for a very long time period. To continue, the three   16 
examples also point to two other aspects of the R&D process, i.e. the presence of 
spillovers and the allowance to cooperate in R&D.  
 
After all, an often heard argument to play the role of imitator (technological follower) 
is  the  possibility  to  free  ride  on  the  efforts  of  the  innovator.  These  free  riding 
opportunities are due to the presence of spillovers from the leading to the following 
firms. For example, AMD enjoyed high spillovers from Intel due to the cross-license 
agreement.  These  free  riding  possibilities  or  spillovers  often  make  it  possible  for 
imitators to duplicate first movers’ innovations at a lower cost, even if the leader’s 
innovation is protected by a patent. In the pharmaceutical industry, for example, about 
70%  of  total  R&D  costs  are  incurred  during  the  clinical  tests.  Generic  drug 
manufacturers, the imitators, are however not required to repeat these tests, by which 
their (imitation) costs are far below the innovator’s R&D costs (DiMasi et al., 2003). 
However, imitators’ cost advantages are not always that terribly large. Mansfield et al. 
(1981) argue that, on average, imitation costs and imitation time are about two thirds 
of the original development cost and time.  
 
So, it is clear that knowledge flows or spillovers from the leading to the following 
firms play an important role in the R&D strategies of leaders and followers. These 
spillovers  differ  across  industries  as  they  depend  on  the  strength  of  the  patent 
protection of leaders and the ease of reverse engineering, inventing around, learning 
or  duplication.  For  example,  spillovers  are  typically  high  in  industries  like 
pharmaceuticals and semiconductors while spillovers tend to be of a small or medium 
level in industries such as machinery and transportation equipment (Bernstein, 1988; 
Bernstein and Nadiri, 1989; Gruber, 1998).  
 
Moreover,  note  that  in  many  cases  relevant  new  knowledge  can  also  spill  over 
between leaders and between followers, again through reverse engineering, through 
contacts with common suppliers or supporting outside laboratories. Changing jobs or 
employees starting up their own business
9, professional exchanges at conferences and 
                                                 
9 For example, three former employees of Google founded the new internet search engine Cuil, which 
was released on July 29
th, 2008 (NRC Handelsblad, 2008).      17 
visits
10,  and  other  features  likewise  may  also  generate  transfers  of  relevant 
knowledge.  Remark  that  spillovers  may  also  flow  from  followers  to  leaders.  The 
cross-license agreement between Intel and AMD can again be used as an example 
here. As both firms have access to each other’s technology, it is possible that there are 
also spillovers from AMD to Intel. However, as Intel is the technological leader, it 
can be expected that the spillover from Intel to AMD is higher than the other way 
around.  
 
It  is  probably  typical  that  the  heterogeneity  between  firms  implies  differences  in 
spillovers. Knowledge spillovers from leaders to followers need not be equal to the 
spillovers from followers to leaders, as the example of Intel and AMD illustrates. 
Leaders may also differ in size, technology, absorptive capacity or product portfolio 
from followers, so that spillovers between leaders need not be the same as spillovers 
between followers.  
 
Finally,  the  MPV-case  illustrates  that  firms  can  cooperate  in  R&D.  Indeed,  a 
widespread phenomenon in the innovation process nowadays  is R&D cooperation 
(Hagedoorn, 2002). Some advantages of combining R&D forces are the avoidance of 
duplication, easier access to the necessary financial assets and the internalization of 
the spillovers between the cooperating firms.  
 
In short, the three examples above indicate that it may be interesting to look at the 
impact  of  asymmetric  spillovers  and  R&D  cooperation  when  firms  decide 
sequentially on their R&D  investments.  However,  in the literature, the theoretical 
insights into the spillover effects and the impact of R&D cooperation are, up to now, 
however  strongly  biased  towards  settings  with  firms  choosing  their  R&D 
simultaneously
 in the presence of symmetric spillovers, although a limited set of more 
recent  studies  has  begun  focussing  on  the  implications  of  firm  heterogeneity  and 
asymmetric spillovers.  
 
                                                 
10 For example, when Carlos Brito started working for the Brazilian brewery Brahma in 1990, his first 
assignment  was  a  visit  the  American  brewery  Anheuser-Bush.  During  this  visit,  Brito  learnt  how 
Anheuser-Bush coped with wholesalers, product placement, productivity etc. (De Standaard, 2008).      18 
De Bondt and Henriques (1995), Amir and Wooders (1999) and Amir et al. (2000) 
look at asymmetric spillovers and role playing in R&D investments in a duopoly with 
simultaneous  output  decisions.  Halmenschlager  (2004)  extends  this  setting  to  one 
leader and two followers, but only the latter invest in R&D while Atallah (2005) looks 
in detail at asymmetric spillovers but in a duopoly with simultaneous moves in R&D 
investments and output. Goel (1990) looks at only one Stackelberg leader who invests 
in  R&D  while  followers  do  not  invest  in  R&D  but  benefit  from  the  leader’s 
LQYHVWPHQWV￿YLD￿VSLOORYHUV￿￿äLJLþ￿HW￿DO￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿DQDO\]H￿WKH￿SHUVLVWHQFH￿RI￿PRQRSRO\￿
power using a dynamic duopoly model with one innovating and one imitating firm. 
Crampes and Langinier (2003) also point to the importance of distinguishing between 
leading and following firms by comparing their R&D investments in some specific 
situations. 
 
Note  that  in  related  IO  literature,  some  aspects  of  leader  follower  behaviour  and 
asymmetric spillovers have already been looked at in earlier contributions. As has 
been mentioned in the general introduction of this thesis, a lot of research attention 
has been devoted to the comparison of leader versus follower R&D investments. This 
literature  indicates  that  role  playing  affects  the  incentives  in  quantity  games 
(Daughety, 1990; Kamien and Zang, 1990) and in innovative races. For example, a 
leading  firm invests  less  than followers  in innovative  races  with  exogenous entry 
(Reinganum,  1985)  while  this  result  is  altered  when  entry  is  free  (Etro,  2004). 
Moreover,  Doraszelski  (2003)  shows  that,  in  R&D  races  with  knowledge 
accumulation, a follower, in order to catch up, sometimes invests more than a leader. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to contribute to the existing literature by analyzing the 
R&D  investment  incentives  of  market  leaders  and  market  followers  when  it  is 
assumed that the former also innovate before the latter. In other words, an industry 
with  one  or  more  persistent  dominant  firms  is  considered
11  (e.g.  Intel  in  the 
microprocessor industry), in which the followers pursue an imitative strategy (e.g. 
AMD  in  the  microprocessor  industry).  In  addition,  symmetric  or  asymmetric 
spillovers accompany these sequential R&D decisions and R&D cooperation among 
leaders or followers is allowed for.  
                                                 
11 More dynamic models, in which the leader can be replaced by a follower, are discussed in chapter 3.     19 
 
Therefore, four stage game settings are modelled with sequential R&D and sequential 
output  decisions  (Stackelberg  competition)  in  which  the  Stackelberg  leaders  also 
move before the Stackelberg followers in R&D. The focus hereafter is, however, only 
on  cost-reducing  strategic  innovative  activities.  Investment  means  research  and 
development outlays that produce new knowledge which in turn allows reducing a 




The model also allows for spillovers between the different players. More specifically, 
there are spillovers between the leaders, between the followers, from the leaders to the 
followers  and  from  the  followers  to  the  leaders.  As  has  been  explained,  these 
spillovers tend to be asymmetric due to the heterogeneity of leaders and followers. 
However,  symmetric  spillovers  will  also  be  looked  at.  This  will  be  done  only  to 
compare tendencies with existing symmetric settings. Finally, leaders or followers are 
also allowed to cooperate in R&D.  
 
So, all in all, a four stage game setting with leading and following firms is looked at 
with spillovers between the different players and R&D cooperation between leaders 
or between followers. The following research questions are then tackled. Firstly, it is 
analyzed whether the impact of the spillovers on the R&D investments of leaders and 
followers  is  the  same  as  in  the  traditional  two  stage  models.  After  all,  R&D 
investments  in  a  symmetric  two  stage  oligopoly  with  simultaneous  choices  are 
negatively  related  to  the  level  of  spillovers  when  firms  compete  in  R&D  and 
positively correlated when they cooperate in R&D.  
 
                                                 
12 Two examples of process innovations have already shortly been touched upon, i.e. the construction 
of bigger ships and the search for the optimal design of these ships in the dredging industry. The 
somewhat narrow approach of only focusing on process innovations yields hopefully the advantage of 
clarifying the intuition of reported tendencies. At the same time, it allows relating the findings to earlier 
ones reported in the already abundant literature following the  seminal papers  of  d’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. (1992). 
13 Ford Motor Company’s introduction of the assembly line in the automobile industry serves as a 
classic but excellent example of a process innovation. By bringing the work to the employees instead of 
bringing the employees to the work, Henry Ford’s ambition was to reduce production time and hence 
production costs. And indeed, when the first moving assembly line was installed in Highland Park 
(Detroit) in 1913, the production time for a single car, the Model T, dropped from more than twelve 
hours to less than six hours (source: www.ford.com, last consulted on June 26, 2008)   20 
Secondly,  it  is  analyzed  when  technological  leapfrogging  tends  to  take  place. 
Technological  leapfrogging  is  here  defined  as  the  situation  in  which  each  of  the 
followers invests more in R&D than each of the leaders. Special attention is paid to 
the role played by the spillovers. In addition, it is analyzed whether R&D cooperation 
can stimulate or discourage technological leapfrogging by followers. Note that this 
analysis  contributes  to  the  longstanding  debate in  IO  about  the  impact  of  market 
structure on R&D incentives as it compares R&D investments of market leaders and 
market followers. 
 
Thirdly, the impact of R&D cooperation on the investments of leaders and followers 
is  analyzed  and  tendencies  are  compared  with  the  two  stage  settings  with 
simultaneous R&D. In these two stage game settings, R&D cooperation
14 results in 
higher efforts compared to R&D competition, provided that the symmetric spillover 
exceeds a critical value.  
 
To continue, next to the analysis of the profitability of leading and following firms, 
attention is also devoted to the impact of R&D cooperation on welfare. It is important 
to  see  whether  the  allowance  for  R&D  cooperation  of  leaders  or  followers  can 
increase consumer and/or total welfare. By doing so, some policy guidelines can be 
formulated.    
 
The main results are the following. With regard to the impact of spillovers on R&D 
investments, tendencies can differ from the two stage models. More specifically, the 
investments of cooperating leaders or cooperating followers can be decreasing with an 
increasing symmetric spillover level, which is caused by, respectively, the presence of 
the spillover from leaders to followers and the spillover from the followers to the 
leaders. Secondly, the model predicts that, if the spillover from the leaders to the 
followers is sufficiently high, the followers spend more resources on cost-reducing 
R&D than the leaders. Thirdly, the comparison of competitive and cooperative R&D 
yields similar results as in the two stage models. Again, critical spillovers drive the 
tendencies concerning R&D investments, profits and welfare. However, these critical 
                                                 
14  R&D  cooperation  as  the  maximization  of  joint  profits,  without increasing the  knowledge  flows 
between cooperating firms, is meant.    21 
spillover values are not the same as in the two stage models. Finally, only slight 
differences between the early and the late entrance setting prevail.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The model is presented in 
section 2.2. Section 2.3 deals with the impact of spillovers on R&D efforts. Leader 
and  follower  R&D  investments  are  compared  in  section  2.4.  The  impact  of 
cooperation  of  leaders  or  followers  on  R&D  investments,  profits  and  welfare  is 
discussed in respectively sections 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7. All these tendencies concern the 
early entrance setting. The late entrance setting is shortly dealt with in section 2.8 and 
section 2.9 concludes.  
2.2. The model 
In order to capture the idea of sequential R&D moves by market leaders and market 
followers, the earlier two stage model with simultaneous moves is extended to a four 
stage setting with sequential moves (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). More 
specifically, the focus is on an oligopoly market consisting of n firms competing non-
cooperatively on the output market with homogeneous products. Of these n firms, k 
firms are assumed to be market leaders while the remaining n-k firms are market 
followers  and  market  leaders  move  before  the  followers  on  the  output  market 
(Stackelberg competition). Note that it is assumed that there can be several leaders, 
which is for example the case in the dredging industry
15. These market leaders are 
moreover assumed to move before the market followers in the investment stage
16. In 
other words, the leadership role embodies both the R&D as the market side. The 
assumption of innovative market leaders is based on the three examples mentioned in 
the introduction. The inverse demand function is: 
1 1
k n L F
i j
i j k
p a q q
= = +
∑ ∑ = − − ,   (2.1) 
                                                 
15  The  introduction  of  more  than  one  leader  is  based  on  the  example  of  the  dredging  industry. 
Moreover, it is then possible to analyze the consequences of R&D cooperation among leaders.  
16  In  the  model  here,  leading  and  following  roles  are  determined  exogenously.  Lieberman  and 
Montgomery  (1988)  argue  that a  combination  of  luck  and  proficiency  (for  example  technological 
foresight)  could  be  at  the  origin  of  leadership  positions.  However,  as  has  been  explained  in  the 
introduction of this chapter, it could be the explicit choice of a firm (for example AMD) to pursue a 
follower strategy.   22 














∑ denote the total 
output of respectively the leaders (L) and the followers (F). Leaders and followers can 




j x , in an attempt to maintain or 
improve  the  own  competitive  position.  Throughout  the  paper  (and  in  line  with 




Two different four stage game settings are considered, i.e. an early entrance and a late 
entrance setting. In the early entrance setting, the sequence of moves runs as follows. 
In the first stage, all k leaders decide on their strategic investment levels, knowing that 
each of the n-k followers will observe their efforts. In the second stage, followers 
decide on their commitments  to innovative efforts. In  the  third  stage, each leader 
commits to  an output level, after observing  the investments of the followers, and 
anticipating  the  subsequent  output  choices  of  the  followers.  In  the  final  stage, 
followers decide on their output observing the results of the previous stages. In the 
late  entrance  setting,  leaders  commit  to  an  R&D  investment  and  output  level  in 
respectively  stage  one  and  stage  two  before  choices  of  R&D  and  output  of  the 
followers (stage three and stage four). These two settings thus replicate an industry in 
which market leadership is rather persistent and the market leaders invest in cost-
reducing R&D before the market followers, which can be seen as small firms (see e.g. 
the  dredging  industry).  Thus,  the  model  does  not  allow  for  followers  to  become 
market leaders. From now on, the model description and the analysis focus only on 
the early entrance setting. In section 2.8, the late entrance setting is (shortly) dealt 
with. 
  
Spillovers may occur in the investment stages one and two, between respectively the 
leaders and the followers. There may also be spillovers between the leaders in stage 
                                                 
17 Other types of commitments are for example branding, quality improvements or demand-enhancing 
R&D.  
18  Results  could  as  well  be  applied  to  advertising  efforts  aimed  at  increasing  demand.  Indeed, 
advertising  efforts  may  not  only  increase  demand  for  the  investing  firm’s  product  as,  due  to  the 
publicity, the public’s awareness of the product category in general may be increased as well, and 
hence, also demand for rivals’ products may be expanded. In that case, a distinction needs to be made 
between the ex post market size for the leaders (a
L) and the ex post market size for the followers (a
F) in 
the inverse demand function.    23 
one and between the followers in stage two. This means that four groups of spillovers 
are looked at: 
-   leader-VSHFLILF￿VSLOORYHU￿ LL;  
-   follower-VSHFLILF￿VSLOORYHU￿ FF; 
-   spillover from leaders to folloZHUV￿ LF;  
-   VSLOORYHU￿IURP￿IROORZHUV￿WR￿OHDGHUV￿ FL.  
 
All spillovers are exogenous and symmetric in each category. Figure 2.1 explains the 
notation.  Asymmetries  are  thus  limited  to  possible  differences  between  the  four 
mentioned groups. The last group, spillovers from followers to leaders, is only used 
here  to  explain  the  consequences  of  spillover  symmetry.  So,  in  the  symmetric 
spillover case, it is assumed that there is also knowledge spilling over from followers 
to leaders in order to relate results with previous findings of the two stage models 
with symmetric spillovers. When spillovers are asymmetric, it is assumed that there is 
no  spillover  from  the  followers  to  the  leaders,  which  is  not  only  simplifying  the 
analysis but is also in line with existing theoretical (Amir and Wooders, 1999; Amir et 




Figure 2.1. The early entrance setting for k=2 and n=5. Extension to the general case of 1†k<n is 
obvious. The spillover from followers to leaders EFL is set equal to zero, except in the benchmark case 
of symmetric spillovers. 
 
In  modern  market  economies  spillovers  will  depend  on  the  type  of  strategic 
investments,  as  well  as  on  the  industry  and  the  cultural,  economic  and  legal 
environment.  Some  polar  cases  that  will  receive  attention  are  blue  print  copying 
￿ LF ￿￿￿DQG￿LGHD￿GLIIXVLRQ￿￿ LF=0). In reality, spillovers (nearly) always lie between 
these  two  extremes,  which  are  nevertheless  very  useful  as  benchmarks.  The 
terminology serves as a metaphor and is borrowed from technology diffusion studies   24 
 
Blue  print  copying  takes  place  when  the  followers  have  access  to  very  detailed 
information, a blue print, on how the new product or new process has been developed. 
Blue print copying may take place when patent protection is not effective and when 
knowledge developed by leaders is a pure public good. An example stems from the 
already described microprocessor industry in the early 1980s when AMD enjoyed 
high spillovers from Intel due to a cross-licensing agreement (see also section 2.1). 
The wheel servers as another example of blue print copying as it was presumably easy 
to copy it just by looking at it.  
 
With idea diffusion, the followers are only aware of the basic idea of the innovative 
product as the leaders are able to completely appropriate their knowledge because of, 
for  example,  perfect  patent  protection,  the  absence  of  the  possibility  to  conduct 
reverse engineering, different suppliers of inputs, little job rotation between firms, the 
lack of close professional contacts, etc. In this case followers only learn that it is 
possible  to  improve  on  production  technologies  and  observe  investment  levels  of 
leaders. Their R&D moves have therefore to follow those of the leaders. An example 
of idea diffusion is the production of porcelain, which was reinvented around 1700 in 
Europe, given the Chinese examples from the 7
th century that reached the West in the 
14
th century. The German follower alchemist Johann Friedrich Böttger only knew for 
certain that it could be done and thus faced idea diffusion (Diamond, 1997)
19.  
 
All firms enter stage one or two with an ex ante unit cost equal to c. The leaders enter 
stage three with an ex post unit cost
L
i c . The followers enter stage four with an ex post 
unit cost
F
j c . Both ex post values are the difference between the ex ante unit costs and 
the amount of effective knowledge that the player has accumulated in the previous 
stages. The effective value is the sum of the own efforts and the imported knowledge 
from other firms that results from the spillovers and equals a cost-reduction of that 
                                                 
19 Note that it is sometimes not clear whether idea diffusion or blue print copying is at work. For 
example, some scientists argue that  the Russian construction of the atomic  bomb was  based on a 
blueprint of the existing American A-bomb because  of information transmissions  by  spies. Others 
believe that the Russians were only aware of the feasibility of constructing an A-bomb, due to the 
bombing  of  Hiroshima,  and  they  reinvented  the  A-bomb  with  little  information  from  Americans 
(Diamond, 1997).    25 
amount  expressed  in  for  example  dollars.  The  ex  post  unit  costs  of  leaders  and 
followers are therefore given by the following equations (2.2) and (2.3): 
1 1
k n L L L F
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l f k
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     j=k+1,...,n.     (2.3) 
On the basis of these ex post unit costs, a Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained in 
stages three and four. The equilibrium output levels depend, given (2.2) and (2.3), on 
the investments to be made in the earlier stages. These investments have for all firms 







= with   a given parameter and  ￿!￿￿.  (2.4) 
 
There  is  no  discounting.  Leaders’  and  followers’  profit  functions  are  given  by 
respectively (2.5) and (2.6):  
( ) ( )
L L L L
i i i i p c q g x π = − −            i=1,...,k and      (2.5)  
( ) ( )
F F F F
j j j j p c q g x π = − −           j=k+1,...,n   (2.6) 
with 
L
i q and 
F
j q the Stackelberg equilibrium values of the last stages. The followers 
choose their investments in stage two and the leaders choose in stage one, knowing 
the effect on the rest of the game.  
 
Note that it is thus assumed that leading and following firms are ex ante symmetric. It 
could of course be argued that the leaders could have lower initial unit costs (lower c) 
and/or face a more efficient R&D cost function (lower W). However, in the analysis 
here, these potential asymmetries are not taken into account. The reason is that the 
main purpose of this chapter is the analysis of the role of symmetric and asymmetric 
spillovers. Introducing ex ante asymmetry between leaders and followers, in terms of   26 
different  ex  ante  unit  costs  and/or  asymmetric  R&D  cost  functions,  would  only 
complicate the analysis and divert attention from the role of the spillovers
20.  
 
The output choices of the leaders in stage three and of followers in stage four are 
always simultaneous Cournot-Nash strategies within each group and stage. Leaders 
may compete in R&D with other leaders, and likewise for the followers. This game is 
labelled somewhat loosely the R&D competition game (indicated by (N,N)) as there 
is both competition of leaders and followers in R&D (Nash behaviour in R&D). Note 
that R&D competition refers to simultaneous competitive R&D choices within the 
group of leaders and followers in respectively the first and second stage of the game.  
 
However, leaders and followers can also cooperate in R&D
21. Two related forms of 
R&D  cooperation  are  considered  here,  namely  (using  both  the  notation  and  the 
terminology of Kamien et al. (1992)) R&D cartelization (labelled by C) and Research 
Joint Venture (RJV) cartelization (labelled by CJ). In an R&D cartel, the cooperating 
firms only coordinate their R&D activities. Mathematically, this is captured by the 
maximization of the joint profits of the R&D cartel members. In an RJV cartel, the 
cooperating  firms  not  only  coordinate  their  R&D  strategies  but,  moreover,  they 
enhance the knowledge sharing among member firms. It is assumed that, in case of 
RJV cartelization, the spillover among the cooperating firms is equal to the maximum 
value of 1 
22.  
 
Cooperation  among  all  leaders  but  not  among  followers  is  looked  at,  while  also 
cooperation among all followers but not among leaders is analyzed. One may think of 
situations where leaders and followers are operating in different geographic regions or 
business  cultures.  They  may  also  face  different  discounting  of  the  future  so  that 
cooperation is sustainable for one group but not necessarily for the other (Kesteloot 
and Veugelers, 1995).  
 
                                                 
20 Where possible, some implications of ex ante asymmetric unit costs will be shortly dealt with.  
21 It is assumed that cooperation in R&D never results in collusion on the output market, although 
R&D cooperation makes it more likely that firms collude on the product market (Martin,1995; Suetens, 
2008). 
22  The  situation  in  which  firms  do  not  coordinate  their  R&D  activities  but  only  maximize  the 
knowledge sharing (labelled RJV competition by Kamien et al. (1992)), is not covered here in order to 
avoid an overload of results.     27 
Consequently,  five  different  games  emerge.  Besides  the  R&D  competition  game 
(N,N), there are two games with cooperating leaders and competing followers, i.e. 
game (C,N) with R&D cartelization among the leaders and game (CJ,N) with RJV 
cartelization among the first movers. Analogically, the games where leaders compete 
among each other in stage one and followers cooperate in stage two are indicated by 
(N,C) when followers form an R&D cartel and (N,CJ) when followers create an RJV 
cartel. Table 2.1 summarizes these five possible games. 
 
 
Choice of R&D  
investment 
Game  




vis other followers 
(N,N)  Nash  Nash 
(C,N)  R&D cartel  Nash 
(N,C)  Nash  R&D cartel 
(CJ,N)  RJV cartel  Nash 
(N,CJ)  Nash  RJV cartel 
Table 2.1. Five possible games dependent on the behaviour of leaders and followers in the R&D stages 
(R&D competition, R&D cartelization or RJV cartelization) in the early entrance setting. In all games, 
a Stackelberg equilibrium in output is anticipated in stages three and four. 
 
As has been mentioned before, both symmetric and asymmetric spillovers are looked 
at.  For  reasons  of  clarity,  Table  2.2  provides  a  detailed  description  of  spillover 
symmetry and asymmetry in each of the  five  games. With asymmetric  spillovers, 
there is no knowledge flow from followers to leaders. 
 
  Symmetric spillovers  Asymmetric spillovers 
(N,N), (C,N), and (N,C)  ELL=ELF=EFF=EFL=E  ELLœELFœEFF and EFL=0 
(CJ,N)  ELF=EFF=EFL=E and ELL=1  ELFœEFF, ELL=1 and EFL=0 
(N,CJ)  ELL=ELF=EFL=E and EFF=1  ELLœELF, EFF=1 and EFL=0 
Table 2.2. Definition of symmetric and asymmetric spillovers in the five games in the early entrance 
setting. 
 
All games are solved by backward induction. However, the solutions for the optimal 
investment levels and consequent output and profit levels of leaders and followers are   28 
rather  complex.  The  analysis  and  results  were  therefore  obtained  by  executing 
numerous  numerical  simulations.  Throughout  the  remainder  of  this  chapter, 
simulations have been conducted for the following parameter values: n=10, a=1000, 
c=100  and  W=400  but  tendencies  are  robust  for  other  parameter  values.  When 
possible, analytical solutions are presented.  
2.3. The impact of spillovers on R&D investments 
In the two stage models with simultaneous moves, competitive choices of R&D tend 
to be discouraged by larger symmetric spillovers, while cooperative choices in an 
R&D cartel tend to be stimulated by symmetric transfers (see e.g. D’Aspremont and 
Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; De Bondt, 1997). Generally, these tendencies 
appear  as  well  in  the  leader  follower  model  considered  here,  although  some 
interesting variations apply. 
 
In this section, it is useful to first have a look at the impact of asymmetric spillovers 
before moving to the analysis of the impact of symmetric spillovers. The reason is 
that a change in the symmetric spillover E boils down to an equal change in each of 
the four asymmetric spillovers.  
2.3.1. Asymmetric spillovers  
If all spillovers are different, it is possible to investigate the effect of changing one 
spillover at the time. The tendencies describing the impact of the different spillovers 
on the innovative efforts of leaders and followers are formalized in Propositions 2.1.a, 
2.1.b and 2.1.c. Note that, as has been mentioned in section 2.2, it is assumed that 
there is no spillover from the followers to the leaders when dealing with asymmetric 
spillovers.  
 
Proposition 2.1.a. Assume that, in the early entrance setting, leaders learn nothing 
from followers (EFL=0). An increase in the leader-specific spillover ELL among leaders 
will: 
-  discourage R&D of competing leaders in games (N,N), (N,C) and (N,CJ); 
-  stimulate R&D by cooperating leaders in an R&D cartel (game (C,N)); 
-  have  no  impact  on  R&D  of  cooperating  leaders  in  an  RJV  cartel  (game 
(CJ,N));   29 
-  have no impact on R&D of followers in game (CJ,N); 
-  have ambiguous effects on R&D of followers in games (N,N), (C,N), (N,C) 
and (N,CJ).   
 
Proposition 2.1.b. Assume that, in the early entrance setting, leaders learn nothing 
from  followers  (EFL=0).  An  increase  in  the  follower-specific  spillover  EFF  among 
followers will: 
-  discourage R&D of competing followers in games (N,N), (C,N) and (CJ,N); 
-  stimulate R&D by cooperating followers in an R&D cartel (game (N,C)); 
-  have no impact on R&D of cooperating followers in an RJV cartel (game 
(N,CJ)); 
-  have no impact on R&D of leaders in game (N,CJ); 
-  have ambiguous effects on R&D of leaders in games (N,N), (C,N), (N,C) and 
(CJ,N). 
 
Proposition 2.1.c. Assume that, in the early entrance setting, leaders learn nothing 
from  followers  (EFL=0).  An  increase  in  the  one-way  outgoing  spillover  ELF  from 
leaders to followers tends to:  
-  discourage R&D of leaders (in all games); 
-  have ambiguous effects on R&D of followers (in all games). 
 
The impact of the leader-specific and follower-specific spillovers is clearly in line 
with the findings of the earlier two stage models. When leaders compete in R&D, 
their investments are negatively related to ELL, which corresponds to the traditional 
appropriability or free riding effect. However, when leaders cooperate in an R&D 
cartel, they also take into account the impact of their investments on the rival firms’ 
profits. Consequently, investments of R&D cartelized leaders are increasing in the 
leader-specific  spillover.  After  all,  when  the  leader-specific  spillover  is  small,  an 
investment  of  one  leader  negatively  affects  other  leaders’  profits,  by  which  the 
investing leader in an R&D cartel will reduce its efforts. With a large leader-specific 
spillover, the reverse is true. The third and fourth claim of Proposition 2.1.a are trivial 
as  ELL  equals  1  when  leaders  form  an  RJV  cartel.  Finally,  the  impact  of  ELL  on 
followers’ R&D investments can be positive or negative, but it should be stressed that 
these changes are very small and almost negligible. An analogous logic applies to the   30 
impact of the follower-specific spillover EFF on investments of leaders and followers 
(see Proposition 2.1.b).  
 
Finally, the spillover from the leaders to the followers ELF reduces the appropriability 
of the advantages of the innovative efforts of the leaders by which their incentives are 
lowered. This tendency occurs in every game as leaders never cooperate in R&D with 
followers. This generalizes the finding that one-way spillovers from an innovator to 
an  imitator  tend  to  discourage  the  efforts  of  the  former  (as  found  by  Amir  and 
Wooders (1999)). In a simple setting with one leader and one follower, the follower is 
stimulated by such an increase in received knowledge, but the reverse tendency is also 
possible
23.  
2.3.2. Symmetric spillovers  
Keeping  in  mind  the  impact  of  the  asymmetric  spillovers,  it  is  now  easier  to 
understand the impact of a change in the symmetric spillovers on the investments of 
leaders and followers. Once again, it should be noticed that the case of symmetric 
spillovers is somewhat exceptional in the present setting. After all, with two groups of 
players, the underlying heterogeneity of leaders and followers will typically result in 
some asymmetries in the possibilities for transferring knowledge within or between 
the groups. 
 
In  this  section,  we  start  by  describing  tendencies  when  there  are  still  some 
asymmetries  in  spillovers.  Firstly,  in  Proposition  2.2,  it  is  assumed  that  ELL=EFF, 
ELF=0 and EFL=0. To continue, in Proposition 2.3, the symmetry is extended to the 
spillover from the leaders to the followers, i.e. ELL=EFF=ELF and EFL=0. Finally, the 
impact of the fully symmetric spillover is described (ELL=EFF=ELF=EFL). Gradually 
moving from full asymmetry (section 2.3.1) to full symmetry contributes to a better 
understanding of the impact of the fully symmetric spillovers.  
 
                                                 
23  Although  it  is  assumed  that  there  is  no  spillover  from  followers  to  leaders  when  considering 
asymmetric spillovers, it is useful to shortly describe the impact of EFL on R&D investments of leaders 
and followers as this information is useful when dealing with symmetric spillovers.  Followers are 
discouraged by an increase in EFL while investments of leaders can be both encouraged or discouraged 
by EFL, but these effects are again very small and can (almost) be ignored.    31 
Proposition 2.2. Assume that, in the early entrance setting, leaders learn nothing from 
followers (EFL=0), followers learn nothing from leaders (ELF=0) and E°°=ELL=EFF in 
games (N,N), (C,N) and (N,C). An increase in this symmetric group specific spillover 
E°° will: 
-  discourage  R&D  of  competing  leaders  (in  games  (N,N)  and  (N,C))  and 
competing followers (games (N,N) and (C,N)); 
-  stimulate R&D by cooperating leaders in an R&D cartel (game (C,N)); 
-  stimulate R&D by cooperating followers in an R&D cartel (game (N,C)).   
 
The propositions of the previous section make it easy to understand the tendencies 
described in Proposition 2.2. From Proposition 2.1.a, it is known that an increase in 
the leader-specific spillover ELL reduces the R&D investments of competing leaders. 
Moreover, see Proposition 2.1.b, an increase in the follower-specific spillover EFF has 
ambiguous effects on the innovative efforts of the leading firm. However, the latter 
effects are so small that the negative effect of the leader-specific spillover always 
dominates. Consequently, R&D investments of competing leaders are decreasing in 
E°°. Analogous argumentations explain the other tendencies of Proposition 2.2.  
 
Note that in proposition 2.2, tendencies of R&D investments of leaders and followers 
in games (CJ,N) and (N,CJ) are ignored. After all, in game (CJ,N) for example, it is 
known that ELL=1 and if ELF=EFL=0, only the impact of EFF on R&D investments of 
leaders is looked at, an analysis which has been described in the previous section 
2.3.1.  
 
Allowing for some more symmetry in spillovers yields more complicated tendencies, 
which are formalized in Proposition 2.3.  
 
Proposition 2.3. Assume that, in the early entrance setting, leaders learn nothing from 
followers (EFL=0) and assume E°=ELF=ELL=EFF in games (N,N), (C,N), (N,C); E°=ELF 
=EFF in game (CJ,N) and E°=ELF =ELL in game (N,CJ). An increase in this symmetric 
spillover E° will: 
-  discourage  R&D  of  competing  leaders  and  competing  followers  in  game 
(N,N);   32 
-  discourage  R&D  of  leaders  if  the  number  of  leaders  is  small  (k†n/2)  or 
stimulate  R&D  of  leaders  if  the  number  of  leaders  is  large  (k>n/2)  and 
discourage R&D of followers in game (C,N); 
-  discourage R&D of leaders and stimulate R&D by followers in game (N,C); 
-  discourage R&D of leaders and discourage or stimulate R&D by followers in 
game (CJ,N); 
-  discourage R&D of leaders and stimulate R&D by followers in game (N,CJ).  
 
The propositions of the previous section contribute again to a better understanding of 
Proposition 2.2. These tendencies are almost the same as  the  ones that appear in 
symmetric oligopolies with simultaneous choices of R&D preceding Cournot-Nash 
rivalry. For example, the investments of cooperating followers in an R&D cartel are 
positively related with the spillover. Indeed, the positive effect of an increase in EFF 
on  investments  of  followers  in  an  R&D  cartel  outweighs  or  reinforces  the  small 
positive or negative effect of the changes in ELL and ELF. 
 
However, an important difference with the two stage models occurs when leaders 
cooperate  in  an  R&D  cartel  (game  (C,N)),  as  mentioned  in  the  second  claim  of 
Proposition  2.3.  The  spillover  E°
  may  discourage  efforts  of  a  small  number  of 
cooperating leaders in an R&D cartel or encourage investments when a large number 
of leaders cooperates in an R&D cartel. From the previous section (2.3.1), it is known 
that a change in E° embodies three effects:  
-  an increase in the leader-specific spillover (ELL) that stimulates cooperating 
leaders’ efforts in an R&D cartel (see Proposition 2.1.a), 
-  an increase in the follower-specific spillover (EFF) that can have a very small 
positive or negative effect on leader’s efforts (see Proposition 2.1.b), 
-  an increase in leakage from the leaders to the followers (ELF) that discourages 
leaders’ efforts (see Proposition 2.1.c).  
 
When the number of leaders is small, the negative effect of ELF dominates the positive 
effect of ELL, yielding a negative relation with the spillover E° (the impact of the 
change in the follower-specific spillover is very small and can be ignored). In other 
words, free riding opportunities by a large group of followers frighten a small R&D 
cartel of leaders. However, when al lot of leaders cooperate in an R&D cartel, the   33 
positive effect due to the cooperation dominates the negative effect resulting from the 
free riding opportunities by the followers.  
 
Finally, the impact of the fully symmetric spillover (E=ELL=EFF=ELF=EFL) is looked at. 
The findings are summarized in Proposition 2.4.  
 
Proposition 2.4. Assume that, in the early entrance setting, leaders learn nothing from 
followers (EFL=0) and assume (E=ELL=EFF=ELF=EFL) in games (N,N), (C,N), (N,C); 
E=EFF=ELF=EFL in game (CJ,N) and (E=ELL=ELF=EFL) in game (N,CJ). An increase in 
this symmetric spillover E will always discourage R&D investments of leaders and 
followers. Only when a large number of leaders cooperates in an R&D cartel (k>n/2), 
their investments are stimulated by an increase in the symmetric spillovers.  
 
As can been observed in Proposition 2.4, leaders’ and followers’ R&D investments 
are always negatively related to the fully symmetric spillover. Even the investments 
of R&D cartelized followers can no longer be stimulated by an increase in the fully 
symmetric  spillover,  as  was  the  case  in  the  simultaneous  two  stage  games.  This 
negative relation is due to the negative impact of the spillover from the followers to 
the  leaders  (see  footnote  23)  which  always  dominates  the  positive  impact  of  the 
spillover among the cooperating followers. Also efforts of R&D cartelized leaders are 
decreasing in the fully symmetric spillover, as long as the number of leaders is not too 
large. When a lot of leaders form an R&D cartel, their investments are encouraged by 
an increase in the symmetric spillover. The reasoning is similar as for Proposition 2.3. 
It thus turns out that the impact of the symmetric spillovers on R&D investments of 
leaders and followers can be different than in the simultaneous two stage games.  
2.4. Impact of leading or following on R&D investments  
In some industries, industry leaders can maintain their leadership position for several 
decades. Intel Corporation, for example, has been the leader in the microprocessor 
industry for several decades. This persistence of leadership can often be explained by 
leaders’ large investments in R&D. In 1995, for example, Intel devoted $1,3 billion to 
R&D, corresponding to an R&D intensity
24 of approximately 8% (Segerstrom and 
                                                 
24 R&D intensity here is equal to the R&D expenditures divided by sales.    34 
Zolnierek, 1999). One explanation for these high investments could be that leaders 
may be able to improve more easily on own products than smaller firms (Segerstrom 
and Zolnierek, 1999). Malerba and Orsenigo (1999) provide further evidence on the 
intense R&D activity by market leaders. Based on EU patent data, they show that, in 
general, a significant part of total innovative activity can be attributed to some large 
and persistent innovators.    
 
However, in other industries, incumbent established firms fail to remain technological 
leaders.  A  number  of  factors  can  contribute  to  this  tendency  for  innovative 
performance  to  slow  down,  related  to  for  example  the  fear  of  cannibalization  of 
current  winning  product  lines,  the  sunk  nature  of  an  existing  technology  and  the 
inappropriate evaluation of innovative ventures (Schnaars, 1994). Failures of firms to 
remain the leader can also be the result of a shortage of financial or technological 
resources or managerial lethargy. For example, cotton-spinners just lacked financial 
and technological resources when DuPont came up with synthetic fibers in the first 
half of the 20
th century (Christensen and Bower, 1996).  
 
Economists have detected in racing and other models that the disincentives to invest 
in R&D are caused by high current profits and have called this the replacement effect 
(Arrow, 1962). Newcomers are not inhibited by this desire to protect current success 
and have strong incentives to engage in larger innovative efforts to introduce new 
products or superior imitations that hurt leaders’ profits. Empirical tendencies in some 
very large samples have detected that the lower efforts of the incumbent and the larger 
efforts of the challengers seem to prevail on average (Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004).  
 
In some markets, all of this may result in so called technological leapfrogging, which 
corresponds to the situation in which an initial technological follower has access to a 
better technology than the leader. Moreover, in the end, this may result in the follower 
surpassing the leader. This happened for example in the video game console industry 
(Schilling, 2003) and in the industry for computerized ticketing services (Schnaars, 
2004).  In  1980,  the  technological  and  market  leader  in  this  latter  industry  was 
Ticketron, which at that time had enjoyed a leadership position for a period of about 
twelve years. At that moment in time, no one (and certainly not the management of 
Ticketron)  could  imagine  that  this  hegemony  would  end  one  day.  However,   35 
Ticketmaster, after having survived financial difficulties in the late 1970s, improved 
on Ticketron’s system by heavily investing in R&D. One of the major improvements 
was the integration of the accounting function of its customers (for example concert 
halls). Ticketron was unwilling to respond to and to invest in these improvements, 
which, in combination with Ticketmaster’s large innovative efforts, resulted in the 
technological and, somewhat later, the market lead of Ticketmaster (Schnaars, 1994). 
Followers that surpass pioneers may thus engage in more intensive innovative efforts.  
 
This section contributes to a better understanding of this process of technological 
leapfrogging by shedding light on the role played by free riding opportunities in this 
process. Here, technological leapfrogging is defined as the situation in which each 
follower invests more than each leader
25. Moreover, it will be analyzed whether R&D 
cooperation  among  leaders  or  followers  enhances  or  discourages  technological 
leapfrogging. It should be noted that technological leapfrogging here does not imply 
that followers become the market leaders as the sequence of play on the market is 
determined exogenously (static character of the game
26). Nevertheless, the analysis 
here  might  provide  useful  insights  into  the  role  of  spillovers  in  the  process  of 
technological leapfrogging. The findings here, both with symmetric and asymmetric 
spillovers, are again extracted from numerical simulations. 
2.4.1. Symmetric spillovers 
With  symmetric  spillovers,  comparing  leaders’  and  followers’  efforts  yields 
Proposition 2.5. 
 
Proposition 2.5. With symmetric spillovers (E=ELL=ELF=EFF=EFL), leaders generally 
invest more than followers in the early entrance setting. Followers only invest more 
than leaders when 
-  a large number of leaders cooperate in an R&D cartel and the symmetric 
spillover is small (game (C,N)) or 
                                                 
25 Note that technological leapfrogging could also be defined as the situation in which the followers 
have lower ex post unit costs than the leaders. In other words, technological leapfrogging would then 
be equal to the situation in which the followers have larger effective knowledge stocks compared to the 
leaders. Although this is an interesting research question, the analysis here is limited to the comparison 
of leaders’ and followers’ individual efforts. After all, it is then also possible to contribute to the vast 
literature on the impact of market power (leader or follower) on innovative investments.  
26  In  chapter  3,  models  are  analyzed  in  which  an  entrant  becomes  the  market  leaders  in  case  of 
leapfrogging.    36 
-  a large number followers cooperate in an RJV cartel and the spillover is 
small (game (N,CJ)). 
 
According to Proposition 2.5, persistence of technological leadership tends to be the 
rule  when  spillovers  are  symmetric.  Proposition  2.4  may  help  to  understand  the 
observed tendencies. When both leaders and followers compete, for example, their 
investments are reduced by the spillover. However, the reduction in the investments 
of the leaders is never large enough to allow for technological leapfrogging by the 
followers.  
 
However, technological leapfrogging might sometimes take place when the spillover 
is symmetric. Firstly, when a large number of leaders cooperates in an R&D cartel 
(game (C,N)), it is known that a reduction in the symmetric spillover reduces leaders’ 
investments but stimulates followers’ R&D efforts (see Proposition 2.4). When the 
symmetric spillover is now sufficiently small, followers’ investments may exceed the 
efforts of the leaders, and technological leapfrogging takes place.  
 
Furthermore, when a large number of followers form an RJV cartel (game (N,CJ)), 
their investments can exceed leaders’ efforts when the spillover is small. Proposition 
2.4 claims that a reduction in the symmetric spillover stimulates both leaders’ and 
followers’ investments. However, due to the maximum spillover among the followers, 
leaders’ investments are smaller than the investments of the followers.  
 
Tendencies  described  in  Proposition  2.5  can  be  observed,  in  a  more  general 
interpretation of strategic investments, in industries in which competing leading firms 
are using different strategies and business models compared to smaller fringe firms. In 
the beer sector, for example, large multinational players focus on global advertising 
and intensive branding, while smaller ones rely on local specialized beer with little or 
no advertising efforts. Spillovers of goodwill and specific knowledge from one player 
to  the  other  tend  to  be  rather  low  and  thus  a  scenario  with  a  (small)  symmetric 
spillover scenario applies. However, when a lot of leaders were then to cooperate in 
an R&D cartel, followers would realize higher investments. A similar argument could 
be  made  for  industries  with  symmetric  but  high  information  flows  between  all 
players, such as  the  dredging  industry.  In this  industry, the R&D intensity (R&D   37 
expenditures divided by sales) of the four major players, being Jan De Nul Group, 
DEME,  Van  Oord  and  Royal  Boskalis  Westminster  is  around  20%  while  R&D 
intensity of smaller firm is around 10%.   
2.4.2. Asymmetric spillovers 
As  Proposition  2.6  details,  sharper  differences  are  detected  with  asymmetric 
spillovers.  However,  these  tendencies  are  somewhat complicated.  The comparison 
between leader and follower efforts is mainly driven by the magnitude of the free 
riding opportunities of the followers (the spillover from the leaders to the followers, 
ELF). Moreover, R&D cooperation also affects the comparison of leader and follower 
efforts.  
 
Proposition 2.6. In all games, leaders tend to invest more than followers when the 
spillover from the leaders to the followers is sufficiently small. However, larger free 
riding  opportunities for the followers  increase  the  likelihood  that  followers  invest 
more than leaders. The threshold value of  the  spillover from  leaders to  followers 
depends moreover heavily on the cooperative behaviour of leaders and followers.  
 
The crucial role played  by the spillover from the leaders to the followers  can  be 
understood by considering Proposition 2.1.c., in which it is stated that an increase in 
the spillover from the leaders to the followers reduces leaders’ investment incentives. 
When these free riding opportunities are too large, investments of leaders can be that 
much reduced by which followers invest more in R&D than leaders.  
 
In other words, for each game I in the early entrance setting with EFL=0, there exists, 
given the number of firms and the number of leaders and given values for ELL and EFF, 
a  critical  ELF
e[I],  which  is  called the equalizer  spillover, for  which  the  following 
applies,  with  I  indicating  the  game  being  played  ((N,N),  (C,N),  (N,C),  (CJ,N), 
(N,CJ)): 
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In Tables 2.3a, 2.3b and 2.3a, some numerical examples of the equalizer spillover 
ELF
e[I] are provided. Note that when ELF
e>1, the investments of the leaders are always 
higher than the investments of the followers. Analogously, when ELF
e<0, the followers 
always invest more than the leaders
27.  
 
It is best to first have a look at the game with competing leaders and competing 
followers  (game  (N,N)).  The  numerical  simulations  of  the  level  of  the  equalizer 
spillover  indicate that,  when  there is  a  small  leader-specific  spillover,  leaders  are 
likely to invest more than followers (game (N,N)). However, when the leaders face 
both a high leader-specific spillover and a high outgoing spillover to the followers, 
leaders may be that much discouraged to invest in R&D (as there is both free riding 
by the other leaders and by the followers), by which the followers may end up with 
the largest R&D efforts.  
 
Managing  spillovers  can  be  a  first  tool  for  leaders  to  discourage  technological 
leapfrogging. Leaders could try to minimize the outgoing spillover to the followers in 
order to avoid technological leapfrogging by the followers. One obvious way to lower 
the outgoing spillover is the retention of R&D employees (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 
2003). Furthermore, managers could also enforce rules that restrict the transfer of 
knowledge to only a specified set of employees. Other rules could restrict physical 
access by employees or visitors to certain locations of the firm, such as laboratories. 
The decreasing impact of these rules on the outgoing spillover depends of course on 
management’s capabilities to monitor employees’ compliance (Liebeskind, 1997).  
 
On the other hand, followers can stimulate the process of technological leapfrogging 
by maximizing the spillover from the leader to the followers. Therefore, followers 
could improve their learning capabilities and absorptive capacities by for example 
investing in basic research (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Adams, 2000; Cassiman et 
al., 2002). In addition, followers could also actively search for R&D employees of the 
leading firms. For example, when German investment banks (the followers) moved to 
London  in  order  to  establish  a  stronger  position  in  the  sector,  they  were  looking 
                                                 
27  It  should  be  noticed  here  that  the  assumed  ex  ante  asymmetry  plays  an  important  role  here. 
Preliminary results indicate that the equalizer spillover increases when leaders have lower ex ante unit 
costs than the followers by which technological leapfrogging is less likely to occur.      39 
aggressively to hire employees from local competitors (the leaders). The following 
citation illustrates this:  
 
“Last  year  [1996],  Deutsche  Morgan  Grenfell  (DMG),  the  fast-expanding 
investment-banking arm of Germany's Deutsche Bank, tormented rivals with 
raids on their most precious employees, occasionally nabbing whole teams of 
bankers at a time.“ (The Economist, 1997). 
 
A second tool for firms to manage the likelihood of technological leapfrogging is 
R&D cooperation. However, a careful use of this instrument is recommended. By 
cooperating in an R&D cartel, the leaders can only increase the equalizer spillover 
when there is a large spillover among the leaders. Indeed, when ELL=1, the equalizer 
spillover increases when leaders move from R&D competition (Table 2.3a) to R&D 
cartelization (Table 2.3b). The reason is that R&D cartelized leaders invest more than 
R&D competing leaders when there is a large leader-specific spillover (see section 
2.5). It should be clear that an RJV cartel among leaders is thus always effective in 
reducing the likelihood of leapfrogging, as the spillover among the leaders is then 
equal to 1.   
 
Followers, however, may also use R&D cooperation when they try to catch up with 
the leaders. When comparing the equalizer spillovers in Tables 2.3a and 2.3c, we 
observe that technological leapfrogging is more likely when followers, who face a 
high  follower-specific  spillover,  are  cooperating  in  an  R&D  cartel  instead  of 
competing in the R&D stage. After all, a sufficiently high spillover among followers 
enhances their efforts (see section 2.5), by which the equalizer spillover is reduced. 
Finally, forming an RJV cartel always lowers the equalizer spillover, as the follower-




In conclusion, it thus turns out that there is a wide set of circumstances in which 
followers  invest  more  in  innovative  activities  than  leaders.  The  likelihood  of 
                                                 
28 When both leaders and followers would form an R&D cartel, it can be expected that the equalizer 
spillover would increase when ELL=1 and EFF=0. Analogously, the equalizer spillover is expected to 
decrease when ELL=0 and EFF=1. However, when ELL=0 and EFF=0 (or ELL=1 and EFF=1), it is a priori 
hard to predict whether the equalizer spillover would decrease or increase.    40 
technological leapfrogging is positively related to the spillover from the leaders to the 
followers. In other words, the larger the free riding opportunities are, the more likely 
it is that followers catch up technologically with the leaders. It has also been indicated 
that R&D cooperation among leaders (followers) may enhance (reduce) leapfrogging 
opportunities.  Another  obvious  instrument  for  leaders  to  discourage  technological 
leapfrogging is to better protect knowledge. On the contrary, followers can stimulate 
technological leapfrogging by maximizing the incoming spillover from the leaders.   
 
If there is only one leader and one follower and blue print copying (ELF=1), the model 
predicts that the follower may invest more than the leader. This tendency is consistent 
with  the  familiar  case  of  an  imitator  surpassing  a  pioneer.  In  the  pharmaceutical 
industry,  for  example,  blue  print  copying  could  correspond  to  one  firm  having  a 
patent on a new drug. The patent may give all the information about the chemical 
avenues to pursue and inventing around may be stimulated. In 1954, Hoffman-La 
Roche knew that a competitor had a pill to calm down agitated people. It went on to 
order extensive  pharmaceutical testing  that culminated  in Librium in  1960 and in 
Valium in 1963 (The Economist, 2005).  
 
EFF  EFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  ELF
e>1  ELF
e>1  0  ELF
e>1  ELF
e>1   




ELL  1  ELF
e=0.058  ELF
e=0.178 
Table 2.3a. Numerical examples (early entrance setting) for the equalizer spillover ELF
e in the game 
with R&D competition among leaders and R&D competition among followers (game (N,N)). Leaders 




Table 2.3b. Numerical examples (early entrance setting) for the equalizer spillover ELF
e in the game 
with R&D cartelization among leaders and R&D competition among followers (game (C,N)). In the 
grey cells, the equalizer spillover values for the game with RJV cartelization among leaders and R&D 
competition among followers (game (CJ,N)) are indicated (ELL=1). Leaders invest more (less) than 




EFF  EFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  ELF
e=0.382  ELF
e=0.428  0  ELF
e=0.007  ELF
e=0.033   




ELL  1  ELF
e=0.966  ELF
e=0.988   41 
Table 2.3c. Numerical examples (early entrance setting) for the equalizer spillover ELF
e in the game 
with R&D competition among leaders and R&D cartelization among followers (game (N,C)). In the 
grey cells, the equalizer spillover values for the game with R&D competition among leaders and RJV 
cartelization among followers (game (N,CJ)) are indicated (EFF=1). Leaders invest more (less) than 
followers if and only if ELF<ELF
e (ELF>ELF
e). 
2.5. Impact of cooperation on R&D investments 
In  this  section,  competitive  and  cooperative  R&D  investments  of  leaders  and 
followers are compared. First, symmetric spillovers are dealt with, followed by the 
analysis with asymmetric spillovers.   
2.5.1. Symmetric spillovers 
With  symmetric  spillovers, comparing  R&D  investments  of  leaders  and  followers 
under the different modes of R&D behaviour (R&D competition, R&D cartelization 
and RJV cartelization) yields Proposition 2.7.  
 
Proposition  2.7.  With  symmetric  spillovers  in  the  early  entrance  setting,  the 
following applies to the R&D investments of the leaders and the followers:  
-  Leaders always invest most when they form an RJV cartel. When leaders 
cooperate in an R&D cartel, their investments are larger than with R&D 
competition if and only if the symmetric spillover exceeds a critical value 










-  Followers  always  invest  most  when  they  form  an  RJV  cartel.  When 
followers cooperate in an R&D cartel, their investments are larger than with 
R&D competition if and only if the symmetric spillover exceeds a critical 
value
FC β , with 
1
2
FC β = .  
 
The  impact  of  R&D  cooperation  on  the  investments  of  leaders  and  followers  is 
analogous to the simultaneous two stage models. R&D cartelization is beneficial for 
the technological progress of leaders or followers when the symmetric spillover is 
EFF  EFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  ELF
e>1  ELF
e<0  0  ELF
e>1  ELF
e=0.205   




ELL  1  ELF
e=0.183  ELF
e<0   42 
sufficiently large. Remark that the critical spillover for the leaders is not the same as 
for the followers. The former, labelled
29 E
LC, depends on the number of leaders and 
followers and differs from the critical spillover that was found in the two stage games 
with simultaneous moves and homogeneous products. Moreover, this critical spillover 
E
LC is decreasing in the number of leaders and when all firms are leading (n=k), E
LC 
equals ½. After all, this specific scenario reduces the four stage setting to the two 
stage setting with simultaneous moves, by which the same critical spillover level of ½ 
is found (as in De Bondt et al., 1992).   
 
In  line  with  the  two  stage  models  with  simultaneous  moves,  the  comparison  of 
competitive  and  cooperative  investments  can  be  explained  by  the  presence  of 
externalities (see De Bondt and Veugelers, 1991). When leaders compete in R&D and 
the symmetric spillover is smaller (larger) than E
LC, the R&D investment of a certain 
leader causes  a negative (positive)  externality  on  the  other leaders. Consequently, 
when E<E
LC (E>E
LC), the investing leader has an incentive to overinvest (underinvest). 
When  leaders  cooperate  in  an  R&D  cartel,  these  externalities  are  internalized  by 
which cooperative investments of leaders in an R&D cartel are lower than competitive 
R&D investments when the spillover is smaller than E
LC and cooperative investments 
in an R&D cartel exceed competitive investments when the spillover is larger than 
E
LC. When leaders cooperate in an RJV cartel, their R&D investments are always 
higher  compared  to  R&D  competition  due  to  the  maximum  spillover  among  the 
leaders.  An  analogous  reasoning  applies  to  the  comparison  of  investments  of 
competing versus cooperating followers.  
 
Thus, when leaders or followers want to increase their R&D activities in their quest 
for low unit costs, R&D cartelization might be an efficient instrument, provided that 
the spillover is sufficiently large. Furthermore, Proposition 2.7 also indicates that an 
RJV cartel always yields higher R&D investments compared to R&D competition. 
This latter tendency suggests that, no matter what the initial spillover level is, leaders 
(followers) can always improve their technological position by cooperating in an RJV 
                                                 
29 E
LC stands for the critical (C) symmetric spillover for which investments of leaders (L) are the same 
with R&D competition and R&D cartelization. E
FC stands for the critical (C) symmetric spillover for 
which investments of followers (F) are the same with R&D competition and R&D cartelization.   43 
cartel  because  of  the  perfect  knowledge  sharing  among  cooperating  leaders 
(followers) in an RJV cartel.  
 
However, some caution is called for here as it is assumed in this study that in an RJV 
cartel, knowledge is shared to a maximum degree. But, while it is indeed reasonable 
to assume that firms may sometimes fully share their R&D knowledge (for example 
through licensing for free), there are several reasons why information sharing may not 
be perfect  in RJV cartels. De Bondt and Wu (1997), for example, argue that the 
increase in information sharing among cooperating firms may be imperfect due to 
technical difficulties or differences in organizational culture. It could also be the case 
that R&D cooperating firms are reluctant to contribute their best R&D personnel to 
the RJV cartel because they do not want to restrict possibilities for growth in related 
areas (Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Bhattacharya et al., 1992) 
2.5.2. Asymmetric spillovers 
With asymmetric spillovers, the comparisons of competitive and cooperative R&D 




Proposition 2.8. Assume that, in the early entrance setting, spillovers are asymmetric 
and suppose leaders learn nothing from followers (EFL=0). Then the following applies 
to the R&D investments of leaders and followers:  
-  Leaders always invest most when they form an RJV cartel. When leaders 
cooperate in an R&D cartel, their investments are larger than with R&D 
competition  if  and  only  if  the  leader-specific  spillover  exceeds  a  critical 
value
C
LL β . 
-  Followers  always  invest  most  when  they  form  an  RJV  cartel.  When 
followers cooperate in an R&D cartel, their investments are larger than with 
R&D competition if and only if the follower-specific spillover exceeds a 
critical value
C
FF β . 
                                                 
30 ELL
C stands for the critical (C) leader-specific spillover for which investments of leaders are the same 
with  R&D  competition  and  R&D  cartelization.  EFF
C  stands  for  the  critical  (C)  follower-specific 
spillover  for  which  investments  of  followers  are  the  same  with  R&D  competition  and  R&D 
cartelization.   44 
 
Tendencies are again similar to the simultaneous two stage games and also to the 
leader follower  setting with  symmetric  spillovers.  The expressions for  the  critical 
spillovers, however, are now rather complicated functions of the other parameters of 
the  model.  The  critical  spillover  levels  for  the  leaders  (
C




31 depend on the number of leaders and followers, but
C
LL β is also dependent on 
the spillover from leaders to followers and the follower-specific spillover. In order to 
give the reader some feeling about the level of these critical spillovers, Tables 2.4a 
and  2.4b  provide  some  numerical  examples  of
C
LL β ,  given  values  for  the  other 
parameters of the model.  
 
EFF  EFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  ELL
C =0.499  ELL
C =0.494  0  ELL
C =0.499  ELL
C =0.495   
ELF  1  ELL
C =0.944  ELL
C =0.945 
 
ELF  1  ELL
C =0.917  ELL
C =0.917 
Table 2.4a. Numerical examples of the critical leader-specific spillover ELL
C. R&D cooperation among 





ELL  ELL  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  EFF
C =0.05  EFF
C =0.05  0  EFF
C =0.0313  EFF
C =0.0313   
ELF  1  EFF




C =0.0313  EFF
C =0.0313 
Table  2.4b.  Numerical  examples  of  the  critical  follower-specific  spillover  EFF
C.  R&D  cooperation 
among  followers  in  an  R&D  cartel  results  in  higher  (lower)  investments,  compared  to  R&D 




As  can  be  derived  from  Table  2.4a,  the  critical  leader-specific  spillover  ELL
C  is 
(slightly) increasing in the number of leaders k when there is idea diffusion from 
leaders to followers ( 0 C k LL β ∂ ∂ > for ELF=0) and decreasing in the number of leaders in 
case of blue print copying from leaders to followers ( 0 C k LL β ∂ ∂ <  for ELF=1). Taking 
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these tendencies into account and carefully analyzing the numerical simulations allow 
stating the first part of Proposition 2.9.  
 
As can be seen in Table 2.4b, the values of the critical follower-specific spillover EFF
C 
are very small. Consequently, R&D cartelization among followers is almost always 
yielding  higher  R&D  investments  than  R&D  competition.  Only  when  there  is  no 
knowledge sharing at all among the followers (EFF=0), R&D competition results in 
higher investments compared to R&D cartelization among followers. This tendency is 
formalized in the second part of Proposition 2.9. Moreover, differentiating reveals that 
sign [ C k FF β ∂ ∂ ]=sign [ ( ) 2 1 k n − + ].  
 
Proposition  2.9.  Consider  the  early  entrance  setting  with  asymmetric  spillovers 
(EFL=0), then:  
-  R&D  cartelization  among  leaders  is  most  likely  to  result  in  higher  R&D 
investments compared to R&D competition when there are only limited free 
riding  opportunities  by  the  followers  (idea  diffusion  or  ELF=0).  When  the 
spillovers from leaders to followers is very large (blue print diffusion or ELF=1), 
only an RJV cartel among the leaders might result in larger efforts compared to 
R&D competition. 
-  R&D  cartelization  among  followers  always  results  in  higher  investments 
compared to R&D competition, except for very small values of EFF. 
 
Thus, the larger the followers’ free riding opportunities on the investments of the 
leaders are, the less likely it is that R&D cartelization of leaders is beneficial for the 
technological  progress  of  the  leaders.  When  facing  high  spillovers  to  followers, 
leaders can only improve on their technological position when they form an RJV 
cartel. 
 
Once  again,  externalities  are  the  rationale  for  these  results.  When  there  is  R&D 
competition  among  leaders  and  values  of  ELL  are  small  (large),  i.e.  ELL<ELL
C 
(ELL>ELL
C), investments of one leader create a negative (positive) externality on the 
other  leaders,  by  which  overinvestment  (underinvestment)  occurs.  With  R&D   46 
cartelization,  the  internalization  of  the  externalities  leads  to  Proposition  2.8.  An 
analogous reasoning applies to the followers.  
2.6. Impact of cooperation on profitability 
R&D cartelization of leaders in game (C,N) or of followers in game (N,C) always 
result in an increase of profits of the cooperating players, compared to their profits 




When  the  symmetric  spillover  is  smaller  than  E
LC,  we  know  that  leaders’  R&D 
investments are higher with R&D competition than with R&D cartelization, by which 
R&D competitive output of leaders also exceeds R&D cartelized output (the larger the 
cost-reductions are, the more beneficial it is for firms to expand output). However, the 
resulting increase in R&D competitive output is offset by the larger R&D investments 
with R&D competition compared to R&D cartelization, by which leaders’ profits are 
higher when they form an R&D cartel than when they compete in R&D. With a large 
symmetric spillover, i.e. above the critical value E
LC, R&D investments of leaders are 
higher  with  R&D  cartelization  than  with  R&D  competition.  The  resulting  higher 
R&D  cooperative  output  compensates for  the  larger  R&D  investments,  and  R&D 
cartelized  profits  are  thus  higher  than  with  R&D  competition.  Finally,  when  the 
symmetric  spillover  equals  E
LC,  leaders’  profits  remain  unchanged.  The 
straightforward reason is that for this spillover level, leaders’ innovative efforts in an 
R&D cartel are unchanged compared to R&D competition.  
 
Moreover, when leaders form an RJV cartel (game (CJ,N)), their profits are always 
higher than with R&D cartelization or R&D competition. Note that, by definition, 
R&D  cartelized  profits  equal  RJV  cartelized  profits  when  E=1  with  symmetric 
spillovers.  
 
Analogous  reasonings  apply  to  the  impact  of  R&D  cooperation  with  symmetric 
spillovers on followers’ profits and with asymmetric spillovers on the profitability of 
                                                 
32 Note that  [ ] [ ] ( ) [ ] ( )
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π φ φ φ = −  with I indicating the game 
being played.    47 
leaders  and followers.  Moreover,  similar results have been obtained  in symmetric 
simultaneous models where profits are always higher with R&D cartelization than 
with  R&D  competition  and  unaffected  by  R&D  cartelization  if  and  only  if  the 
symmetric  spillover  equals  ½  (assuming  homogeneous  products).  The  same 
tendencies are thus present in the sequential early entrance setting considered in this 
chapter, both with symmetric and asymmetric spillovers.  
 
The result that R&D cartelization (and hence RJV cartelization) is raising the profits 
of cooperating firms is not that surprising. After all, due to the coordination of R&D 
strategies  in  an  R&D  cartel,  competition  is  softened  by  which  profits  are  higher 
compared to R&D competition. Consequently, it would thus always be in the interest 
of leaders (followers) to cooperate in R&D.  
 
However, R&D cooperation also entails some costs and risks which are not taken into 
account in the model of this study. Firstly, start-up investments of R&D cooperatives 
can be quite significant. These start-up costs might involve investments in physical 
assets, such as an R&D laboratory, and negotiation costs (Pisano, 1990; Brockhoff, 
1992). Furthermore, the daily managing of the R&D cartel or RJV cartel may give 
rise to coordination costs, agency costs and costs of monitoring the partner by which 
R&D cooperative profits are further reduced (Veugelers,  1997; Becker  and Dietz, 
2004). Due to these additional costs, cooperation in R&D can fail or simply not take 
place.  
2.7. Implications for welfare 
In this section, the social desirability of R&D cooperation of leaders or followers in 
the early entrance setting is analyzed. Therefore, social welfare (SW), defined as the 
sum of consumer surplus
33 (CS) and producer surplus (PS)
 34, is ranked across the five 
games,  for  both  spillover  symmetry  and  spillover  asymmetry.  These  rankings  are 
limited  to  some  polar  cases.  More  specifically,  with  symmetric  spillovers,  two 
scenarios are analyzed, i.e. no information sharing (E=0) and full information sharing 
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(E=1). For asymmetric spillovers, it is assumed that there is no information sharing 
between leaders and between followers (ELL=0 and EFF=0), except for the case in 
which  leaders  or  followers  form  an  RJV  cartel.  In  the  description  of  the  main 
tendencies, the focus of the analysis is restricted to only welfare.  
 
Firstly, tendencies of welfare and consumer surplus are, just like in the simultaneous 
two stage models, (nearly always) the same, by which describing the tendencies of 
only welfare suffices. Moreover,  it  may  not be that interesting to dwell upon the 
ranking of producer surplus. After all, leaders and followers are only concerned about 
their own profits and not about total producer surplus. Consequently, producer surplus 
will not always be maximized by firms. For example, when there is no information 
sharing with symmetric spillovers (E=0), producer surplus is the highest when leaders 
cooperate in an R&D cartel, but leaders’ private incentives are to cooperate in an RJV 
cartel. It is important to notice that side payments, which are not allowed for in the 
model here, could change this line of reasoning. After all, when side payments would 
be feasible, leading firms could opt for the R&D cartel when this would result in the 
highest producer surplus. In that case, the side payments from the followers to the 
leaders should compensate the latter sufficiently for their lower profits in an R&D 
cartel compared to an RJV cartel. However, this discussion is beyond the scope of this 
study. A further reason to limit the analysis to welfare is that the main ambition of this 
section is to analyze the desirability of R&D cooperation from the society’s point of 
view and not from the viewpoint of individual firms when we aim to derive policy 
implications.  
 
Note furthermore that the impact of R&D cooperation on welfare depends on the 
same critical spillovers as the ones driving the impact of R&D cooperation on the 
R&D  investments,  see  Proposition  2.7  and  2.8.  For  example,  R&D  cartelization 
among leaders results in higher welfare if and only if E>E
LC for symmetric spillovers 
or  ELL>ELL
C  for  asymmetric  spillovers.  Note  that  with  RJV  cartelization  among 
leaders,  the  spillover  always  exceeds  its  critical  value,  by  which  welfare  is  thus 
always  higher  with  RJV  cartelization  than  with  R&D  competition.  Analogous 
tendencies apply to the impact of R&D cooperation among followers on welfare.    49 
2.7.1. Symmetric spillovers 
Two spillover scenarios are considered here, namely no information sharing (E=0) 
and full information sharing (E=1)
35. The complete ranking is provided in Table 2.5. 
Proposition  2.10  summarizes  the  main  tendencies.  With  symmetric  spillovers,  the 
number of leaders is important to determine which game yields the highest welfare.  
 
Proposition 2.10. In the early entrance setting with symmetric spillovers, the number 
of leaders determines which game yields the highest welfare.   
•  When  the  number  of  leaders  is  small,  society  is  best  off  when  followers 
cooperate in an RJV cartel.  
•  When there is an intermediate to high number of leaders, society is best off 
when leaders cooperate in an RJV cartel.  
 
From Proposition 2.10, it is clear that, for symmetric spillovers, society is always 
better off when leaders or followers form an RJV cartel. Moreover, whether it should 
be the leaders or the followers who should cooperate in R&D hinges critically on the 
market structure, i.e. the number of leaders and followers. When there are only a few 
leaders, welfare is highest when followers cooperate in an RJV cartel. But, on the 
contrary, in case there are a lot of leaders, it is better to let the first movers form an 
RJV cartel. Thus, in short, governments should motivate the larger groups of players 
to cooperate in R&D.  
 
These tendencies originate from the impact of RJV cartelization on the level of R&D 
investments.  Remember  from  section  2.5.1  that  RJV  cartelization  among  leaders 
(followers) always results in larger innovative efforts of leaders (followers) compared 
to R&D competition, by which output increases and the equilibrium price decreases, 
which is advantageous for consumers and society as a whole.  
 
When the number of leaders is small, the increase in total R&D investments turns out 
to be higher with an RJV cartel among followers than with an RJV cartel among 
                                                 
35 When spillovers are symmetric, it is  obvious that with full information sharing, an  R&D cartel 
among leaders (followers) and an RJV cartel among leaders (followers) yield the same CS, PS and SW.    50 
leaders. For a large number of leaders, the opposite is true, thus there is a larger 
increase in total R&D investments with an RJV cartel among leaders.  
 
It  is  again  not  appropriate  to  give  too  much  weight  to  the  benchmark  case  of 
symmetric  spillovers.  However,  it  is  interesting  to  observe  the  possibility  that 
consumers and society may be better off when followers cooperate in an RJV cartel in 
case there are only a few leaders. The question then is whether similar tendencies 
apply with asymmetries. In the next section, some findings on welfare implications 
with asymmetric spillovers are summarized.  
2.7.2. Asymmetric spillovers 
With asymmetric spillovers, the focus is again on some polar cases. More specifically, 
it is assumed that there are no within group spillovers. Only, by definition, with RJV 
cartelization, the spillover between the cooperating firms equals 1. Thus, ELL=0 and 
EFF=0 in games (N,N), (C,N) and (N,C); ELL=1 and EFF=0 in game (CJ,N); and ELL=0 
and EFF=1 in game (N,CJ). In Table 2.6, it is summarized which game results in the 
highest CS, PS and SW.  
 
The tendencies of welfare with asymmetric spillovers are more or less in line with the 
findings with symmetric spillovers, as can be observed in Proposition 2.11.  
 
Proposition  2.11.  In  the  early  entrance  setting  with  asymmetric  spillovers,  the 
number of leaders and the spillover from leaders to followers determine which game 
yields the highest welfare.   
•  With a small number of leaders, society is best off when followers cooperate 
in an RJV cartel.  
•  With an intermediate number of leaders, society is best off with an RJV cartel 
of leaders when there is idea diffusion from leaders to followers (ELF=0) and 
with an RJV cartel of followers when there is blue print copying from leader 
to followers (ELF=1). 
•  With a large number of leaders, society is best off when leaders cooperate in 
an RJV cartel. 
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E=0  CSN,CJ>CSCJ,N>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWCJ,N>SWN,C>SWN,N>SWC,N  Small k 
E=1  CSN,CJ=CSN,C>CSCJ,N=CSC,N>CSN,N  PSN,CJ=PSN,C>PSCJ,N=PSC,N>PSN,N  SWN,CJ=SWN,C>SWCJ,N>SWC,N>SWN,N 
E=0  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWC,N  Intermediate 
or high k 
E=1  CSCJ,N=CSC,N>CSN,CJ=CSN,C>CSN,N  PSCJ,N=PSC,N>PSN,CJ=PSN,C>PSN,N  SWCJ,N=SWC,N>SWN,CJ=SWN,C>SWN,N 
Table 2.5. Ranking of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and welfare (SW) in the early entrance setting with symmetric spillovers. 
 
 
ELF=0  CSN,CJ>CSCJ,N>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWCJ,N>SWN,C>SWN,N>SWC,N  Small k 
ELF=1  CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSCJ,N>CSC,N  PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSC,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWN,C>SWN,N>SWCJ,N>SWC,N 
ELF=0  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,C>SWN,N>SWC,N  Intermediate k 
ELF=1  CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSCJ,N>CSC,N  PSCJ,N>PSC,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWN,C>SWN,N>SWCJ,N>SWC,N 
ELF=0  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,C>SWN,N>SWC,N  High k 
ELF=1  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSCJ,N>PSC,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,C>SWN,N>SWC,N 
Table 2.6. Ranking of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and welfare (SW) in the early entrance setting with asymmetric spillovers with ELL=0 and EFF=0 in 
games (N,N), (C,N) and (N,C.); ELL=1 and EFF=0 in game (CJ,N) and ELL=0 and EFF=1 in game (N,CJ).   52 
The level of R&D investments lies again at the heart of these tendencies. With a small 
number of leaders, the increase in total R&D investments appears to be higher with an 
RJV  cartel  among  followers  than  with  an  RJV  cartel  among  leaders. For  a  large 
number of leaders, the opposite is true.  
 
With an intermediate number of leaders, tendencies are a bit more complicated. When 
there is idea diffusion from leaders to followers (ELF=0), the increase in total R&D 
investments is the highest when leaders form an RJV cartel, compared to game (N,N). 
But, when there is blue print copying to followers (ELF=1), an RJV cartel among 
followers results in higher total R&D investments compared to an RJV cartel among 
leaders as the investments of the latter are reduced by to the free riding opportunities 
by the followers. 
2.7.3. Policy implications 
Although  the  analysis  concerning  the  social  desirability  of  R&D  cooperation  of 
leaders and followers has only focused on some polar spillover cases, the findings can 
be used to point to some implications for policy guidelines.  
 
When there are only a few leaders, by which the industry is more or less concentrated, 
policy makers should encourage the following (smaller) firms to cooperate in R&D. 
Moreover, the R&D cooperating followers should also be motivated to increase their 
knowledge sharing, for example by cross-license agreements, meetings, exchanging 
R&D personnel etc.  
 
Encouraging  RJV  cartelization  of  followers  will  also  enhance  technological 
leapfrogging.  Indeed,  from  section  2.4.2,  we  know  that  RJV  cartelization  among 
second movers makes technological leapfrogging more likely. Note furthermore that 
followers benefit from forming an RJV cartel as they realize higher profits when they 
cooperate in R&D than when they compete in R&D.  
 
Another advantage for policy makers, when encouraging only followers to cooperate, 
in R&D relates to the possible extension of R&D cooperation to collusion on the 
output market. After all, it is known that R&D cooperation makes it more likely that 
firms  collude  on  the  product  market,  thereby  reducing  welfare  (Martin,  1995).   53 
However, these welfare diminishing effects of collusion on the output market tend to 
be  smaller  when  the  R&D  cooperating  firms  have  less  market  power.  From  that 
perspective,  it  could  thus  be  in  the  interest  of  governments  to  restrict  R&D 
cooperation to only small firms (followers). However, it might sometimes be difficult 
for policy makers do distinguish between small and large firms. An indication of the 
market power of firms might be provided by their market shares (see also Motta, 
2004).  
2.8. Late entrance setting 
A related but slightly different setting is the late entrance setting. This setting also 
consists of four stages, but their sequence differs from the early entrance setting, as 
has been detailed in section 2.2. After the investments of the market leaders in stage 
one,  the  leaders  decide  on  their  optimal  output  quantities  in  stage  two.  Market 
followers  invest  in  R&D  (stage  three)  after  leaders’  commitments  to  quantities. 
Finally, in stage four,  the followers choose their output quantities. This  setting is 
called, somewhat loosely, the late entrance setting.  
 
Note that this setting could also represent the scenario in which innovative market 
leaders  expect  and  encourage  entry.  A  nice  illustration  stems  from  the  copying 
machine industry in the 1960s. When Xerox was granted a patent on the electrofax 
copying  process  (an  electrostatic  copying  technique  using  special  coated  paper), 
Xerox did not restrict entry. On the contrary, Xerox encouraged entry by licensing its 
technology to other (following) firms but Xerox has been able to benefit from moving 
first as Xerox controlled approximately 60% of the market at the end of the 1960s 
(Blackstone, 1968).   
 
The aim of this section is to analyze whether the detected tendencies of the early 
entrance setting remain valid in the late entrance setting. Therefore, the same five 
games as in Table 2.1 are looked at. To indicate the difference in spillovers between 
the early and late entrance setting, the spillovers are here labelled by the symbol G. Ex 
post unit costs and profit functions are given by equations (2.2), (2.3), (2.5) and (2.6) 
in which the symbol E needs to be replaced by G. Figure 2.2 provides a graphical 
illustration of the late entrance setting and the different spillovers.  
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Figure 2.2.  The  late entrance setting for k=2 and  n=5. Extension to the  general case of 1†k<n is 
obvious. The spillover from followers to leaders GFL is set equal to zero, except in the benchmark case 
of symmetric spillovers. 
 
The  same  four  groups  of  spillovers  are  considered.  For  completeness,  Table  2.7 
defines  symmetric  and  asymmetric  spillovers.  As  can  be  observed  in  Figure  2.2, 
spillovers from followers to leaders are again considered. However, the introduction 
of this spillover could be questioned, as the output stage of the leaders is ahead of the 
R&D investment stage of the followers. There are however two reasons to take the 
spillover from followers to leaders into account. Firstly, it is useful to do so as it is 
then  easier  to  compare  tendencies  with  the  early  entrance  setting.  Secondly,  this 
assumption  of  a  positive  spillover  from  followers  to  leaders  can  be  justified  by 
assuming that the decisions on  investment and output levels (of  both leaders  and 
followers) are credible commitments but that the actual conduct of the game takes 
place at once. Then, bi-directional spillovers between the group of leaders and the 
group of followers are possible.  
 
  Symmetric Spillovers  Asymmetric Spillovers 
(N,N), (C,N), and (N,C)  GLL=GLF=GFF=GFL=G  GLLœGLFœGFF and GFL=0 
(CJ,N)  GLF=GFF=GFL=G and GLL=1  GLFœGFF, GLL=1 and GFL=0 
(N,CJ)  GLL=GLF=GFL=G and GFF=1  GLLœGLF, GFF=1 and GFL=0 
Table 2.7. Definition of symmetric and asymmetric spillovers in the five games in the late entrance 
setting.  
2.8.1. Impact of spillovers 
In  the  late  entrance  setting,  the  impact  of  asymmetric  spillovers  on  R&D 
investments of leaders and followers is exactly the same as in the early entrance 
setting. With spillover symmetry, however, some minor differences with the early 
entrance setting can occur but, in general, the impact of symmetric spillovers is 
similar.  
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Indeed, just  like in the early  entrance  setting, R&D  investments of leaders  and 
followers are in  general discouraged  by an  increase in  the  symmetric  spillover. 
However, there are two exceptions. Firstly, R&D investments of R&D cartelized 
leaders are increasing when there are a lot of leaders (k>n/2), which was also the 
case in the early entrance setting. But now, moreover, followers’ R&D investments 
always increase in the symmetric spillover when they form an R&D cartel. The 
latter tendency is different from the early entrance setting.   
2.8.2. Impact of leading or following 
Comparing  strategic  investments  of  leaders  and  followers  in  the  late  entrance 
setting yields more or less similar results as in the early entrance setting.  
 
With  symmetric  spillovers,  the  comparison  of  leader  and  follower  efforts  is 
however slightly different and a bit more complicated than in the early entrance 
setting. The leaders, in general, invest more than the followers but larger efforts of 
the followers are also possible in a limited number of scenarios. First of all, just like 
in the early entrance setting, a few second movers tend to invest more then a large 
number of R&D cartelized first movers when the spillover is small (game (C,N)). 
Moreover, when both leaders and followers compete in R&D (game (N,N)), the 
followers invest more than the leaders when the number of leaders is high and the 
spillover is large. To continue, in games with competing leaders and R&D or RJV 
cartelized followers (games (N,C) and (N,CJ)), R&D investments of cooperating 
followers are higher than the investments of the leaders when the spillover is large. 
Finally, when leaders form an RJV cartel, In game (CJ,N), the leaders always invest 
more than the followers.  
 
With  asymmetric  spillovers,  it  is  assumed  that  there  is  no  spillover  from  the 
followers  to  the  leaders  (GFL=0).  The  comparison  of  leader  and  follower  R&D 
efforts is then again driven by the level of free riding opportunities of followers on 
leaders’  innovative  investments.  In  Tables  2.8a,  2.8b  and  2.8c,  some  numerical 
examples of the equalizer spillover in the late entrance setting (
e
LF δ ) are provided.   
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These simulations indicate that R&D competing followers tend to invest more than 
R&D competing leaders when there is blue print copying from leaders to followers 
and  among  leaders  (GLF=GLL=1)  and  competing  followers  face  a  low  internal 
spillover (game (N,N)).  
 
Just like with early entrance, RJV cartelization among leaders might again be an 
appropriate tool for leaders to decrease the likelihood of technological leapfrogging 
by  followers.  For  followers,  RJV  cartelization  only  turns  out  to  be  efficient  in 
stimulating technological leapfrogging when there is a high spillover among the 
leaders. Thus again, R&D cooperation can be considered to be a tool for leaders and 
followers to discourage or stimulate technological leapfrogging.  
GFF  GFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  GLF
e>1  GLF
e>1  0  GLF
e>1  GLF
e>1   







Table 2.8a. Numerical examples (late entrance setting) for the equalizer spillover GLF
e in the game with 
R&D competition among leaders and R&D competition among followers (game (N,N)). Leaders invest 




Table 2.8b. Numerical examples (late entrance setting) for the equalizer spillover GLF
e in the game with 
R&D cartelization among leaders and R&D competition among followers (game (C,N)). In the grey 
cells, the equalizer  spillover  values for the  game with RJV cartelization among leaders and R&D 
competition among followers (game (CJ,N)) are indicated (GLL=1). Leaders invest more (less) than 




Table 2.8c. Numerical examples (late entrance setting) for the equalizer spillover GLF
e in the game with 
R&D competition among leaders and R&D cartelization among followers (game (N,C)). In the grey 
cells,  the equalizer  spillover  values  for  the  game  with  R&D  competition  among  leaders and  RJV 
cartelization among followers (game (N,CJ)) are indicated (GFF=1). Leaders invest more (less) than 
followers if and only if GLF<GLF
e (GLF>GLF
e). 
EFF  GFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  GLF
e =0.396  GLF
e =0.541  0  GLF
e =0.040  GLF
e =0.200   
GLL  1  GLF
e =0.958  GLF
e >1 
 
ELL  1  GLF
e =0.999  GLF
e >1 
GFF  GFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  GLF
e >1  GLF
e >1  0  GLF
e >1  GLF
e >1   
GLL  1  GLF
e >1  GLF
e >0.788 
 
GLL  1  GLF
e =1  GLF
e =0.212   57 
2.8.3. Impact of cooperation on R&D investments 
With  symmetric  spillovers,  tendencies  are  completely  the  same  as  in  the  early 








 while the 
critical spillover for the followers G
FC is equal to ½.  
 
When spillovers are asymmetric, R&D investments of both leaders and followers 
can be higher or lower when they form an R&D cartel. There is again a critical 
leader-specific spillover GLL
C determining the comparison of R&D investments of 
competing leaders versus leaders in an R&D cartel. However, the value of GLL
C 
differs slightly from the early entrance setting. Moreover, investments of the leaders 
in  an  RJV  cartel  always  exceed  the  investments  of  R&D  competing  or  R&D 
cartelized  leaders
36.  R&D  cartelization  among  followers  yields  higher  R&D 
investments  compared  to  R&D  competition  among  followers  if  and  only  if  the 
follower-specific  spillover  exceeds  its  critical  value  GFF
C  with  GFF
C=½.  Finally, 
followers  always  invest  more  in  an  RJV  cartel  than  in  an  R&D  cartel
37.  In  
Table 2.9, some values of the critical leader-specific spillover GLL
C are presented. 
 
GFF  GFF  n=10 
k=2  0  1 
n=10 
k=5  0  1 
0  GLL
C =0.5  GLL
C =0.5  0  GLL
C =0.5  GLL
C =0.5   
GLF  1  GLL
C =0.945  GLL
C =0.945 
 
GLF  1  GLL
C =0.917  GLL
C =0.917 
Table 2.9. Numerical examples of the critical leader-specific spillover GLL
C. R&D cooperation among 




2.8.4. Impact of cooperation on profitability and welfare 
The impact of cooperation on profitability yields the same tendencies compared to 
the early entrance setting. Leaders (followers) benefit from R&D cartelization, as 
their  profits  are  always  higher  than  with  R&D  competition.  After  all,  R&D 
cooperation softens competition, by which profits are increased. Moreover, RJV 
cartelization is always most beneficial for leaders (followers).  
                                                 
36 When GLL=1, R&D investments of cooperating leaders in an R&D cartel are the same as in an RJV 
cartel.  
37 When GFF=1, R&D investments of cooperating followers in an R&D cartel are the same as in an RJV 
cartel.   58 
 
Tendencies of consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare are very similar to 
the early entrance setting although  some minor differences  can  be observed for 
producer surplus and welfare. In the appendix, the ranking of CS, PS and SW is 
detailed for both symmetric and asymmetric cases.  
 
Again, the social desirability of R&D cooperation of leader or followers critically 
depends on the number of leaders. When the industry is dominated by only a few 
firms, society is best off with R&D cooperation of the followers. The same welfare 
tendencies as in the early entrance setting thus prevail here.  
2.9. Conclusion 
This study has shown the importance of accounting for the heterogeneity of firms in 
strategic investments games. After all, some firms are more innovative and take the 
role of leader while other firms pursue a more imitative strategy and take the role of 
follower. It is moreover typical that this heterogeneity results in asymmetric spillovers 
between  leaders  and  followers.  As  R&D  cooperation  is  a  widely  used  policy 
instrument to enhance innovative activity, first or second movers have been allowed 
to bundle R&D forces. All in all, a four stage setting strategic investment setting with 
cost-reducing R&D has been considered. Both an early and a late entrance setting 
have been analyzed and similar results have been obtained. 
 
Firstly,  as  for  the  impact  of  the  spillovers  on  R&D  investments  of  leaders  and 
followers, it has been shown that tendencies can differ from the two stage models 
with  simultaneous  moves.  More  specifically,  the  symmetric  spillover  is  usually 
exerting a negative impact on cooperative investments of leaders and followers, which 
is due to, respectively, the spillover from the leaders to the followers and the spillover 
from the followers to the leaders. However, with asymmetric spillovers, tendencies 
are the same as in the two stage models and are helpful in understanding tendencies 
with symmetric spillovers. 
 
Secondly,  the  investments  of  leaders and  followers  have  been  compared  for  both 
symmetric and asymmetric spillovers. When spillovers are asymmetric, it has been 
pointed out that followers often devote more resources to R&D than leaders. This   59 
technological  leapfrogging  especially  tends  to  take  place  when  free  riding 
opportunities  for  the  followers  are  sufficiently  large.  Consequently,  in  order  to 
discourage technological leapfrogging, leaders should try to minimize spillovers by 
for example limiting the movement of R&D employees to followers or by restricting 
knowledge transfers within the firm. However, it is obvious that followers, in their 
endeavour to catch up with leaders, will try to maximize the spillover from leaders to 
followers. Possible ways to do so are investments in absorptive capacity and the hunt 
for industry leaders’ R&D personnel.  
 
The  findings  of  the  study  also  indicate  that  R&D  cooperation  might  be  another 
instrument in the process of technological leapfrogging of which both leaders and 
followers can make use. On the one hand, bundling R&D forces in an RJV cartel can 
help leaders to avoid being leapfrogged by the followers. After all, RJV cartelized 
leaders invest more than R&D competing leaders by which followers need to increase 
their  investments  when  they  want  to  surpass  the  leaders.  On  the  other  hand,  by 
forming an RJV cartel, followers can encourage technological leapfrogging. Note that 
the  allowance  for  R&D  cooperatives  in  the  United  States  and  in  the  European 
Community  may  be  seen  in  this  perspective.  After  all,  a  major  objective  of  the 
permission for firms to cooperate in R&D in both regions was a response to their 
decline in technological lead over other regions, for example Japan (Hagedoorn et al., 
2000).  
 
To continue, the economic performance of R&D cooperation (R&D cartel or RJV 
cartel)  has  been  compared  with  R&D  competition.  This  analysis  yields  similar 
findings  as  in  the  two  stage  models  with  simultaneous  moves.  More  specifically, 
critical  spillovers  drive  this  comparison,  both  with  spillover  symmetry  and 
asymmetry. With symmetric spillovers, investments of leaders in an R&D cartel are 
higher  than  with  R&D competition  if  the  spillover  is  larger  than  (n-k+1)/(n-k+2). 
Similarly, followers realize higher investments with R&D cooperation than with R&D 
competition  if  the  symmetric  spillover  is  larger  than  ½.  When  spillovers  are 
asymmetric,  critical  leader-specific  (follower-specific)  spillovers  again  determine 
whether  R&D  cartelization  enhances  R&D  investments  compared  with  R&D 
competition. RJV cartelization always yields the highest investments. Note that the 
critical spillover for the leaders is sometimes rather high. In that case, only an RJV   60 
cartel  might  help  the  leaders  to  improve  on  their  technology  compared  to  R&D 
competition. However, as has been indicated, knowledge sharing may not always be 
perfect.     
 
It  has  also  been  shown  that  R&D  cartelization  among  leaders  (followers)  always 
results  in  an  increase  of  profits  compared  to  R&D  competition.  After  all,  R&D 
cartelization is a competition  softening  instrument, by which it is no wonder  that 
leaders (followers) are better off when they form an R&D cartel.  
 
Analyzing the effectiveness of R&D cooperation (in terms of consumer, producer and 
total surplus) is however a complicated task as the comparison across the different 
games  in  both  the  early  and  the  late  entrance  setting  strongly  depends  on  the 
parameters of the model. Therefore, it is better to look at those scenarios in which the 
welfare is highest. On this basis, some basic insights can be obtained by which some 
policy guidelines could be formulated.  
 
This  analysis  has  demonstrated  that  appropriate  government  intervention  strongly 
depends on the industry structure, i.e. the number of leaders and followers. More 
specifically, when there are a lot of leading firms, R&D cooperation among leaders 
should be stimulated. However, most industries are characterized by only a small 
number  of  dominating  firms.  In  this  case,  governments  should  promote  R&D 
cooperation among the small followers, as welfare is then highest. Governments could 
for example provide financial support for small firms in order to cope with the start-
up  costs  of  the  venture.  Note  that  by  encouraging  followers  to  cooperate, 
technological leapfrogging would be stimulated. Moreover, it is known that R&D 
cooperation  often  extends  to  collusion  on  the  product  market,  thereby  reducing 
welfare (Martin, 1995). Motta (2004) argues that these anti-competitive effects are 
less likely when small firms cooperate in R&D. A market share criterion could be 
used by governments to assess firms’ market power.  
 
Before moving to the next chapter, we would like to point to some limitations of the 
study here. Firstly, the spillover levels are assumed to be exogenous. In reality, it is 
known  that  firms  try  to  minimize  outgoing  and  maximize  incoming  spillovers 
(Cassiman et al., 2002). In addition, the study does not take into account the notion of   61 
absorptive  capacity  (Cohen  and  Levintahl,  1989),  as  this  would  unnecessary 
complicate  the  analysis.  To  continue,  although  the  model  allows  for  some 
asymmetries,  spillovers  are  still  assumed  to  be  symmetric  within  each  group. 
However, it could well be the case that spillovers within a group are asymmetric as 
well.  
 
A second limitation concerns the exogenously determined roles of all the players. In 
this respect, it should be stressed that market leaders may not always move first in the 
innovation process. It would be interesting to endogenize the sequence of moves in 
the R&D stages, given the Stackelberg competition on the output market. Moreover, 
all firms, both leaders and followers, have the same ex ante unit costs and the same 
R&D cost function. It could be argued that leaders could have lower ex ante unit costs 
(due  to  past  R&D  experience)  or  could  be  more  efficient  in  conducting  R&D. 
However, by assuming ex ante symmetric firms, the analysis can focus more easily on 
the pure spillover effects.  
 
To continue, in the study here, it has been assumed that all leaders or all followers 
cooperate in one R&D cooperative. However, it could of course be well the case that 
only  some  followers  cooperate  while  others  compete  or  form  another  R&D 
cooperative.  Moreover,  also  cooperation  between  leaders  and  followers  could  be 
looked at.  
 
Finally,  a  minor  drawback  of  this  study  is  the  fact  that  results  mainly  rely  on 
numerical  simulations.  However,  it  should  be  underlined  that  the  expressions  for 
optimal R&D investments are very complex, even for a small number of leaders and 
followers. Furthermore, in more and more studies, simulations are used to sketch the 
main tendencies in case analytical expressions get too complicated (see for example 
Atallah (2005)).      62 
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Appendix 
Ranking of consumer surplus, producer surplus and welfare in the late entrance setting 
Late Entrance with symmetric spillovers 
G=0  CSN,CJ>CSCJ,N>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSN,C>PSCJ,N>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWCJ,N>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWC,N  Small k 
G=1  CSN,CJ=CSN,C>CSCJ,N=CSC,N>CSN,N  PSN,CJ=PSN,C>PSCJ,N=PSC,N>PSN,N  SWN,CJ=SWN,C>SWCJ,N=SWC,N>SWN,N 
G=0  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWC,N  Intermediate 
or high k  G=1  CSCJ,N=CSC,N>CSN,CJ=CSN,C>CSN,N  PSCJ,N=PSC,N>PSN,CJ=PSN,C>PSN,N  SWCJ,N=SWC,N>SWN,CJ=SWN,C>SWN,N 
Table 2.11. Ranking of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and welfare (SW) in the late entrance setting with symmetric spillovers. 
 
Late Entrance with asymmetric spillovers 
GLF=0  CSN,CJ>CSCJ,N>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSN,C>PSCJ,N>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWCJ,N>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWC,N  Small k 
GLF=1  CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSCJ,N>CSC,N  PSN,C>PSCJ,N>PSN,N>PSC,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWCJ,N>SWC,N 
GLF=0  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWC,N  Intermediate k 
GLF=1  CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSCJ,N>CSC,N  PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSC,N>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWN,CJ>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWCJ,N>SWC,N 
GLF=0  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSC,N>PSCJ,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWC,N  High k 
GLF=1  CSCJ,N>CSN,CJ>CSN,N>CSN,C>CSC,N  PSCJ,N>PSC,N>PSN,C>PSN,N>PSN,CJ  SWCJ,N>SWN,CJ>SWN,N>SWN,C>SWC,N 
Table 2.12. Ranking of consumer surplus (CS), producer surplus (PS) and welfare (SW) in the late entrance setting with asymmetric spillovers with GLL=0 and GFF=0 in games 
(N,N), (C,N) and (N,C.); GLL=1 and GFF=0 in game (CJ,N) and GLL=0 and GFF=1 in game (N,CJ).   70   71 
3.  Leadership  persistence  and  technological 
leapfrogging in patent races without winner-takes-all 
          Joint Work with Professor Raymond De Bondt 
 
This study focuses on the role of reward sharing in patent races with an incumbent 
and  one  or  more  entrants.  It  is  shown  that  the  comparison  of  the  efforts  of  the 
incumbent and the entrants does not only depend on the assumptions regarding entry, 
i.e. exogenous versus endogenous entry, but also on how the rewards of the race are 
shared among the winner and the losers of the race. Indeed, when there is exogenous 
entry, it is possible that the incumbent invests more than the entrants, namely when a 
winning  entrant  shares  with  other  (losing)  entrants,  thereby  reversing  the  winner-
takes-all finding of Reinganum (1985). Moreover, when there is endogenous entry, 
the incumbent may invest less than the entrants, when the winning incumbent needs to 
share but a winning entrant takes it all. Hence, also Etro’s (2004) finding can be 
altered.  
3.1. Introduction 
It is well known that leading firms can sometimes dominate the market for a very long 
time period. Exemplifying are the longstanding dominant positions of Intel in the 
microprocessor industry, of the Renault Espace in the market for MPV’s and of De 
Nul, Boskalis, Van Oord and DEME in the dredging industry (see 2.1). Other well-
known examples are Microsoft in the industry of operating systems and Nokia in the 
market  of  mobile  phones.  To  maintain  their  leadership  positions,  these  firms 
intensively engage in research and development (R&D) activities in order to come up 
with new or improved products or technologies. For instance, in 2000, Microsoft’s 
R&D expenditures equaled $3,7 billion (=16,4% of its total sales).  
 
Indeed, actual or potential competitors do not rest on their laurels but also compete for 
the market. Moreover, it is not uncommon that one of these competitors manages to 
be the first  to commercialize a new product and, subsequently,  becomes the new 
market leader. For example, in the market for portable MP3 players, Creative used to 
be the market leader but was surpassed by Apple, because of its introduction of the   72 
Ipod.  The  market  for  laser  printers  serves  a  second  example.  Although  Hewlett-
Packard is the market leader nowadays, the first laser printers were developed and 
commercialized by Xerox and IBM (Etro, 2007; McKenzie and Lee, 2006).  
 
This kind of competition for the market is often modeled by stochastic patent races
38 
in which there is one firm with the possibility of committing to a certain level of R&D 
investments before its  competitors. After  all,  this firm can be  seen as the market 
leader or an incumbent monopolist, due to for example a patent on a certain product 
or technology by which it is reasonable to assume that this firm moves first in the 
patent race. But actual competitors or potential entrants also invest in R&D. The first 
to successfully develop an innovation is the winner of the race and is granted a patent. 
These  patent  races  can,  in  general,  be  classified  along  two  dimensions,  namely 
winner-takes-all versus market sharing and exogenous versus endogenous entry.  
 
Firstly, patent races differ from each other in the way the rewards of the discovery are 
shared among the winner and the losers of the race. In race settings with winner-
takes-all, it is assumed that the winner of the race gets the full value of the discovery. 
However, it could well be the case that the value of the innovation is shared among 
the winner and some or all losers. Then, the winner gets only a share of the total value 
of the innovation and the remainder of the ‘cake’ is divided among the losing firms. 
Indeed,  losing  firms  can  sometimes  easily  imitate an  innovation.  Mansfield  et  al. 
(1981), for example, find that on average 60% of patented innovations are imitated 
within a time period of 4 years. 
 
The degree of reward sharing differs across industries as it depends heavily on the 
effectiveness of the patent. Other spillover mechanisms can enhance the imitation 
process, such as the ease of reverse engineering, mobility of personnel, meetings at 
professional conferences, publications, informal communication among engineers etc. 
In  some  industries,  such  as  the  semiconductors,  computers  and  software,  reward 
                                                 
38 Reinganum (1989) distinguishes between symmetric and asymmetric patent races. In the symmetric 
models, all participants of the patent race decide simultaneously on their R&D investments (see for 
example  Loury,  1979;  Lee  and  Wilde,  1980;  Reinganum,  1983  and  Stewart,  1983).  Asymmetric 
models  are  characterized  by  sequential  moves.  After  all,  in  asymmetric  patent  races,  there  is  an 
incumbent (e.g. a current patent  holder) choosing its  R&D investments  before the entrants.  These 
asymmetric models are therefore very suitable for the comparison of the R&D activity of a market 
incumbent with potential entrants (Reinganum, 1983; Reinganum, 1985).   73 
sharing tends to be rather high as patents are usually offering weak protection to the 
innovator (Bessen and Maskin, 2000). But in other industries, a patent may yield 
strong protection. For example, Levin et al. (1987) argue that patent protection in the 
chemical industry tends to be rather effective as it may be rather easy to prove the 
uniqueness of a certain molecule
39.  
 
A  nice  illustration  of  reward  sharing  is  the  story  of  the  CAT  scanners
40,41.  CAT 
scanners are instruments to take high quality three-dimensional pictures of internal 
organs  of  the  body,  based  on  the  X-ray  technology.  As  happens  frequently,  the 
invention  of  the  CAT  scanner  was  not  the  result  of  an  active  search  for  this 
technology but rather of luck. After all, while working as an engineer in the area of 
pattern  identification  and  computer  storage  techniques  at  the  Central  Research 
Laboratories of the record company EMI in the late 1960s, Hounsfield hit upon a 
brilliant idea. By scanning the brain from multiple angles and reconstructing those 
images  with computers, higher quality  (compared to simple X-ray  snapshots)  and 
three-dimensional pictures of the human brain, would result. By late 1971, the first 
clinical  tests  of  the  brain  scanner  turned  out  to  be  promising  and,  although  EMI 
lacked  experience  in  the  medical  equipment  industry,  EMI  decided  to  enter  the 
scanner market, yielding the company a head start over its potential competitors. For a 
couple of years, EMI had the whole market for itself, but it was clear that other firms, 
which were active in other segments of the medical equipment industry, would enter 
this specific market. However, as brain scanners were already widely spread, entrants 
needed to come up with an improved technology as hospitals would of course not 
replace their current scanners with a similar one. So, the race for the full body scan 
took  off.  The  entrants  were  indeed  firms  with  more  experience  in  the  medical 
equipment industry, such as General Electric (GE), Pfizer, and Technicare but it was 
nevertheless EMI who won the race and was granted a patent for its full body scanner 
(mid 1970s). However, the company could enjoy its market leadership position for 
only a short period of time. After all, GE and Technicare entered the market with 
copycat products, thereby ignoring EMI’s patents and EMI abandoned the market a 
                                                 
39 Note that patent protection not only differs across industries but also across countries. For example, 
patent  protection  in the  United  States  is stronger  than  in Japan,  France,  the  United  Kingdom  and 
Germany (Martinez and Guellec, 2004).  
40 CAT is the acronym of Computed Axial Tomography. 
41 This example is based on Teece (1986), Trajtenberg (1990) and Schnaars (1994).    74 
few years later
 42. So, although the market leader EMI won the race, it shared its prize 
to a large extent with the entrants in the CAT scanner market. This example points to 
the importance of analyzing reward sharing in patent races with sequential moves. 
However, until now, sharing of rewards has only been looked at in patent races with 
simultaneous moves (Stewart, 1983).  
 
A second dimension of classification concerns exogenous (fixed) versus endogenous 
(free) entry. Until recently, the R&D behavior of the incumbent and the entrants has 
only been analyzed from a short run perspective, with a fixed number of firms, i.e. 
exogenous entry (Reinganum, 1985). Etro (2004), however, analyzes an asymmetric 
patent race with one incumbent and an endogenously determined number of entrants 
in a winner-takes-all setting. When there is free entry, firms keep on entering the 
industry until their (expected) profits equal zero. This free entry scenario corresponds 
to the long run. This distinction between exogenous and endogenous entry is however 
not without consequences when it comes to the comparison of the R&D investments 
of the incumbent and the entrants.  
 
With exogenous entry and winner-takes-all, leapfrogging by an entrant is more likely 
than monopoly persistence as the incumbent invests less than each of the entrants by 
which an entrant is more likely to win the race (Reinganum, 1985). After all, when the 
number  of  entrants  is  given,  the  incumbent  reduces  its  incentives  as,  due  to  the 
strategic complementarity between the investments of the incumbent and the entrants, 
the entrants also reduce their investments. Consequently, the probability of innovation 
shrinks, by which the lifespan of the incumbent’s current patent increases, which is in 
the interest of the incumbent. However, the incentives to reduce efforts are lower for 
the entrants  as they do not have to  give  up a current  stream of profits when the 
innovation is obtained. This impact of the current patent on the incumbent’s R&D 
incentives is in line with the replacement effect of Arrow (1962). As a result, potential 
entrants invest more in R&D than the incumbent. This tendency is consistent with 
empirical findings that, on average, challengers tend to invest more to enter a new 
market than incumbents (e.g. Czarnitzki and Kraft, 2004). With exogenous entry and 
                                                 
42 It should be noted that also financial, marketing and distribution advantages helped the imitators to 
drive EMI out of the market.   75 
winner-takes-all, Reinganum (1985) claims furthermore that the first mover has lower 
expected profits compared to the entrants (second mover advantages). 
 
However, with endogenous entry and winner-takes-all, this finding is altered, so the 
incumbent  invests  more  than  each  of  the  entrants.  Etro  (2004)  shows  that,  with 
endogenous entry, the incumbent can neither influence the aggregate probability nor 
an entrant’s individual probability of innovation. Thus, the incumbent can not extend 
the lifespan of the current patent by lowering its R&D investments. The only ambition 
of the incumbent is then to win the race and its incentives to do so are higher than 
those of the entrants. After all, the incumbent does not consider the impact of its 
investments  on  the  aggregate  probability  of  innovation,  but  entrants  do  take  this 
impact into account as it reduces their expected profits and this explains why the 
incumbent invests more than the entrants. It may thus be clear that the assumption of 
free entry changes the incentives of the incumbent dramatically.   
 
In this study, a closer look is taken at the behavior of incumbents and entrants in 
patent races, with exogenous or endogenous entry, when the rewards of a discovery 
are shared among the winner and the losers of the race. The purpose is to compare 
R&D investments of an incumbent monopolist and one or more entrants. By doing so, 
the study contributes to the extensive Schumpeterian debate on the impact of market 
power  on  R&D  investment  incentives.  Moreover,  by  taking  reward  sharing  into 
account,  better insights are gained into the likelihood of leadership persistence or 
technological leapfrogging. Note that we especially do not use the term monopoly 
persistence here. After all, a winning incumbent monopolist is not necessarily the 
monopolist  after  the  race,  as  there  may  be  reward  sharing  with  losing  entrants. 
Furthermore, technological leapfrogging implies that one of the entrants is the first to 
innovate and is granted a patent on this new technology or product. Technological 
leapfrogging is also not necessarily resulting in a monopoly position for the winning 
entrant because of reward sharing.   
 
Three  different  reward  sharing  scenarios  are  looked  at.  For  each  of  these  three 
scenarios, R&D investments and profits of incumbents and entrants are compared. 
The  main  finding  is  that  sharing  of  rewards  can  change  the  comparison  of  the 
incumbent’s and the entrants’ efforts and profits, compared to winner-takes-all patent   76 
races.  Firstly,  with  exogenous  entry,  the  incumbent  sometimes  commits  itself  to 
higher investments than each of the entrants. Secondly, when entry is endogenous, 
situations are detailed in which entrants invest more than the incumbent. Thirdly, it is 
possible that the incumbent realizes higher expected profits than the entrants in a 
patent race with exogenous entry (first mover advantages).  
 
In  addition,  by  introducing  reward  sharing  in  patent  races,  the  link  with  R&D 
behavior of firms in strategic investment games in the presence of spillovers can be 
made. More specifically, spillovers can be interpreted as an inverse measure of the 
strength  of  patent  protection  (Amir  and  Wooders,  1999).  Then,  a  strong  patent 
protection corresponds to a small spillover and vice versa. Analogously, spillovers 
and market sharing parameters can also be seen as measures of the pace of imitation. 
If  a  new  product  or  a  new  technology  is  imitated  shortly  after  its  innovation, 
spillovers  are  large  and  there  is  a  high  degree  of  market  sharing  (cfr.  blue  print 
copying in chapter 2). On the other hand, when it takes a long time for second movers 
to imitate, spillovers are small and there is little sharing (cfr. idea diffusion in chapter 
2).  An  interesting  study  combining  spillovers  and  reward  sharing  is  provided  by 
Martin (2002) who models a patent race with both input and output spillovers. These 
output spillovers take place after the completion of the innovation and they define the 
sharing of the rewards. Hauenschild (2003) extends the output spillover model of 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and the input spillover model of Kamien et al. 
(1992) with R&D uncertainty in order to analyze and compare R&D performance in 
both models.  
 
The remainder of this study goes as follows. In section 3.2, the patent race setting and 
the three reward sharing scenarios are described. Sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 deal with 
the comparative  statics of  and  the comparison between  incumbent’s and  entrants’ 
R&D investments in each of the three scenarios. Profits of the incumbent and the 
entrants are discussed in section 3.6. In section 3.7, R&D investments are compared 
with the socially optimal R&D investments and section 3.8 concludes.   
3.2. The model 
Stochastic  innovative  races  with  one  first  mover  and  several  second  movers  are 
considered. The first mover is an incumbent monopolist, as it holds a patent on the   77 
current  technology.  Moreover,  this  patent  results  in  a  flow  of  current  profits  (S, 
with 0 π ≥ ).  The  entrants  are  assumed  not  to  be  active  in  this  specific  market  or 
industry at the beginning of the race and, hence, do not earn current profits
43. For both 
the incumbent and the entrants, there is a fixed cost in order to participate in the 
patent race (F, with F>0). This fixed cost could for example be interpreted as the 
opportunity costs of entering this specific industry or market. Moreover, all firms 
continuously invest a flow of resources in R&D, z
L for the incumbent and z
i for the 
entrants (with i=1,2,…,n). In other words, in each time unit, the incumbent and the 
entrants  spend  respectively  z
L  and  z
i  on  R&D.  Due  to  its  leading  position,  the 
incumbent has the opportunity to commit to a certain R&D investment level before 
the entrants. When one of the racing firms has obtained the innovation, all firms 
immediately stop investing in R&D and a patent, with a private value P, is granted to 
the winner. One could think of P as representing the expected value of the profits 
obtained by the innovation.  
 
The probability of discovering the new technology or new product at a certain point in 
time is assumed to be only dependent on the own and current R&D investments
44 and 
is  given  by  the  hazard  rate  function  () . h .  Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that  () . h   is 
concave and increasing,  () ’ . 0 h > and () ’’ . 0 h < . Let  ( )
L h z  and  ( )
1




 be respectively the 
probability that the incumbent or one of the entrants is making the discovery at a 
certain point in time. Consequently, the probability that the incumbent discovers the 
innovation before time t is equal to  ( )
1
L h z t
e
−
− . Analogously, the probability of success 
by one of the entrants before time t equals to  ( )
1 1
n i h z t
i e
 
  − ∑   =   − . 
 
                                                 
43 In the model here, the first mover is called the incumbent monopolist and the second movers are 
called entrants. Indeed, the latter are assumed not to be active in the incumbent’s market before the race 
starts and do not enjoy current profits (in this market). Only the incumbent is active in this market and 
earns  some  profits.  For  example,  only  EMI  was  active  in  the  market  for  CAT  scanners  and  GE, 
Technicare and Pfizer were entrants in this specific market. However, the findings of this chapter may 
apply as well to scenarios in which one dominant firm and a number of smaller competitors compete 
for the market. For example, in the industry for operating systems, Microsoft is the market leader but 
some smaller players also try to conquer the market (e.g. Linux and Mac).  
44 This assumption reflects the memoryless nature of the patent race as the probability of winning the 
race depends neither on own past investments nor on the rival firms’ past investments. For patent races 
with knowledge accumulation, see for example Doraszelski (2003).   78 
Based on this information, the expected profit functions of the incumbent (3.1) and 
the entrants (3.2) can be formulated: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1 2
1 0
n i L h z t h z t n L rt L L L L i V e e e h z P h z P z dt F i
i t
π
   
      − ∑ − ∞       −   =   = + + − − ∑ ∫        =     =             
  (3.1) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1 2 3
1 0
n i L h z t h z t n i rt i i L i i i i i V e e e h z P h z P h z P z dt F
j t
j i
           − ∑   − ∞     −    = = + + − − ∑ ∫        =   =         ≠        
  (3.2) 
Integrating leads to the following expressions for the expected profits (as expected 
benefits minus expected R&D costs minus the fixed cost) of the incumbent (3.3) and 
the entrants (3.4): 
( ) ( )






Expected Benefits Expected R&D Costs
n L L L h z P h z P i L z L i V F
n n j L j L r h z h z r h z h z
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  (3.4) 
with   1
L P the rewards for the incumbent if the incumbent wins, 
  2
L P  the rewards for the incumbent if an entrant wins, 
  1
i P  the rewards for entrant i if entrant i wins, 
  2
i P  the rewards for entrant i if the incumbent wins and 
  3
i P  the rewards for entrant i if another entrant wins. 
 
The values of these payoffs depend on how the value of the innovation is shared 
among  the  winner  and  the  losers  of  the  race.  The  market  sharing  parameter  is 
indicated by V with V†1. A high value of V corresponds to a small degree of reward 
sharing and a small value of V refers to a large degree of reward sharing. Three 
different  reward  sharing  scenarios  are  looked  at.  These  three  scenarios  are 
summarized in table 3.1.  
   79 
The first asymmetric reward sharing scenario (A1) is based on the story of EMI, 
described in the introduction of this chapter. As a winning incumbent in the market 
for  CAT  scanners,  EMI  lost  (part  of)  the  market  to  the  losing  entrants.  In  this 
scenario, it is further assumed that winning entrants take it all. For example, due to 
their experience in the medical equipment industry, it is not unreasonable to assume 
that GE or Technicare would have been able to better appropriate the returns from the 
innovation when one of them would have won the race.  
 
In the second asymmetric scenario (A2), the winning incumbent takes it all, but a 
winning entrant shares with the other entrants. In the chemical industry for example, it 
is not uncommon that the leading firm uses a totally different technology compared to 
small firms
45. Consequently, a breakthrough in a technology by the leader can not be 
used by any small following firm. Vice versa, when a small firm invents an improved 
production  technology,  the  leader  does  not  reap  some  of  the  fruits  of  that  new 
technology but other small firms may copy some part of the new production process, 
as these small firms are less able to protect their knowledge and their production 
processes  are  similar.  This  second  asymmetric  reward  sharing  scenario  may  also 
represent industries in which entrants or small firms kind of cooperate in the patent 
race. After all, Freel and Harrison (2006) show that small or medium sized firms often 
cooperate with each other in order to develop a new product or a new process. Here, 
cooperation is defined as the commitment to share information and ideas about new 
products or production processes. An example of cooperation in the competition for 
the market may be the search of K-Mart for a partner in the competition for the North 
American Retail market, dominated by Wal-Mart (The Economist, 1998).  
 
Besides these two asymmetric reward sharing scenarios, a closer look is also taken at 
symmetric  reward  sharing.  For  example,  in  the  industry  for  mobile  phones, 
innovations of leading firms are copied by small firms and vice versa. Indeed, the first 
mobile phone with internet connectivity was developed by Nokia, the leader in the 
industry. But also smaller mobile phone producers can be the first to introduce an 
innovative cell phone. SHARP, for example, was the first to commercialize a mobile 
                                                 
45 See also footnote 43.    80 
phone  with  a  camera.  However,  nowadays,  all  mobile  phones  producers  market 
models with internet connectivity and a camera.  
 
Mathematically, the reward sharing scenarios go as follows. In the symmetric reward 
sharing  scenario,  the  winner  of  the  race  gets  P σ   and  the  remaining  part  of  the 
discovery,( ) 1 P σ − , is divided among the n losing firms, by which each loser of the race 
gets  ( ) 1
P
n
σ − . This reward sharing scenario is labeled as patent race S. Note that the 
symmetric reward sharing scenario is to some extent comparable with the symmetric 
spillover scenario in chapter 2. 
 
In the first asymmetric reward sharing patent race, A1, a winning incumbent needs to 





σ −  
 
 
. If an entrant would win the race, he takes it all and the other 
firms get nothing. Again, the link with the model described in chapter 2 can be made. 
Here, this asymmetric situation is more or less similar to the situations in which there 
are high spillovers from leaders to followers.  
 
Finally, in patent race A2, a winning entrant shares with the other entrants while the 
winning incumbent takes it all. Consequently, a winning entrant gets  P σ  and each of 





σ −  
  −  
. The rewards for a winning 
incumbent equal the full value of the discovery P.  
 
These three different reward sharing scenarios are analyzed with exogenous entry, in 
which the number of firms is given, and with free entry, in which the number of firms 
is determined endogenously. When entry is exogenous, the discussion only focuses on 
parameter values of P, V, n, V, S and r for which  ( , ) 0 L L V z z >  and  ( , ) 0 L V z z > (positive 
profit condition). With endogenous entry, only parameter values of P, V, V, S and r 
are allowed for which  * ( , , ) 0 L L V z z n >  (positive profit condition) and  * ( , , ) 0 i L V z z n =  (zero 
profit condition), with n
* the equilibrium number of firms.   
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Table 3.1. Rewards for the incumbent and the entrants in the three different reward sharing scenarios.  
 
3.3. Symmetric reward sharing 
In this section, tendencies of the symmetric reward sharing patent races are described. 
For both the exogenous and the endogenous patent race, the R&D investments of the 
incumbent and the potential entrants are compared, after some comparative statics 
have been dealt with. Firstly, however, the game is solved in a general way. Specific 
characteristics of exogenous or endogenous entry are detailed afterwards.  
3.3.1. Solutions 
When there is symmetric reward sharing, the expected profits of the incumbent and 
the entrants are given by, respectively, equations (3.5) and (3.6) (see (3.3) and (3.4) 
and Table 3.1): 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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.  (3.6) 
The two stage game is solved by backward induction. Each of the entrants maximizes 
its expected profits by choosing independently its level of R&D investments z
i, after 
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0 = (3.7) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, the R&D investments of all entrants are the same ( i z z = , 
for i=1,...,n), yielding the following expression:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
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Now, define the following function
46,47:  
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with     ( ) 0 L
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 and 
                                                 
46 The subscript S refers to the symmetric reward sharing scenario.  
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Combining (3.8) and (3.11) and evaluating in x=z yields: 
( ) S g z =
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∂ ×  −      + + + − + −             ∂
  ∂ −   − + +         ∂  
    (3.12)
   
The comparison of the R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants is driven 
by the sign of ( ) S g z . If the sign of  ( ) S g z  is positive, the incumbent invests more than 
each  entrant.  A  negative  sign  of ( ) S g z indicates  higher  R&D  investments  of  each 
entrant. At this point, a distinction between exogenous and endogenous entry needs to 
be made.   
3.3.2. Exogenous entry 
3.3.2.1. Comparative statics 
The comparative statics of  the  investments of the incumbent and the entrants are 
obtained by numerical simulations
48. The following table summarizes the impact of 
































































Table 3.2. Comparative statics in the symmetric reward sharing patent race with exogenous entry.  
 
The investments of both the incumbent and the entrants are an increasing function of 
the market sharing parameter V. Thus, the larger the part for the winner of the race is, 
the more the firms are willing to invest in order to increase the probability of winning 
the race. This tendency is analogous to the negative impact of symmetric spillovers on 
competitive R&D investments in strategic investment games with a given number of 
firms (see for example section 2.3.1).  
 
                                                 
48 All numerical simulations in this chapter are obtained by using Maple.    84 
Moreover,  the  number  of  entrants  has  a  positive  effect  on  the  level  of  R&D 
investments of both the incumbent and the entrants. To continue, it is clear that a 
higher value of the discovery P provokes higher investments of all racing firms. When 
the discovery would be a gold mine, for example, the gold diggers will search more 
intensively when the expected value of the mine is higher. The interest rate r has also 
a positive impact on the R&D investments while there is no influence of the fixed cost 
F. The negative effect of the incumbent’s current profits on its investments reflects 
Arrow’s replacement effect. The investments of the entrants are also decreasing in the 
current profits.    
3.3.2.2. Comparison of R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants 
With market sharing (V<1), the sign of  ( ) S g z  is unclear
49 as the first term of (3.12) 
depends  on  the  sign  of  ( ) ( ) L h z h z   −    ,  which  is  of  course  unknown.  Therefore,  the 
comparison of the incumbent’s and the entrants’ efforts needs to rely on numerical 
simulations. These simulations indicate that an entrant always invests more than the 
incumbent.  Consequently,  the  finding  of  Reinganum  can  be  generalized  to  patent 
races  with  exogenous  entry  and  symmetric  reward  sharing.  This  tendency  is 
formalized in Proposition 3.1.  
 
Proposition 3.1. In a patent race with symmetric market sharing and exogenous entry, 
each entrant always invests more than the incumbent, for all possible values of the 
market sharing parameter V.  
 
The intuition behind this result is an extension of the winner-takes-all setting with 
exogenous  entry  (Reinganum,  1985).  Indeed,  the  incumbent  tries  to  expand  the 
lifespan of the current patent by lowering its R&D investments as then, due to the 
strategic  complementarity  between  the  investments  of  the  incumbent  and  the 
entrants
50, the entrants also reduce their investments. But now, market sharing further 
discourages the incumbent and the entrants to invest in R&D. However, the incentives 
                                                 
49 When V=1, the game is reduced to the winner-takes-all scenario, so the incumbent invests less than 
each entrant (Reinganum, 1985). Indeed,  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ’ 0 1
nh z
g z h z P z h z S L z
π π σ
∂
  = − + − − <   = ∂
.  
 






 for all possible values of V.    85 
to cut down investments are lower for the entrants than for the incumbent as only the 
incumbent enjoys a current stream of profits by which each entrant invests more in 
R&D  than  the  incumbent.  Consequently,  the  entrant  has  a  higher  probability  of 
winning the race and it is thus more likely that the entrant will show up with the 
innovation.  Technological  leapfrogging  is  thus  more  likely  than  leadership 
persistence. 
 
Figure 3.1 provides some graphical illustrations of the investments of the incumbent 
and an entrant in function of the sharing parameter V, for different values of n.  
 
 
      n=1            n=5 
Figure 3.1. Symmetric reward sharing with exogenous entry. R&D investments of the incumbent and 
an entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = , n=1 and n=5. The full line 
represents the investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of an 
entrant (z).  
3.3.3. Endogenous entry 
In a long run symmetric equilibrium, the zero profit condition states that the expected 
profits of the entrants are equal to zero: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 0 L L ZPC h z P h z P z F r nh z h z S n n
σ σ  − −        = − + − − + + =                
  (3.13) 
 
Equation (3.13) determines the equilibrium number of entrants n
*. This equilibrium 
number of entrants is negatively related to the investments of the incumbents. In other 
words,  by  enhancing  its  investments,  the  incumbent  can  reduce  the  number  of 
entrants. In addition, combining (3.8) with (3.13) yields: 
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( )( ) ’ 1 h z P F σ − =   (3.14) 
 
From (3.14), the R&D investments of the entrants z can be calculated and (3.14) 
clearly indicates that z does not depend on z
L. Moreover, z is also independent of r and 
S.  
 















can be calculated (see appendix):  













    (3.15) 
with
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2
1
’
1 1 L L
z x
h x P F
n n




  −   −    
∂     =
− −     ∂ − +    
   
     
Substituting (3.15), for x=z, in (3.12) yields:  
   
             ( ) S g z =
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 − −      − −            
 
   −    −             − + −      
      − −
− +                  
  (3.16) 
3.3.3.1. Comparative statics 
In patent races with symmetric reward sharing and free entry (see Table 3.3), the 
investments  of  the  incumbent  and  the  entrants  are  an  increasing  function  of  the 
sharing parameter V and the value of the discovery P. The interest rate r has no effect 
on the R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants. When considering the 
impact of the fixed cost F and the current profits S, a distinction needs to be made 
between the winner-takes-all (V=1) and the reward sharing scenario (V<1). In the 
former,  as  has  been  discussed  by  Etro  (2004),  the  incumbent’s  investments  are 
independent  of  F  and  S  while  in  the  latter  they  are  decreasing  in  F  and  S.  The 
investments of the entrants are negatively affected by the fixed cost F while there is 
no impact of S on efforts of the entrants.  
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The equilibrium number of entrants n
* is decreasing in V by which the number of 
entrants  is  the  lowest  when  there  is  winner-takes-all.  The  current  profits  of  the 
incumbent have no impact on the equilibrium number of firms when there is winner-
takes-all as both the incumbent’s and the entrants’ efforts are then unaffected by a 
change  in  S.  However,  when  there  is  reward  sharing,  the  equilibrium  number  of 
entrants is increasing in the current profits. Indeed, with reward sharing, an increase 
of the current profits reduces the incumbent’s investments and, hence, more entrants 
enter the race. The value of the discovery P has a positive effect on n
* while there is 







Table 3.3. Comparative statics in the symmetric reward sharing patent race with endogenous entry. 
Current profits and the incumbent’s R&D investments 
The negative effect of current profits on the incumbent’s investments with reward 
sharing deserves some further attention as this is an important difference with the 
winner-takes-all scenario. Therefore, the impact of the current profits S is detailed for 
both V=1 and V<1. 
 
When there is a winner-takes-all scenario (V=1), the zero profit condition (3.13) can 
be rewritten as follows:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
L h z P z F r nh z h z   − = + +        (3.17) 
 
From this expression, it is clear that, by reducing its investments, the incumbent is not 
able  to  expand  the  lifespan  of  the  current  patent.  Indeed,  the  investments  of  the 
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the  left  hand  side  of  (3.17)  remains  unchanged  when  the  incumbent  lowers  its 
investments. It is then obvious that the right hand side of (3.17) also needs to stay as it 
is. In other words, the aggregate probability of innovation can not be reduced by the 
incumbent, by which it is impossible to affect the lifespan of the current patent. Thus, 
the current stream of profits S does not play a role for the incumbent when deciding 
on its R&D investments when there is winner-takes-all (Etro, 2004).  
 
However, when there is some market sharing (V<1), the intuition changes. Consider 
again the zero profit condition (3.13), which is now rewritten as:  
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 L L h z P h z P z F r nh z h z
n n
σ σ − −       − + − = + +             .  (3.18) 
 
Now, when the incumbent cuts down its R&D investments, it is at first sight not clear 
what happens  with the aggregate probability of  innovation.  After all, lower R&D 
investments  of  the  incumbent  result  in  a  higher  number  of  entrants.  Numerical 
simulations indicate that a reduction in z
L and its concomitant increase in n negatively 
affect the (left and) right hand side of (3.18). Thus, by reducing its R&D investments, 
the incumbent can lower the aggregate probability of innovation and hence increase 
the lifespan of the current patent. The higher the value of this current patent in terms 
of profits is, the higher the incumbent’s incentives are to lower its R&D investments.  
3.3.3.2. Comparison the R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants 
In the winner-takes-all scenario with free entry, the incumbent invests more than each 
entrant
51 (Etro, 2004). When there is symmetric sharing of rewards, V<1, and S=0, the 
sign of  ( ) S g z  is unclear as it depends on the sign of ( ) ( ) L h z h z   −    . Numerical simulations, 
however,  indicate  that  Etro’s  tendency  can  be  generalized  to  patent  races  with 
endogenous entry and symmetric reward sharing. However, when the current profits S 
are sufficiently large and there is reward sharing, it is possible that the entrants invest 
more than the incumbent. Proposition 3.2 formalizes and Figure 3.2 illustrates.  
 
                                                 
51 For V=1,  ( ) ( ) ( )
1
’ 0 A g z h z h z P z
σ =
  = × × − >   .    89 
Proposition 3.2. In a patent race with symmetric market sharing and endogenous 
entry, the incumbent always invests more than an entrant, for all possible values for 
the reward sharing parameter V and S=0. When V<1, this tendency can be reversed 
when the current profits S are sufficiently large.  
 
Consider first the case in which there are no current profits (S=0). When there is 
winner-takes-all, it has been shown that the incumbent can not influence the aggregate 
probability of innovation. Moreover, as investments of entrants are independent of the 
efforts of the incumbent, the incumbent can also not change the individual probability 
of  innovation  by  an  entrant.  Consequently,  the  only  remaining  ambition  of  the 
incumbent is then to win the race. In its raid to win the race, the incumbent does not 
take the impact on the aggregate probability of innovation into account. However, this 
impact is taken into account by the entrants and reduces their incentives. Hence, the 
incumbent invests more than the entrants. 
 
Reward sharing reduces investment incentives of both the incumbent and the entrants 
compared to the winner-takes-all scenario. Moreover, the ambition of the incumbent 
to win the race is now countered by an incentive to expand the lifespan of the current 
patent.  After  all, from  (3.14),  we  know  that  the  incumbent can  not  influence  the 
individual probability of innovation of an entrant. Consequently, in order to be more 
likely to win the race, the incumbent should invest more than the entrant. However, 
with reward sharing, the incumbent can extend the lifespan of the current patent by 
reducing its R&D investments. These incentives to lower its investments are higher 
the larger the current profits are. Now, with small current profits, it turns out that the 
incentive to win the race offsets the incentive to extend the lifespan of the current 
patent. In this case, the incumbent invests most and thus leadership persistence is 
most likely. Only when the current profits are very large, the incentive of extending 
the lifespan of the current patent becomes more important than the incentive to win 
the race.  
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Figure 3.2. Symmetric reward sharing with endogenous entry. R&D investments of the incumbent and 
an entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = . The full line represents the 
investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of an entrant (z).  
 
3.4. Asymmetric reward sharing A1: winning follower takes it 
all 
In this section, the first asymmetric scenario, labeled A1, is dealt with. As has been 
detailed in section 3.2 and in Table 3.1, a winning incumbent (for example EMI) 
shares  with the losing entrants, while a  winning entrant takes  it  all.  For  both the 
exogenous and endogenous entry scenario, the investments of the incumbent and the 
entrants are compared and some comparative statics are provided. The analysis starts 
with the general solution of this specific type of asymmetric reward sharing patent 
races.  
3.4.1. Solutions 
Combining  the  specific  characteristics  concerning  the  sharing  of  the  rewards,  as 
detailed in Table 3.1, with equations (3.3) and (3.4) allows formulating the expected 
profit functions of the incumbent (3.19) and the entrants (3.20):  
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   (3.20) 
Each  entrant  chooses  its  optimal  R&D  investments  z
i,  after  having  observed  the 
investments of the incumbent (z
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    − + +          
+ +  
  −       − + −            
  0 =   (3.21) 
 
R&D investments of the entrants are the same in a symmetric equilibrium, z
i=z for all 
i. Thus: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1




  −         = − + + − + − =                
  (3.22) 
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   − + +      
  + +   ∂         − + + −       ∂  
  0 =   (3.23) 
or equivalently: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ’ 1 ’ 0 L L L L L L
L
nh z
h z P r nh z h z h z h z P z
z
φ σ π
  ∂        = − + + − + + − =             ∂  
  (3.24) 
Now, define the following function
52: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 ’ 1 L
A A g x h x P r nh z h z h x P x σ ψ σ π       = − + + − + −            (3.25) 
with   ( ) 1 0 L
A g z = ,  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
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Combining (3.22) and (3.25) and evaluating in x=z,  
( ) 1 A g z =
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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− − + +
  − + −  
  −  
+ + −    
   
   (3.26) 
The sign of (3.26) drives the comparison of z and z
L.  
                                                 
52 The subscript A1 refers to the asymmetric reward sharing scenario A1.   92 
3.4.2. Exogenous entry 
In  this  section,  the  comparative  statics  of  and  the  comparison  between  the 
incumbent’s and the entrants’ efforts are detailed for patent races with exogenous 
entry and reward sharing scenario A1 (see table 3.1).  
3.4.2.1. Comparative statics 
The impact of the different parameters on the R&D investments of the incumbent and 
the  entrants  are  analogous  to  the  symmetric  reward  sharing  patent  races  with 
exogenous entry, see Table 3.4. Note that an increase in reward sharing (thus a lower 
value for V) also reduces the investments of the entrants, although a winning entrant 
never shares. However, entrants’ investments are far less sensitive to a change in V 































































Table 3.4. Comparative statics in the asymmetric reward sharing patent race A1 with exogenous entry.  
3.4.2.2. Comparison of R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants  
With exogenous entry and asymmetric reward sharing A1 (a winning entrant takes it 
all but a winning incumbent shares), it is not straightforward to conclude from (3.24) 
whether the incumbent invests more or less in R&D than the entrants, as the sign 
of ( ) A g z is unclear
53. After all, the first two terms of (3.26) are negative while the third 
term  is  positive  and  it  is  not  clear  which  term  dominates.  Numerical  simulations 
indicate however that the sign of  ( ) 1 A g z is negative for all values of V, thus entrants 
always invest more than the incumbent. This tendency is formalized in Proposition 
3.3. 
 
Proposition  3.3.  In  a  patent  race  with  exogenous  entry  and  asymmetric  market 
sharing A1, in which a winning incumbent shares with losing entrants but a winning 
entrant takes it all, an entrant always invests more than the incumbent, for all possible 
values of the market sharing parameter V. 
 
                                                 
53 When V=1,  ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 1
’ 0 A L
n h z





  = − + − − <   ∂
, see Reinganum (1985).    93 
Indeed,  when  there  is  winner-takes-all  (V=1),  an  entrant  invests  more  than  the 
incumbent. As already mentioned before, the incumbent reduces its efforts to make 
sure the entrants lower their efforts as well (strategic complementarity
54), by which 
the incumbent extends the lifespan of its current patent. However, the entrants have 
lower incentives to shrink their investments as they do not enjoy a current stream of 
profits. Now, introducing reward sharing between a winning incumbent and losing 
entrants further reduces the R&D investments of the incumbent compared to entrants’ 
efforts. So, the entrants always invest more than the incumbent in this specific reward 
sharing  scenario.  Consequently,  technological  leapfrogging  tends  to  be  the  rule. 
Moreover, the larger the degree of reward sharing is, the more likely technological 
leapfrogging  is.  Note  that  technological  leapfrogging  here  results  in  a  monopoly 
position for the winning entrant.  
 
Although he still has a chance of winning the race, it could be in the interest of the 
incumbent not to enter the race for a new product or a new technology, especially 
when the degree of market sharing is large. Indeed, firstly, for all values of V, there is 
a higher probability that one of the entrants wins the race. Secondly, if the incumbent 
would win the race, part of the prize is snatched away by the losing entrants. For 
example, as mentioned in the introduction, EMI could only benefit for a short time 
period from its patent on the full body scanners as more experienced firms (in the 
medical  equipment  industry)  entered  and  quickly  controlled  the  whole  market. 
Maybe, EMI could have been better off when it would not have raced for the bull 
body scanner but, instead, would have looked for other business opportunities. 
  
The tendencies described here were also found in a strategic investment game with 
leaders  and  followers,  no  uncertainty,  asymmetric  spillovers  and  exogenous  entry 
(section 2.4.2 or Vandekerckhove and De Bondt, 2008). Large spillovers from leaders 
to followers may result in lower investments of leaders compared to followers, even 
though large efforts of leaders could improve their subsequent Stackelberg profits. 
Figure 3.3 provides some graphical illustrations.  
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      n=1            n=5 
Figure 3.3. Asymmetric reward sharing A1 with exogenous entry. R&D investments of the incumbent 
and an entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = , n=1 and n=5. The full line 
represents the investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of an 
entrant (z).  
3.4.3. Endogenous entry 
In the asymmetric patent race A1 with free entry, the zero profit condition states that:   
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1
1
0 L L
A ZPC h z P h z P z F r nh z h z
n
σ −     = + − − + + =        
  (3.27) 
From  this  zero  profit  condition,  the  equilibrium  number  of  entrants,  n
*,  can  be 
calculated  and  this  equilibrium  number  of  entrants  is  negatively  related  with  the 
investments of the incumbents. Moreover, combining (3.22) and (3.27) results in:  
( )( ) ’ 1 h z P F − =   (3.28) 
From (3.28), the R&D investments of each of the entrants, z, can be derived and, as 
was the case with symmetric reward sharing, the R&D investments of the entrants do 
not depend on the R&D investments of the incumbent and are also independent of r 
and S. Moreover, in this specific case, z is also independent of the sharing parameter 
V.  
 










details, see the appendix of this chapter): 
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.  (3.29) 
Substituting (3.29) in (3.26) and evaluating in x=z results in:     95 
( ) 1 A g z =
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− − + +
    −     −             − + + −      −     +        
  −  
+ + −    
   
  (3.30) 
3.4.3.1. Comparative Statics 
To continue, the comparative statics of the R&D investments of the incumbent and 














































































































Table 3.5. Comparative statics in the asymmetric reward sharing patent race A1 with endogenous entry.  
 
Comparative  statics  of  the  investments  of  the  incumbent  in  patent  races  with 
endogenous entry and asymmetric reward sharing A1 are the same as with symmetric 
reward  sharing.  Thus,  the  incumbent’s  efforts  are  increasing  in  V.  Furthermore, 
current profits reduce the incumbent’s investment incentives when there is reward 
sharing. The tendencies of the equilibrium number of entrants are also the same as in 
the case of symmetric reward sharing.  
 
However,  the  investments  of  the  entrants  are  independent  of  the  market  sharing 
parameter V (see (3.28)). Entrants do not reduce their R&D investments when there is 
reward sharing in case of a winning incumbent. After all, entrants do not share when 
they win, by which their investments are not influenced by changes in V when there is 
free entry.  
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Current profits and the incumbent’s R&D investments 
Here, the impact of the current profits on the investments of the incumbent depends 
again on the value of V. When there is winner-takes-all (V=1), the investments of the 
incumbent are unaffected by a change in S (Etro, 2004). However, when there is some 
reward sharing (V<1), the investments of the incumbent decrease when S increases. 
This  tendency  can  be  understood  by  considering  the  zero  profit  condition  (3.27), 
which is now rewritten as:    
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 L L h z P h z P z F r nh z h z
n
σ −     + − = + +        
  (3.31) 
 
When the incumbent cuts down his efforts, it is known that the number of entrants 
will rise but the investments of each entrant remain unaffected. Consequently, the left 
hand side of (3.31) decreases by which the right hand side of (3.31) needs to decline 
as well. Thus, the incumbent can lower the aggregate probability of innovation by 
reducing his R&D investments. Of course, the more valuable the current patent is, the 
more incentives the incumbent has to cut down his efforts.  
3.4.3.2. Comparison of R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants 
Analyzing  the  sign  of  (3.30)  allows  comparing  the  R&D  investments  of  the 
incumbent and the entrants. For values of V<1, however, the sign of (3.30) is unclear 
as the first and second terms are negative while the third term is positive and it is not 
clear which term dominates
55. Numerical simulations indicate that, for S=0, the sign 
of (3.30) can be positive (for high values of V) or negative (for small values of V). It 
is  thus  possible  that,  with  endogenous  entry,  the  entrants  invest  more  in  R&D 
compared  to  the  incumbent,  see  Proposition  3.4.  For  a  graphical  illustration,  see 
Figure 3.4.  
 
Proposition 3.4. In a patent race with asymmetric market sharing A1, in which there 
is  only  sharing  when  the  incumbent  wins,  and  endogenous  entry,  the  incumbent 
invests more than entrants when there is a small degree of market sharing (high value 
                                                 
55  For  For  V=1,  the  winner-takes-all  result  with  endogenous  entry  of  Etro  (2004)  is  obtained. 
Indeed ( ) ( ) ( )
1
’ A g z h z h z P z
σ =
  = −    and the sign of this expression is always positive. So the incumbent 
invests more than each of the entrants.  
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of V) while the entrants invest more than the incumbent when there is a large degree 
of market sharing (low value of V). 
 
With winner-takes-all, the only incentive for the incumbent is to win the race and its 
incentives to do so are higher than entrants’ incentives. However, losing part of the 
new market by the incumbent in the asymmetric patent race A1 with endogenous 
entry  tends to  discourage its  efforts in  two different  ways. Firstly, the sharing of 
rewards in se has a negative impact on the incentives of the incumbent. After all, the 
more  the  entrants  can  benefit  from  the  innovation  of  the  incumbent,  the  less  the 
incumbent  is  willing  to  invest  in  R&D.  Secondly,  this  negative  effect  on  R&D 
investments is strengthened by the fact that the incumbent can lower the aggregate 
probability of innovation (and hence extend the lifespan of the current patent) by 
lowering its investments.  
 
All in all, the R&D investments  of the incumbent  decrease when  there is reward 
sharing between the winning incumbent and the losing entrants. When the reward 
sharing is sufficiently large, the incumbent’s R&D efforts can be reduced that much 
by which Etro’s asymmetry (2004) is reversed in the advantage of the entrants, who 
then  invest  more  in  R&D  than  the  incumbent.  Consequently,  technological 
leapfrogging tends to be more likely in patent races with endogenous entry when the 
losing entrants can easily steal a large part of the fruits of the incumbent’s innovation. 
 
An  analogous tendency is observed in  strategic  investment  games in which  R&D 
expenses decrease when the spillover increases. This is reminiscent of the public good 
character of R&D. The same is observed here. More specifically, in this case, there is 
only sharing when the incumbent wins, which can be interpreted as a spillover from 
the leader to the followers. When the reward sharing is sufficiently high (low value of 
V), the reduction of the incumbent’s investments is of such an extent (compared to 
winner-takes-all)  that  investments  of  entrants  exceed  the  investments  of  the 
incumbent.  
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Figure 3.4. Asymmetric reward sharing A1 with endogenous entry. R&D investments of the incumbent 
and an entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = . The full line represents 
the investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of an entrant (z).  
 
3.5. Asymmetric reward sharing A2: winning leader takes it all 
In this section, patent races with the second asymmetric reward sharing scenario (A2) 
are analyzed. Here, a winning entrant shares with the other entrants, while a winning 
incumbent takes it all. After solving the game in general, some comparative statics of 
the R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants are detailed, followed by a 
comparison of their efforts.  
3.5.1. Solutions 
Substituting the payoffs of case A2 in the expected profit functions of the incumbent 
(3.3) and the entrants (3.4), yields: 
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0 =   (3.34) 
In a symmetric equilibrium, all entrants spend the same amount of resources on R&D. 
So, with z
i=z for all i: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ’ 1 ’ 0 i L h z P r nh z h z h z h z P z φ σ        = − + + − − =            (3.35)   99 
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or equivalently: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ’ 1 ’ 0 L L L L L L
L
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φ π
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   (3.37) 
 
Now define the following function
56: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 2 ’ 1 L
A A g x h x P r nh z h z h x P x ψ π       = − + + − + −            (3.38) 
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The  sign  of  (3.38)  determines  the  comparison  of  the  R&D  investments  of  the 
incumbent and the entrants.  
3.5.2. Exogenous entry 
3.5.2.1. Comparative statics 
The comparative statics of the R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants are 
analogous to the two other patent races with exogenous entry. Both the incumbent’s 
and the entrants’ investments are increasing in the sharing parameter V. Note however 
that the incumbent’s investments are less sensitive to a change in V than the entrants’ 
investments.  For  completeness,  Table  3.6  summarizes  the  tendencies  for  the 































































Table 3.6. Comparative statics in the asymmetric reward sharing patent race A2 with exogenous entry. 
                                                 
56 Subscript A2 refers to the asymmetric reward sharing scenario A2.   100 
3.5.2.1. Comparison the R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants 
Numerical simulations are necessary to compare the investments of the incumbent 
and the entrants. After all, the sign of (3.38) is unclear
57 as the first term is positive 
while  the  second  term  is  negative.  These  simulations  indicate  that  the  sign  of 
( ) 2 A g z can be negative (for high values of V) and positive (for small values of V). In 
other words, when there is sufficient reward sharing, Reinganum’s comparison of the 
investments of the incumbent and the entrants is reversed as the incumbent invests 
then more than each entrant, see Proposition 3.5 and Figure 3.5. However, when the 
incumbent’s current profits are very high, the entrants always invest more than the 
incumbent.  
 
Proposition 3.5. In a patent race with asymmetric market sharing (A2), in which a 
winning entrant shares with the other losing entrants, and with exogenous entry, an 
entrant  invests  more  than  the  incumbent  when  there  is  a  small  degree  of  market 
sharing (high values of V) while the incumbent invests more than each entrant when 
there is a large degree of market sharing (small values of V). For sufficiently high 
current profits of the incumbent, an entrant always invests more than the incumbent.  
 
With winner-takes-all, the incumbent always invests less than the entrants. However, 
when  there  is  reward  sharing,  the  incumbent’s  and  the  entrants’  investments  are 
reduced compared to the winner-takes-all setting but followers’ incentives are reduced 
more when there is a higher degree of reward sharing. This tendency can be compared 
with  the  negative  impact  of  the  follower-specific  spillover  among  competing 
followers  in  a  strategic  investment  game  with  leaders  and  followers  (see  section 
2.3.2). When the reward sharing is sufficiently large, its negative impact on entrants’ 
investments  offsets  the  negative  impact  of  the  current  patent  on  the  incumbent’s 
investments
58 and  explains why the incumbent may invest more than  the  entrants 
when reward sharing is sufficiently large. Reinganum’s (1985) finding can thus be 
altered when the value of V is sufficiently small. Note that, for very large values of 
                                                 
57 For V=1, it is known that (by making use of the first order condition of the followers): 
( )
( ) ( )
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 , cfr Reinganum (1985).  






 for all possible values of V.   101 
the  current  profits  of  the  incumbent,  the  entrants  always  invest  more  than  the 
incumbent. 
 
Thus, when the reward sharing among entrants is large enough, the incumbent is more 
likely to win the race by which there is a higher likelihood of leadership persistency. 
Here,  leadership persistence equals monopoly persistence as a winning incumbent 
does not share and thus captures the total value of the patent.  
 
Before  entrants  enter  this  kind  of  patent  races,  a  good  assessment  of  the  reward 
sharing parameter might  be valuable.  When  entrants can protect their  innovations 
effectively (and reward sharing is small), it is worthwhile for the entrants to give it a 
try. However, when the reward sharing is too large, the investments of the incumbent 
are  higher  by  which  an  entrant  is  less  likely  to  win  the  race  compared  to  the 
incumbent. Moreover, if an entrant wins, a large part of the prize is then shared with 
other  entrants.  Thus,  if  reward  sharing  is  too  large,  improving  on  protection 
instruments for innovations or not entering the race at all could be in the interest of 
the entrants. 
 
      n=2            n=5 
Figure 3.5. Asymmetric reward sharing A2 with exogenous entry. R&D investments of the incumbent 
and an entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = , n=2 and n=5. The full 
line represents the investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of 
an entrant (z).  
3.5.3. Endogenous entry 
With endogenous entry, the zero profit condition states: 
( ) ( ) ( ) 2 0 L
A ZPC h z P z F r nh z h z   = − − + + =       (3.39)   102 
This zero profit condition determines the equilibrium number of entrants n
*, which is 
decreasing in the investments of the incumbent. The combination of the zero profit 
condition and (3.35) yields: 
( )( ) ’ 1 h z P F σ − =   (3.40) 
From (3.40), the investments of the entrants z can be derived and it is clear that z, just 
like in the two other patent races with endogenous entry, does not depend on z
L. 
However, z depends on the degree of market sharing and it can easily be verified that 
z  is  an  increasing  function  of  the  sharing  parameter  V.  Moreover,  z  is  also 
independent of r and S. 
 
By using the zero profit condition of the entrants,  ( ) ( ) nh z




 can be calculated (see 
appendix):  ( ) ( ) ( ) ’
nh z
h x





. Substituting this expression in (3.38), evaluated in x=z, 
results in:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 2 ’ 1 L
A g z h z P r nh z h z     = − × + +        (3.41) 
Moreover,  as  ( ) ( ) ( ) ’





  (see  appendix),  the  following  condition  on  the  R&D 
investments for the incumbent prevails, by using (3.37): 
( ) ’ 1 L h z P =   (3.42) 
Equation (3.39) shows that the R&D investments of the incumbent are only dependent 
on and increasing in the value of the discovery P.  
3.5.3.1. Comparative statics 
The comparative statics of the efforts of the incumbent and the entrants can easily be 
derived using (3.40) and (3.42) and are summarized in table 3.7. As indicated by 
(3.42), the incumbent’s investments are independent of the market sharing parameter 
V, as a winning incumbent takes it all. R&D investments of the incumbent are of 
course increasing in the value of the discovery P, while being independent of all the 
other  remaining  parameters.  Investments  of  entrants  are  increasing  in  V  and 
increasing in P, while decreasing in the fixed costs F (see 3.40). Tendencies of the 
equilibrium number of entrants are the same as with symmetric reward sharing.  






Table 3.7. Comparative statics in the asymmetric reward sharing patent race A2 with endogenous entry. 
Current profits and the incumbent’s R&D investments 
Equation (3.42) states that the incumbent’s R&D investments are never affected by a 
change in the current profits. Indeed, for each degree of reward sharing, the zero 
profit condition states that:  
 
( ) ( ) ( )
L h z P z F r nh z h z   − = + +       (3.43) 
 
From  this  expression,  it  is  clear  that  the  incumbent  can  not  alter  the  aggregate 
probability of innovation by lowering its R&D efforts. Consequently, the level of 
current profits will not influence the R&D investment decision of the incumbent.  
3.5.3.2. Comparison of the R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants 
The  comparison  of  the  R&D  investments  of  the  incumbent  and  each  entrant  is 
straightforward as the sign of (3.38) is always positive. The finding of Etro (2004) 
appears to be robust for the introduction of this specific type of asymmetric reward 
sharing, see Proposition 3.6 and Figure 3.6.  
 
Proposition 3.6. In a patent race with endogenous entry and with asymmetric reward 
sharing A2, in which a winning entrant shares with the losing entrants, the incumbent 
always invests more than the entrants. 
 
The intuition of this result is straightforward. It has already been mentioned that with 
winner-takes-all, the incumbent invests more than each of the entrants as the only 
ambition of the incumbent is to win the race. Now, reward sharing further discourages 
R&D investments of the entrants, while the incumbent’s investments are unaffected 
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impact on the incumbent’s incentives. Consequently, the incumbent always invests 
more  than  the  entrants  by  which  leadership  persistence,  which  equals  monopoly 
persistence here, is most likely. Furthermore, the larger the reward sharing is (or the 
smaller V), the less likely an entrant is to win the race
59. Figure 3.6 illustrates. 
 
Just like with exogenous entry, the entrants should again think twice before entering 
the race. First, their individual chances to win the race are smaller than the incumbent, 
by which there is a high likelihood that their R&D investments will be lost. Secondly, 
in the less likely case that an entrant would win the race, the winner needs to share the 
prize with the other entrants. 
 
 
Figure 3.6. Asymmetric reward sharing A2 with endogenous entry. R&D investments of the incumbent 
and  an  entrant  in  function  of  V,  with  V=1000,  F=10,  r=0.10,  S=0  and  ( ) h x x = .  The  full  line 
represents the investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of each 
entrant (z).  
3.6. Expected profits of the incumbent and entrants 
In this section, the expected profits of the incumbent and the entrants are analyzed. 
For  patent  races  with  exogenous  entry,  comparative  statics  are  provided  and  the 
incumbent’s and the entrants’ profits are compared. For patent races with endogenous 
entry, the analysis limits itself to the comparative statics of the expected profits of the 
incumbent. After all, the expected profits of the incumbent are, by definition, always 
higher than the expected profits of the entrants, as expected profits of the incumbent 
                                                 
59 It is also possible to derive Proposition 3.4 by combining (3.40) and (3.42). 
From (3.40) and (3.42), it is known that  
( )
1
’ =  
P
L h z  and  ( )
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So,  ( ) ( ) ’ ’
L h z h z < . Using the properties of the h(.) function, it is clear that z
L>z.   105 
are assumed to be positive (positive profit condition) and followers’ expected profits 
equal zero (zero profit condition).  
3.6.1. Comparative statics with exogenous entry 
The comparative statics of the expected profits of the incumbent and the entrants in 
patent races with exogenous entry are presented in Tables 3.8a and 3.8b. Here, only a 
description  of  the  tendencies  is  provided.  The  reason  is  that,  with  the  available 
information, it is hard to predict and analyze comparative statics of expected profits. 
Consider  for  example  a  change  in  the  sharing  parameter  V.  From  the  previous 
sections, it is known that, with exogenous entry, an increase in the reward sharing 
parameter V encourages investments of the incumbent and the entrants. However, this 
knowledge  is  not  sufficient  to  predict  the  effect  of  an  increase  in  the  sharing 
parameter  on  expected  profits.  Firstly,  it  is  not  known  whether  these  higher 
investments increase or reduce the expected total R&D costs. After all, due to the 
higher investments, there is an earlier expected time of innovation but it is not clear 
whether this earlier innovation date compensates for the larger R&D investments per 
time unit. The impact of an increase in V on total expected R&D costs is thus not 
straightforward.  Secondly,  it  is  of  course  impossible  that,  by  increasing  their 
investments, both the incumbent and the entrants have a higher probability of winning 
the race. However, how the probability of innovation by the incumbent changes vis-à-
vis the probability of innovation by one of the entrants is not known.  
 
In all three reward sharing scenarios, an increase in the number of entrants negatively 
affects expected profits. After all, the more entrants there are, the more competitive 
the  racing  environment  is  by  which  expected  profits  are  reduced.  To  continue,  a 
higher  private  patent  value  of  the  innovation  always  has  a  positive  effect  on  the 
expected profits of the incumbent and the entrants. To continue, the current profits 
have a positive effect while the interest rate has a negative effect on expected profits 
of the incumbent and the entrants.  
 
With symmetric reward sharing, expected profits of the incumbent and the entrants 
decrease in V. In patent races with asymmetric sharing A1, there is still a negative 
impact of V on the expected profits of the entrants but expected incumbent’s profits 
are positively affected by V. When the asymmetric sharing takes the form of A2, the   106 
incumbent’s expected profits are decreasing in V and entrants’ expected profits are 






















































Table 3.8a. Impact of n, P, F, S and r on expected profits of the incumbent and the entrants in patent 
races with exogenous entry and all three types of reward sharing (S, A1 and A2). 
 






































∂  for large V 
Table 3.8b. Impact of V on the expected profits of the incumbent and the entrants in patent races with 
exogenous entry.  
3.6.2.  Comparison  of  expected  profits  of  the  incumbent  and  the 
entrants with exogenous entry 
Expected profits of the incumbent and the entrants are only compared for S=0. After 
all, sufficiently large current profits can always result in higher expected profits for 
the  incumbent,  even  if  V=1.  Numerical  simulations  are  used.  Proposition  3.7 
summarizes.  
 
Proposition  3.7.  In  patent  races  with  exogenous  entry,  S=0  and  reward  sharing, 
entrants generally realize higher expected profits than the incumbent. However, with 
reward  sharing  among  entrants  (A2),  the  incumbent  can  realize  higher  expected 
profits compared to the entrants, provided that the reward sharing is large enough 
(thus a small value of V). 
 
According to Proposition 3.7, the entrants always enjoy second mover advantages 
when there is symmetric (S) or asymmetric reward sharing A1. This tendency is a 
generalization  of  the  finding  of  Reinganum  (1985)  that  entrants  realize  higher 
expected profits than the incumbent when there is winner-takes-all. As the entrants   107 
always invest more in R&D in these two scenarios, their probability of innovation is 
always higher compared to the incumbent’s probability of innovation, which explains 
the higher expected profits of the entrants. This reasoning applies to all values of V. 
When there is asymmetric reward sharing A2, the incumbent may benefit, in terms of 
expected profits, from moving first in the R&D stage. When the winning incumbent 
takes it all while the winning entrant needs to share with other entrants, it could be 
that the incumbent’s expected profits are higher than the entrants’ expected profits 
when V is small enough (i.e. sufficient sharing of rewards). After all, when there is a 
large degree of reward sharing among entrants, R&D expenditures of the incumbent 
may be larger than investments of the entrants and first mover advantages may then 
prevail  as  the  incumbent  has  then  a  higher  probability  of  winning  the  race. 
Consequently,  reward  sharing  can,  in  some  specific  cases,  alter  the  prediction  of 
Reinganum (1985). Figures 3.7a, 3.7b and 3.7c present some graphical presentations 
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      n=1          n=5 
Figure 3.7a. Symmetric reward sharing with exogenous entry. Expected profits of the incumbent and an 
entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = , n=1 and n=5. The full line 
represents the investments of the incumbent (z






















      n=1          n=5 
Figure 3.7b. Asymmetric reward sharing A1 with exogenous entry. Expected profits of the incumbent 
and an entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = , n=1 and n=5. The full 
line represents the investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of 
















      n=2          n=5 
Figure 3.7c. Asymmetric reward sharing A2 with exogenous entry. Expected profits of the incumbent 
and an entrant in function of V, with P=1000, F=10, r=0.10, S=0,  ( ) h x x = , n=2 and n=5. The full 
line represents the investments of the incumbent (z
L) and the dashed line represents the investments of 
an entrant (z). 
3.6.3. Comparative statics with endogenous entry 
With  endogenous  entry,  it  is, just like  with  exogenous  entry,  hard  to predict  and 
analyze the comparative statics of the expected profits of the incumbent. Again, it is 
for example difficult to assess the impact of a change in R&D investments on the 
expected  value  of  total  R&D  costs.  Therefore,  this  section  is  limited  to  only  the 
description of the comparative statics. With endogenous entry (see  Table 3.9) the 
expected profits of the incumbent are increasing in the market sharing parameter V 
when there is symmetric sharing and asymmetric sharing A1. However, when there is 
asymmetric sharing A2, the expected profits of the incumbent are decreasing in V. 
Another  remarkable  tendency  is  that  the  expected  profits  of  the  incumbent  are   109 
decreasing in the value of the discovery P. To continue, the incumbent’s expected 
profits are decreasing in the fixed cost F and the interest r, but increasing in the 
current profits S.  
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Table  3.9.  Impact  of  V,  P,  F, S  and  r  on  expected  profits  of  the incumbent  in  patent races  with 
endogenous entry.  
3.7. Social planner 
In the last section of this study, R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants 
are compared with the optimal investments from the social planner’s point of view. 
The social planner maximizes total welfare, which equals the sum of producer and 
consumer surplus. Producer surplus is the sum of expected profits of the incumbent 
and the entrants. Consumer surplus is equal to the discounted value of the difference 
between the social value of the innovation and its private value. Indeed, the social 
value of an innovation is often higher than its private value. For example, Philipson 
and Jena (2006) estimate that innovators of the HIV/AIDS therapies, which entered 
the market from the late 1980s onwards, could only appropriate 5% of the social 
surplus. In dollar amounts, consumer surplus equaled  approximately $1,33 trillion 
while producer surplus only amounted to roughly $63 billion.  
 
Analytically, consumer and producer surplus are given by the following functions: 
  ( ) ( )




n L i h x h x P P S S
i CS
n i L r h x h x S S
j
   + −   ∑       =   =
+ + ∑
=
, and          (3.44) 
  ( ) ( )





n n L L i i L i L i V x x V x x x x S S S S S S
i i PS n F




+ + − −   ∑ ∑
  = =   = − +
+ + ∑
=
,       (3.45)   110 
with  P
*  indicating  the  social  value  of  the  innovation,  and  L xS and i xS the  optimal 
investments  of  the  incumbent  and  the  entrants  from  the  perspective  of  a  social 
planner.  
 
For all three reward sharing scenarios, inserting the expected profit functions
60 brings 
about the following analytical expression for producer surplus: 
  ( ) ( )
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.        (3.46) 
Consequently, total surplus, as  the  sum of PS  and CS,  is given by the following 
expression:  
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.        (3.47) 
From  (3.47),  it  is clear  that  total  surplus  is  not  dependent  on  the  reward  sharing 
parameter V. In other words, the social planner does not care if and how rewards of an 
innovation are shared among the winner and the losers of the race
61.  
 
Consequently, with exogenous entry, the only ambition of the social planner is to 
choose the optimal investments of the incumbent and the entrants. When there is free 
entry, the social planner moreover has to decide on the optimal number of entrants n*. 
More precisely, the objective functions for the social planner are the following:  
  for exogenous entry:    
( ) ( )




n h x P x
TS n F
r n h x xS
π   + + −     = − +
+ +  and  (3.48)  
  for endogenous entry:  
( ) ( )




n h x P x
TS n F
r n h x x n S
π   + + −     = − +
+ + ,  (3.49) 
with xS the optimal investments of the incumbent and the entrants.  
 
                                                 
60 The expected profit functions are given by (3.5) and (3.6) for the symmetric reward sharing scenario, 
by (3.19) and (3.20) for the asymmetric reward sharing scenario A1 and by (3.32) and (3.33) for the 
asymmetric reward sharing scenario A2.  
61  In the  analysis  here, the  social  value  of  the  innovation  P
* is  determined  exogenously.  It  could 
however be argued that the value of P
* depends on the degree of reward sharing. Indeed, if the winner 
takes it all, the winner becomes a monopolist while an oligopoly can result when there is reward 
sharing. As a monopoly results in higher prices, the social value P
* could be assumed to be higher 
when there is a larger degree of market sharing (thus a lower value for V would then result in a higher 
value of P
*).    111 
It turns out that, with exogenous entry, both the incumbent and the entrants always 
invest more in R&D than what is socially optimal. When entry is endogenous, the 
incumbent and the entrants also overinvest in R&D compared to the social optimum. 
Note that overinvestment in R&D by the incumbent and the entrants is most serious 
when there is winner-takes-all as in general, racing firms invest less in R&D when 
there is reward sharing
62. Only when the social value of the innovation is sufficiently 
larger than the private value, it could be that both the incumbent and the entrants 
invest less than the socially optimal amount of R&D expenditures. 
 
In addition, with endogenous entry, the problem of excessive R&D expenditures is 
further deteriorated as the number of  firms entering the race exceeds the  socially 
optimal number of entrants, provided that the social value does not exceed the private 
value too much.  
 
These findings are in line with previous research. For example, Reinganum (1989) 
claims that the following tendency is true for patent races:  
 
“The typical outcome of these comparisons [between models that compare 
noncooperative  investment  in  research  and  development  with  cooperative 
investment or the surplus-maximizing result] is that aggregate expenditure on 
R&D is too high relative to the cooperative [or surplus-maximizing] optimum; 
there are too many firms and each invests too much.” 
 
Consequently, the study shows that it can be in the government’s interest to tax R&D 
in order to reduce private R&D investments
63. This observation is similar to Li (2001) 
who  argues  that  radical  technological  breakthroughs,  i.e.  sufficiently  large  quality 
improvements, should be taxed. Moreover, it is found here that the degree of taxation 
should depend on the degree of reward sharing in the industry, which is determined 
by the strength of patent protection. 
                                                 
62  With  asymmetric  reward  sharing  A1,  only  incumbent’s  R&D  investments  are  reduced  when  V 
decreases. With asymmetric reward sharing A2, only entrants are discouraged to invest in R&D when 
there is more reward sharing.  
63 Remark that a decrease in R&D investments of the incumbent and the entrants results in a later 
introduction time of the innovation. As society is often better off with an early introduction of the 
innovation, the social value P
* of the innovation could be reduced when the innovation is introduced 
later.    112 
3.8. Conclusion 
The  study  in  this  chapter  contributes  to  the  debate  on  leadership  persistence  or 
technological leapfrogging when there is competition for the market. The new and 
important result is that leadership persistence or technological leapfrogging does not 
only depend on exogenous versus endogenous entry but also on the assumption of 
winner-takes-all versus reward sharing. More specifically, it is shown that leadership 
persistence  may  also  take  place  in  markets  with  exogenous  entry  whereas 
technological leapfrogging can also occur in markets with free entry.  
 
Indeed, when entry is assumed to be exogenous (the short run perspective), the study 
reveals that the incumbent invests in general less than the entrants. However, with 
reward sharing, this relationship may be reversed and leadership persistence is then 
more  likely.  This  latter  tendency  prevails  in  patent  races  in  which  a  winning 
incumbent takes it all but a winning entrant shares with the other entrants. Note that 
leadership persistence coincides here with monopoly persistence, as there is no reward 
sharing from the incumbent to the entrants.  
 
Moreover, with endogenous entry, introducing reward sharing can alter the winner-
takes-all tendency of leadership persistence. After all, when there is reward sharing 
from the incumbent to the entrants but not vice versa, the incumbent can be that much 
discouraged to invest by which leapfrogging might take place.   
 
The findings here contribute to the existing literature. Etro (2007) states:  
 
“We  do  not  want  to  give  the  message  that  persistent  monopolies  are 
necessarily the fruit of effective competition [free entry] for the market, but 
rather that they can be the fruit of effective competition.”  
 
The study in this chapter provides thus scenarios in which effective competition or 
free entry does not result in leadership persistence. Moreover, the study shows that 
leadership persistence can also occur in less competitive markets (exogenous entry). 
Thus,  in  addition  to  entry  conditions,  leadership  persistence  and  technological 
leapfrogging moreover depend on how rewards of the innovation are shared. All in   113 
all,  the  incorporation  of  symmetric  and  asymmetric  reward  sharing  can  help  the 
search for richer hypotheses to be tested in empirical work. 
 
Furthermore, we have also shown that both the incumbent and the entrants overinvest 
in  R&D  compared  to  the  social  optimum.  Moreover,  with  endogenous  entry,  too 
many  firms  participate  in  the  race.  This  could  clear  the  way  for  government 
intervention aiming at the reduction of excessive investments in R&D. Taxation of 
R&D investments could be one possible instrument. However, as the level of taxation 
depends then on several characteristics of the industry, such as the number of entrants 
and the degree of reward sharing, it may be clear that government’s task tends to be 
rather complicated.  
 
Finally, it would be interesting to analyze how R&D cartelization (maximization of 
joint profits) among entrants would change the results. After all, in chapter 2, it has 
been shown  that  R&D  cartelization among  followers  could  enhance  technological 
leapfrogging.  A  second  (obvious)  extension  would  be  to  assume  more  than  one 
incumbent  and  R&D  cartelization  among  the  incumbents.  An  interesting  question 
would also be to evaluate whether R&D cooperation in patent races can reduce the 
excessive R&D investments of incumbents and entrants.  
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4.  Cournot  versus  Bertrand  competition  with  cost-
reducing R&D and input spillovers 
Joint work with Professor Jeroen Hinloopen 
 
In this study, the economic performance of Cournot and Bertrand competition in a 
duopoly with substitutable goods is considered. Production costs are endogenous in 
the  sense  that,  before competing  in  the  product  market,  firms  can  invest  in  cost-
reducing R&D, either in competition or in cooperation with each other. Economic 
performance between these two competition modes is compared in terms of R&D 
investments,  profits,  prices  and  total  surplus.  The  study  indicates  that  markets  in 
which  there  is  less  competition  intensity  (Cournot  markets)  are  better  breeding 
grounds for R&D activity. Furthermore, it is shown that prices can be lower under 
Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition, both with R&D competition 
and  R&D  cooperation  in  the  first  stage.  This  occurs  when  the  R&D  process  is 
efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when products are not too differentiated. 
A key feature of the analysis is that technological spillovers are assumed to be an 
input of the R&D process rather than an output. As far as we know, this study is the 
first to report that with cost-reducing R&D and input spillovers, consumer surplus can 
be higher with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition, both in case of 
R&D  competition  and  R&D  cooperation.  So,  this  study  contributes  to  a  better 
understanding of the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition. Moreover, the 
study points out that firms’ R&D investments are always higher with Cournot than 
with Bertrand competition by which more insights in the relation between market 
structure and innovative activity are provided.  
4.1. Introduction  
When symmetric firms supply demand substitutes and market structure is exogenous, 
it  is  widely  held  that  competition  over  price  (Bertrand  competition)  yields  lower 
prices and higher quantities than competition over quantities (Cournot competition)
64. 
                                                 
64 When duopolists supply market complements, Bertrand competition still results in the lowest prices 
and highest static welfare, but firms’ profits are higher with competition over prices than competition 
over quantities (Singh and Vives, 1984). Häckner (2000) shows, however, that Cournot competition   120 
Accordingly, in the former profits are lower and consumer surplus is higher than in 
the latter. Moreover, the reduction in producer surplus with Bertrand competition is 
more than offset by the concomitant increase in consumer surplus, by which Bertrand 
markets turn out to be more efficient compared to Cournot markets. This renowned 
result was first established by Sing and Vives (1984) for a differentiated duopoly (a 
geometric  approach  of  this  result  can  be  found  in  Cheng  (1985))  and  has  been 
generalized by Vives (1985) for a differentiated oligopoly. When duopolistic firms are 
asymmetric (in terms of unit costs or demand), prices are still lower with Bertrand 
competition compared to Cournot competition but price competition can sometimes 
result in higher producer surplus compared  to quantity competition, namely when 
firms  are  highly  asymmetric  and  products  are  sufficiently  differentiated. 
Consequently, total welfare, as the sum of consumer and producer surplus, is still 
always higher with Bertrand competition than with Cournot competition (Zanchettin, 
2006).   
 
Considering  endogenous  market  structures  may  however  reverse  the  traditional 
welfare comparison of Cournot and Bertrand competition. Cellini et al. (2004) and 
Mukherjee  (2005)  show  that  under  free  entry,  total  welfare  can  be  higher  with 
quantity competition than with price competition when the products are sufficiently 
differentiated.  After  all,  the  number  of  firms  entering  under  Cournot  competition 
exceeds the number under Bertrand competition. The resulting increase in the number 
of product varieties can more than compensate for the higher price that always obtains 
under Cournot competition when products have a low degree of substitutability.  
 
Alternatively,  market  structure  can  also  be  endogenous  in  the  sense  that  the 
competition in the product market is preceded by a stage where firms bargain on 
wages  with  labor  unions  (Lopez  and  Naylor,  2004)  or  conduct  research  and 
development  (R&D)  aimed  at  increasing  product  quality  (Symeonidis,  2003)  or 
lowering production costs (Qiu, 1997). With wage bargaining in the first stage, only 
the profit comparison can be reversed (Lopez and Naylor, 2004). After all, when labor 
unions are  both relatively powerful  and place sufficient  weight  on wages in their 
objective functions, profits are higher with price than with quantity competition. Yet, 
                                                                                                                                          
can yield lower prices than Bertrand competition when more than two firms market complements and 
quality differences are large.    121 
consumer surplus and total welfare under Cournot competition always fall short of 
that under Bertrand competition. 
 
When the product market stage is preceded by a stage of investments in product or 
process R&D, welfare can be higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand 
competition as the incentives to invest in R&D are higher under the former than under 
the latter mode of competition (Qiu, 1997; Symeonidis, 2003)
65. For process R&D 
post-innovative production costs under Cournot competition are then reduced more 
than under Bertrand competition. With a symmetric cost structure, profits are larger 
under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition. This difference is then 
enhanced further if ex post production costs are lower under Cournot competition than 
under Bertrand competition. As a result, total welfare under Cournot competition can 
exceed total welfare under Bertrand competition (Qiu, 1997), despite the fact that the 
price under Bertrand competition is always lower than under Cournot competition. 
For  product  R&D  similar  results  apply  although  here  the  higher  welfare  under 
Cournot  competition  is  due  to  higher  qualities  which  directly  enhance  consumer 
surplus (Symeonidis, 2003).  
 
In this study, the celebrated result of Sing and Vives (1984) is qualified by showing 
that  Cournot  competition  can  yield  lower  prices  than  Bertrand  competition  in  a 
duopoly,  which  supplies  demand  substitutes,  with  endogenous  production  costs. 
Production costs are endogenous in the sense that both firms invest in cost-reducing 
R&D before competing in the product market with differentiated products. Both the 
setting with R&D competition and R&D cooperation in the first stage are analyzed. 
Besides  the  possibility  of  lower  prices  with  Cournot  compared  to  Bertrand 
competition,  the  study also  shows that R&D  investments are always higher when 
firms  compete  with  quantities,  which  is  in  line  with  Qiu  (1997)  and  Symeonidis 
(2003).  
 
                                                 
65 However, in some studies, the comparison of Cournot and Bertrand incentives is reversed. Firstly, 
when only one duopolist invests in cost-reducing R&D and there are no spillovers, Bester and Petrakis 
(1993) show that R&D incentives may be higher with Bertrand than with Cournot competition when 
the degree of product substitutability is sufficiently large. This result is due to the fact that, by investing 
heavily  in  cost-reducing  R&D  with  Bertrand  competition,  the  investing  firm  can  force  the  non-
investing  firm  out  of  the  market.  Secondly,  if  firms  conduct  both  process  and  product  R&D,  the 
incentives comparison across competition types might change as well (Lin and Saggi, 2002).    122 
A motivating example for the analysis in this chapter is the semiconductor industry. In 
this  industry,  competition  with  quantities  is  more  relevant  than  competition  with 
prices as capacities can not be expanded quickly due to capacity constraints. One of 
the characteristics of the semiconductor industry is the high R&D intensity of firms. 
For example, in 1989, the R&D intensity of firms in the semiconductor was more than 
12% (Irwin and Klenow, 1996). Moreover, the industry has been characterized by 
very rapid price declines. In the 1990s, for instance, prices have been falling with 
more than 36% per year by which low prices prevail in the semiconductor industry. 
These  decreases  in  prices  can,  to  some  extent,  be  attributed  to  technological 
innovations lowering the production costs
66 (Aizcorbe, 2002). This example suggests 
thus that low prices may prevail when firms compete with quantities
67.  
 
Apparently, the analysis here is closely related to that of Qiu (1997), but two major 
differences should be stressed, i.e. the way in which spillovers are modelled and the 
allowance for R&D cooperation in the R&D stage.  
 
In the study here, technological spillovers are considered to occur during the R&D 
process while Qiu (1997) assumes that final R&D results spill over. That is, input 
spillovers rather than output spillovers are considered. With output spillovers, it is 
assumed that part of the completed R&D project spills over to the rivals
68. However, 
when  input  spillovers  are  considered,  information  leaks  out  to  rivals  before  the 
completion of the R&D project, thus during the R&D process.  
 
There are at least three important motivations for considering input spillovers instead 
of  output  spillovers.  First,  empirical  studies  indicate  that  spillovers  indeed  occur 
during  the  R&D  process  (Kaiser,  2002).  This  finding  corresponds  to  the  three 
channels that Geroski (1995) identifies through which a technological spillover can 
                                                 
66 Other factors contribute to the price declines as well. For example, learning-by-doing has also been 
playing an important role in the falling prices in the semiconductor industry (Irwin and Klenow, 1994). 
 
67 The alternative pricing pattern when firms would compete with prices in the semiconductor industry 
is of course not available.  
68 Reverse engineering may serve as an example of a channel through which output spillovers can take 
place. For instance, at the end of the Second World War, when the first German V-1 flying bomb or 
cruise  missile  struck  in  England  on  June  12,  1944,  American  engineers  started  applying  reverse 
engineering to the components of the V-1 bomb. This resulted in the first successful test flight of the 
JB-2, the American version of guided missiles, only a few months later (October 1944).  
Source: Cummings in IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Winter 2003/2004.     123 
occur:  (i)  the  exchange  of  ideas  through  publications,  casual  encounters  and  at 
seminars, (ii) the flow of knowledge when a knowledge worker changes employer, 
and (iii) the deduction of the line of reasoning of rivals by observing their behaviour. 
Thus, R&D from one firm to another mostly spills over during the R&D process, by 
which these spillovers are called input spillovers.  
 
Second, Qiu (1997) assumes the R&D results of one firm to be perfectly additive to 
its  rival’s  R&D  results. However,  there are  at  least  three  reasons  to  question  this 
assumption. Note that the two firms operate in the same product market while initially 
using the same production technology. It is then most likely that there will be some 
overlap in their independently obtained research results that are aimed at reducing the 
costs of production. Also, the parts that do not overlap are expected not to be a perfect 
match to rival’s research results. Finally, differences in corporate culture, research 
strategies,  and internal organization  hamper  any  firm's  ability  to  fully  appropriate 
rival's research results. In sum, high levels of technological output spillovers are not 
likely to be observed (Gerschbach and Schmutzler (2003) take an extreme position 
here by assuming that all of any firm's R&D results are perfectly additive to any of its 
rivals' R&D results). 
 
Third, Qiu (1997) assumes diminishing returns to scale in R&D. In combination with 
additive  output  spillovers  this  has  a  counter-intuitive  implication.  If  one  firm  has 
spent more on R&D than its rival, it could be in the interest of the former to donate its 
next R&D investment dollar to its rival and to appropriate the R&D results through 
the technological spillover. If these spillovers are substantial this could result in a 
more effective additional cost reduction than spending this last R&D dollar on own 
R&D (Amir, 2000). 
 
Another important difference between this study and that of Qiu (1997) is that here, 
the  efficiency  of  Cournot  and  Bertrand  markets  is  not  only  analyzed  for  R&D 
competition but also for R&D cooperation in the investment stage
69. After all, a well-
known and important aspect of R&D is its public good character, which is reflected in 
the  free  flow  of  knowledge  that  is  generated  by  any  firm  conducting  R&D  (the 
                                                 
69 In this chapter, R&D cooperation is defined as the maximization of joint profits without increasing 
the knowledge spillover (cfr. R&D cartelization in chapter 2). .    124 
technological  spillover).  According  to  Kamien  et  al.  (1992)  this  technological 
spillover creates two externalities that influence firms’ R&D investment decisions
70. 
First  there  is  the  competitive  advantage  externality  whereby  any  firm’s  R&D 
activities strengthen rivals’ position in the product market through the reduction in 
rivals’ production costs. This reduces the incentives to conduct R&D, by which this 
externality is always negative. Second, any firm’s reduction in production costs adds 
to  the  joint  profits.  This  combined-profits  externality  can  be  either  positive  or 
negative. The weaker the technological spillover is, the more likely it is that this 
externality is negative. Indeed, only in case the technological spillover is substantial, 
the rivals’ research effort contributes to own profits through the concomitant cost 
reduction. Firms competing in R&D only consider the first externality when deciding 
how  much  to  invest  in  R&D.  R&D  cooperatives  also  take  the  combined-profits 
externality into account. Consequently, it can be expected that comparing Bertrand 
and Cournot markets will yield different results dependent on R&D competition or 
R&D cooperation in the first stage.  
 
For these reasons, the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition is re-examined 
assuming  input  spillovers  and  R&D  competition  or  R&D  cooperation  in  the  first 
stage.  Moreover,  firm’s  incentives  under  Cournot  and  Bertrand  competition  are 
compared.  In  passing,  a  technical  error  in  Qiu  (1997),  related  to  the  stability  of 
equilibria when R&D is a strategic substitute, is revealed.  
 
Note that the ambition of this study is not to compare the economic performance of 
R&D competition with R&D cooperation, as this has already been done before. When 
firms  compete  with  quantities,  R&D  cooperation  yields  higher  R&D  investments, 
consumer and total surplus compared to R&D competition if, and only if, the spillover 
is larger than T/2 (with T indicating the degree of product differentiation
71). When 
firms compete with prices, the spillover also needs to exceed a certain threshold value 
in  order  R&D  cooperation  yields  higher  investments,  consumer  and  total  surplus. 
More specifically, this critical spillover is equal to T/(2-T
2) (Hinloopen, 1997).  
 
                                                 
70 A more detailed description of these two externalities can be found in Hinloopen (1997).  
71 When  =1, products are homogeneous. When  =0, products are completely differentiated.    125 
The main results of our study are the following. It is found that, both with R&D 
competition and cooperation, firms always invest more in cost-reducing R&D when 
they compete with quantities. Moreover, the study reports the important new message 
that prices can be lower under Cournot competition, namely when products are not 
that  differentiated,  when  technological  spillovers  are  strong,  and  when  the  R&D 
production process is sufficiently efficient. It is precisely under these circumstances 
that the incentives to conduct R&D are much larger under Cournot competition than 
under Bertrand competition as in this case much more of the benefits of any cost 
reduction are transferred to consumers when there is price competition. As a result, 
post innovation costs are much lower under Cournot competition, which translates 
into  a  lower  equilibrium  price.  The  range  of  cases  for  which  total  surplus  under 
Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger, as profits 
under Bertrand competition are always below those under Cournot competition.  
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model. 
In section 4.3., R&D investments, profits and prices are compared between Cournot 
and Bertrand competition given R&D competition. In section 4.4., the same analysis 
is done for R&D cooperation. Section 4.5 concludes.   
4.2. The model 
A two-stage game is considered. In the first stage firms invest in cost-reducing R&D. 
In the second stage they compete with either prices or quantities. Market demand in 
indirect form is linear and is given by
72: 
( ) i i j p a q q θ = − + ,  (4.1) 
 
i,j=1,2, i￿j, where pi and qi are the respective price and quantity of product i, and 
where   captures the extent to which products are differentiated; in case  =1 products 
are homogeneous while  =0 corresponds to completely differentiated products (i.e. 
both firms have a local monopoly). These polar cases are further ignored, that is, 
±]0,1[. Unless stated otherwise, i,j=1,2, i￿j holds throughout the rest of the paper. 
Market demand in direct form is then given by: 
                                                 
72 This follows from a standard quadratic utility function, see Singh and Vives (1984).   126 




i i j q a p p θ θ
θ
  = − − −   −
.  (4.2) 
 
The industry consists of two firms each producing one version of the differentiated 
product. Ex ante marginal costs of production, c, are exogenously determined and are 
the same for the two firms. It is assumed that both firms are active, that is, c<a. These 
ex ante production costs can be reduced by investing in process-innovating R&D. 
Note that if one firm conducts R&D, the rival firm can absorb part of this effort 
without having to pay for it
73. Accordingly, if firm i invests xi in R&D, its effective 
R&D investments Xi are given by: 
i i j X x x β = + .  (4.3) 
 
,Q￿￿￿￿￿￿￿￿ ±[0,1] represents the technological spillover. From this equation, it is clear 
that, due to the spillover, part of the inputs of the rival firm j can be absorbed by firm 
i, therefore, the spillovers is called input spillover
74. The reduction in the marginal 
cost brought about by these R&D investments is determined by an R&D production 
function f. This function is a mapping from effective R&D inputs to cost reductions. 
Following Kamien et al. (1992) diminishing returns to scale in R&D are assumed: 







= ,  (4.4) 
whereby  >0 determines the efficiency of the R&D phase. The higher the value of   
is, the less efficient the R&D production function is, as a given amount of R&D 
inputs then results in a smaller reduction in unit costs. Note that in this setting the 
technological spillover is an input of the R&D process. Firm i’s profits then equal 
i i i x π Π = − ,  (4.5) 
                                                 
73 It is understood that firms have to conduct at least some R&D themselves to share in the rival’s R&D 
activities (for an early recognition of this point see Cohen and Levinthal, 1989). We abstain from 
modelling this absorptive capacity as it would make the analysis intractable (see Kamien and Zang, 
2000). 
74 Note the difference with the model with output spillovers (see d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). 




τ . The resulting cost reduction (the R&D 
output) for firm i is equal to xi. Moreover, part of the output of firm j, xj, spills over to firm i, by which 
the total reduction in unit costs for firm i amounts to xi+Exj. Thus, clearly, in the model of d’Aspremont 
and Jacquemin, the spillover E transfers R&D outputs from firm j to firm i.    127 
with  ( ) i i i i i p q c y q π = − − and  ( ) i i j y x x β γ = + . 
 
First,  the  scenario  with  R&D  competition  is  solved  and  analyzed  (section  4.3), 
followed by the R&D cooperation scenario (section 4.4).  
4.3. R&D competition 
Both the Cournot and Bertrand game are solved by backward induction. Moreover, 
regularity  conditions  need  to  be  taken  into  account,  which  limit  the  admissible 
parameter space. Then, it is possible to compare R&D investments, profits, prices and 
total welfare under Bertrand and Cournot competition.  
4.3.1. Market equilibria 
4.3.1.1. Second-stage Bertrand competition   











a c y y
p X X c
θ θ θ
θ
− + − − −
− =
−
.  (4.6) 
Inserting (4.6) into (4.5) and maximizing the resulting profits over R&D investments 
results in the following cost reduction
76, 
77: 
￿ ( )( )









γ θ θ θ θ θβ
− − −
=
+ − − − − −
,  (4.7) 
and concomitant total output: 
i ( )( )









γ θ θ θ θ θβ
− −
=
+ − − − − −
.  (4.8) 
Single-firm equilibrium profits then equal: 
i ( )( )( ) ( )
( )( )
￿ ( )
2 2 2 2 2
2
2 2
1 1 4 2
1 4
B B q
γ θ θ θ θ θβ
γ β θ
+ − − − − −
Π =
+ −
,  (4.9) 
where  i ￿ 2 B B Q q = . Consumer surplus and total surplus are then respectively given by: 
                                                 
75 A hat refers to a conditional equilibrium outcome. 
76 A tilde refers to an unconditional equilibrium expression; superscript B stands for second-stage 
Bertrand competition. 
77 The concomitant second-order and stability conditions are dealt with below.   128 
j ( ) ￿ ( )
2
1 B B CS q θ = +   (4.10) 
and: 
j ( )( )( ) ( ) ( )
( )( )
￿ ( )
2 2 2 2
2
2 2
1 1 4 3 2 2 2
1 4
B B TS q
γ β θ θ θ θ θβ
γ β θ
+ + − − − − −
=
+ −
.  (4.11) 
4.3.1.2. Second-stage Cournot competition 
Maximizing (4.5) over quantities gives us: 
￿ ( )
( )( )









γ θ θ θβ
− −
=
+ − − −
.  (4.12) 
Maximizing each firm’s profits over R&D investments after inserting (4.12) into (4.5) 
yields as cost reduction and concomitant total output level
78: 
￿ ( )( )








γ θ θ θβ
− −
=
+ − − −
,  (4.13)  
and: 
i ( )( )









γ θ θ θβ
− −
=
+ − − −
.  (4.14) 
Single-firm profits are given by: 









γ β θ θβ
γ β θ
+ − − −
Π =
+ −
,  (4.15) 
with  i ￿ 2 C C Q q = .  Consumer  surplus  and  total  welfare  under  second-stage  Cournot 
competition then equal: 
j ( ) ￿ ( )
2
1 C C CS q θ = + ,  (4.16) 
and: 






1 3 4 2 2
1 4
C C TS q
γ β θ θ θβ
γ β θ
+ + − − −
=
+ −
.  (4.17) 
                                                 
78 Superscript C stands for second-stage Cournot competition.   129 
4.3.2. Regularity conditions 
The  R&D  stage  gives  rise  to  eight  regularity  conditions.  In  addition  to  the  two 
second-order conditions, post-innovation costs have to be positive and the equilibrium 
has to be stable. The second-order conditions under Bertrand and Cournot competition 
require, respectively: 
( )
( )( ) ( )
3 2





θ θ θ θβ
− −
≥
− − − −
,  (R1) 
and 
( )











.  (R2) 
Under Bertrand and Cournot competition positive post-innovation costs respectively 
imply: 
( )




























.  (R4) 
 
Finally, the Routh-Hurwitz stability condition is that: 
l ( ) l ( ) l ( ) l ( )
2 2 2 2
2 2
, , , ,
0
i j i j i j i j i j i j
i j i j i j
x x x x x x x x
x x x x x x
∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π ∂ Π
− >
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
.  (4.18) 
 
This condition depends on the strategic nature of the R&D process. Following Bulow 
























Accordingly,  in  a  symmetric  equilibrium  condition  (4.18)  boils  down  to  (see 
Hinloopen, 2007):   130 
( ) ( )
2 2
2
, , i i j i i j
i j i
x x x x
x x x
∂ Π ∂ Π
<
∂ ∂ ∂
,  (4.19) 
for strategic substitutes. For strategic complements it reads as: 
( ) ( )
2 2
2
, , i i j i i j
i j i
x x x x
x x x
∂ Π ∂ Π
< −
∂ ∂ ∂
.  (4.20) 
 
Under Bertrand competition these two stability conditions respectively translate into: 
( )




4 2 1 2
θ θβ
γ
θ θ θ θ θβ
− −
≥
− + − − +
,  (R5) 
and 
( )











.  (R6) 
In case of Cournot competition the two stability conditions are: 
( )
























.  (R8) 
 
Five of these regularity conditions are redundant as the following Lemma shows. 
 
Lemma 1. Five of the eight regularity conditions can be ignored as they are less 
binding  than  the  three  remaining  regularity  conditions.  More  specifically,  the 
parameter space is bounded by regularity conditions R4, R5 and R7. 
 
Proof. It is immediate that R4 dominates R3, that R5 dominates R6, and that R7 
dominates R8. Also, R5 dominates R1 and R7 dominates R2. 
 
Note that Qiu (1997) considers the stability conditions only in case of R&D being a 
strategic complement. In his model the stability conditions for R&D as a strategic   131 
substitute under Cournot and Bertrand competition are respectively given by (using 












,  (4.21) 
and 
( )( )











,        (4.22) 
ZKHUH￿ ±[0,1] is the output spillover, where v is the measure of the efficiency of the 
5￿'￿SURFHVV￿￿DQG￿ZKHUH￿ ±[0,1] indicates the extent of product differentiation. The 
analysis of Qiu (1997) applies only to R&D that is a strategic complement as it is 
straightforward to show that conditions (4.21) and (4.22) are more binding than the 
stability conditions when R&D is a strategic complement. 
4.3.3. Cournot versus Bertrand 
4.3.3.1. R&D investments 
Comparing R&D efforts of the different competition modes leads to the following 
Proposition: 
 
Proposition  4.1.  When  firms  compete  in  R&D,  their  R&D  investments  and 
concomitant cost reductions are always larger with Cournot compared to Bertrand 
competition.  
 
Proof.  ￿ ￿ ( )( )( ) ( )( )
2 1 2 2 2 2 C B y y θ θ θβ θ θ θβ > ⇔ + − − > + − − , or 1 β > − .  
Moreover,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
C B C B y y x x > ⇔ > .  
 
According to Proposition 4.1, R&D activity is higher under Cournot competition than 
under  Bertrand  competition.  This  result  is  not  that  surprising  and  replicates  Qiu 
(1997) who points out that there are four effects at work when firms decide upon their 
R&D investments, i.e. a cost effect, a size effect, a spillover effect and a strategic 
effect. Analyzing the sign of these effects contributes to the understanding and the   132 
intuition of this result. A detailed analytical derivation of these signs is presented in 
the appendix of this chapter. 
 





effect (-) size effect (+) strategic effect (+) spillover effect (-)
1
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j j i i i i i i
C C
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y y q
x q q q q y y y y y q
π π β π π
γ γ γ
    ∂   ∂Π ∂ − ∂ ∂
= + + + −       ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ Ψ Ψ ∂           ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿ ￿ .  
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1
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B B
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x p p p p p p y y y y y p
π π β π π
γ γ γ
    ∂ ∂   ∂Π ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂





For both Bertrand and Cournot competition, the signs of the cost, size and spillover 
effect are the same. Firstly, the cost effect is negative as R&D is costly, resulting in 
disincentives for firms to invest in R&D. Secondly, the more a firm produces, the 
more this firm is willing to invest in R&D by which the size effect is thus positive. 
After all, the higher the output is, the larger the gain from a cost-reduction is. Thirdly, 
the spillover effect is negative as, due to the knowledge spillover, the rival firm can, 
to some extent, free ride on the efforts of the other firm, thereby reducing the R&D 
incentives of the latter.  
 
But, fourthly, the sign of the strategic effect is different between quantity and price 
competition. In Cournot markets this strategic effect is positive. After all, by investing 
in R&D, firm i lowers its production costs and the firm with the lower production 
costs is the tougher competitor who has  the largest market  share and realizes the 
highest profits. Using the terminology of Fudenberg and Tirole (1984), the investing 
firm  i  pursues  a  top  dog  strategy
79  as  it  has  an  incentive  to  increase  its  R&D 
investments because these higher investments result in higher profits at the expense of 
its rival.  
 
                                                 
79 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). A firm is called a top dog when its commitment is tough and the 
stage two variables are strategic substitutes. Indeed, an investment in cost-reducing R&D by firm i 
results in a higher output of firm i (tough investment) and quantities are strategic substitutes in Cournot 
markets.    133 
In Bertrand markets this strategic effect is negative as any reduction in production 
costs and its resulting decrease in price by firm i induce its rival j to cut its price as 
well. Consequently, in order to avoid such aggressive moves, the investing firm may 
be better off by reducing its R&D investments, which is typical for a puppy dog
80. 
  
Consequently,  firms  are  more  willing  to  invest  in  R&D  when  there  is  Cournot 
competition. The switch from output spillovers to input spillovers does not affect this 
reasoning. The ranking in Proposition 4.1 is also found by Breton et al. (2004) who 
replicate the analysis of Qiu (1997) within an infinite horizon setting. 
 
The actual difference in R&D activity that leads to the ranking in Proposition 4.1 is 
closely related to the efficiency of the R&D process. That is: 
 
Lemma 4.2. With R&D competition, the difference in R&D activity between Cournot 
and Bertrand competition is larger the more efficient the R&D process is.   
 
Proof. Note that  
￿ ￿ ( )( )( )









γ θ θ θβ γ θ θ θ θ θβ
− + −
− =
   + − − − + − − − − −   
. 
Then, observe that 








C B y y θβ θ θβ
γ
γ θ θ
− − − ∂ −
> ⇔ >
∂ + −
. This last condition 
is  less  binding  than  R7  if,  and  only  if, 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )
3 2 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 2 2 0 θβ θ θ θ θβ θ θβ − + − − − − − + > .  Considering  the  left-
hand  side  (LHS)  of  this  last  inequality,  the  result  then  follows  as 
{ } , 1 0
min lim 0 LHS LHS θ β β θ = →
= = . 
 
The larger the reduction in production costs for any level of R&D investments is, the 
more prominent the strategic effect is that affects  any firm’s  incentive to  conduct 
                                                 
80 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1984). A firm is called a puppy dog when its commitment is tough and 
the stage two variables are strategic complements. Indeed, the investment of firm i is tough as an 
investment in R&D results in a lower price of firm i and prices are strategic complements in Bertrand 
markets.   134 
R&D. Hence, the more efficient the R&D process is (thus the lower the value for J 
is), the larger the difference in R&D investments is under Cournot competition vis-à-
vis Bertrand competition. 
 
Note that the difference between investments under Cournot and Bertrand competition 
is also larger the less differentiated the products are. Indeed, the reward in terms of 
market  share  for  an  investing  firm  with  Cournot  competition  is  larger  the  less 
differentiated products are whereas with Bertrand competition the price cut by one 
firm  as  a  response  to  a  price  decrease  by  its  rival  tends  to  be  larger  the  less 
differentiated products are. Consequently, the more substitutable products  are, the 
larger the wedge between Cournot and Bertrand investment incentives is.  
 
Moreover,  the  difference  between  investments  under  Cournot  and  Bertrand 
competition  is  increasing  in  the  spillover.  After  all,  the  more  intense  market 
competition is, the more firms are discouraged by larger free riding opportunities by 
rivals. Consequently, an increase in the spillover discourages Bertrand firms more 
than Cournot firms as Bertrand competition is more intense than Cournot competition. 
These two comparative statics were also found by Symeonidis (2003).  
4.3.3.2. Profits 
Under  Cournot  competition  firms  invest  more  in  R&D  than  under  Bertrand 
competition (Proposition 4.1). And larger R&D investments reduce profits, all else 
equal. However, under Cournot competition,  the  resulting reductions in unit costs 
more than compensate for these higher R&D investments, by which profits are always 
higher  with  Cournot  competition  than  with  Bertrand  competition.  This  result 
generalizes the traditional ranking of profits (and thus producer surplus) under both 
modes  of  competition,  as  was  found  by  Singh  and  Vives  (1984).  The  following 
Proposition summarizes this finding. Consequently, firms are always both better off 
when they compete with quantities compared to prices.  
 
Proposition  4.2.  With  R&D  competition,  firms’  profits  are  always  higher  with 
Cournot than with Bertrand competition.  
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Proof. First note that i i ( ) ( ) ( )
2 1 C B a c A B γ β Π −Π = − − + , where 
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. 
Then observe that: 
 








θ θ β θ θ
γ
θ θ
− − − − −
Π −Π > ⇔ >
+ −
. 
This  last  condition  is  less  binding  than  condition  R7  if,  and  only 
if,( ) ( ) ( )
2 3 3 2 2 1 32 16 12 16 2 1 8 8 1 0 β θ θ θβ θ β θ β θ β β θ β     − + − − − + + + − + >     . 
Considering  the  LHS  of  this  last  inequality  the  result  then  follows  as 
{ } , 1 0
min lim 0 LHS LHS θ β β θ = →
= = . 
 
Consequently, it could be in the interest of both firms to compete with quantities. 
However, the competition modes in industries are often determined by the underlying 
technology. Indeed, firms tend to compete with quantities in industries characterized 
by  capacity  constraints  (for  example  the  automobile  industry)  whereas  Bertrand 
competition  is  more  relevant  in  industries  in  which  there  are  no  constraints  on 
capacity. Consider for example the market for downloadable music. In this market, it 
is hard, not to say impossible, for firms to credibly commit to a certain capacity as it 
is impossible to limit the number of downloads of songs. After all, capacity can be 
expanded very quickly, by which firms will soon end up in Bertrand competition. 
 
To  continue,  as  post-innovation  production  costs  are  lower  under  Cournot 
competition,  this  larger  producer  surplus  can  compensate  for  the  lower  consumer 
surplus in Cournot  markets compared  to Bertrand  markets by which total  welfare   136 
might be higher with quantity competition than with price competition. But before 
total surplus is analyzed, consumer surplus is considered first. 
 
4.3.3.3. Price 
For  comparing  prices  under  Cournot  and  Bertrand  competition,  the  following 







  (A1) 
If assumption A1 holds, the R&D process is labeled ‘efficient' as a small value for J 
corresponds to a relatively large reduction in unit costs for a given amount of R&D 
inputs  (see  section  4.2).  According  to  Lemma  4.2,  This  corresponds  to  situations 
where post-innovation costs under Cournot competition are particularly low compared 
to post-innovation costs under Bertrand competition, as it is known that the difference 
in R&D investments and concomitant cost reductions are larger the more efficient the 
R&D process is (see Lemma 4.2). As will be shown below, this difference in ex post 
unit costs can be that large that the equilibrium price can be lower under Cournot 
competition than under Bertrand competition. First note that the assumption A1 of an 
efficient R&D process does not rule out the existence of equilibria: 
 
Lemma 4.3. The set where regularity conditions R4, R5, R7 and assumption A1 hold 
is not empty. 
 
Proof. For A1 and R4 to hold jointly it is required that  ( ) ( ) 1 / 2 / 2 a c θ θβ < < + − , or 
( ) ( ) 2 a c a c θ β − < + . Indeed, a and c can always be chosen such that this inequality 
holds.  For  A1  and  R5  to  hold  jointly  it  is  required  that 
( ) ( )( )( )
2 2 2 1 2 / 2 1 2 θ θβ θ θ θ θβ   > − − + − − +    or 
( )( ) ( )
2 2 3 6 3 1 36 16 19 9 / 2 f β θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ   > − − − − + − − =  
 
.  Note  that  f( )  is 
















= .  For  A1  and  R7  to  hold  jointly  it  is  required  that 
( ) ( )( )
2 1 2 / 2 2   θβ θ θβ   > − − +   or  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 6 18 2 /2 g β θ θ θ θ θ > − − − − = .  Note   137 
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= − ≈ . 
 
Figure 4.1 displays the admissible parameter space and assumption A1 for particular 
values of a, c, and  . Note that from the proof of Lemma 4.3 it follows that f( )-
g( )>0, ￿￿ ±]0,1[. Hence, under assumption A1 the admissible parameter space is 
confined by regularity conditions R4 and R5. It is now possible to state the main 
result of the analysis: 
   
Figure 4.1. Comparing consumer surplus with Cournot and Bertrand competition under assumption A1 
and regularity conditions R4 and R5 (a=100, c=70,  =7/25) with R&D competition.  
 
Proposition 4.3. With R&D competition, prices are lower under Cournot competition 
than under Bertrand competition when the R&D process is efficient, spillovers are 
high and products are not that differentiated.  
 
Proof.  Lower  prices  obtain  under  Cournot  competition  than  under  Bertrand 
competition if, and only if,  i i Q Q C B > , or  ( ) 1/ 4 ² γ θ < − . 
 
Proposition  4.3  conveys  the  new  message  of  this  study.  In  a  duopoly  with 
substitutable  products,  total  quantities  produced  can  be  higher  under  Cournot 
competition than under Bertrand competition. Or, in other words, prices can be lower 
when  firms  compete  with  quantities  than  when  they  compete  with  prices.  This 
happens when post-innovation costs under Cournot competition are sufficiently below 
post-innovation  costs  under  Bertrand  competition.  Considering  the  admissible 
parameter  space  in  Lemma  4.3,  this  occurs  when  the  R&D  process  is  efficient, 
spillovers are substantial, and products are not that differentiated. It is precisely under   138 
these circumstances that the benefits of any cost reduction are transferred to a much 
larger  extent  to  consumers  under  Bertrand  competition  than  under  Cournot 
competition or, in other words, it is precisely then that the strategic effect is most 
prominent. Consequently, the difference between R&D investments between Cournot 
and Bertrand competition is then that large by which production costs under Cournot 
competition  are  much  lower  than  under  Bertrand  competition.  Due  to  this  large 
difference in ex post unit costs, it is possible that the equilibrium price is lower with 
Cournot than with Bertrand competition.  
 
When prices are lower with Cournot than with Bertrand competition, the reverse is 
true for consumer surplus. Consumers can thus be better off with Cournot competition 
than with Bertrand competition when the spillovers are high, products are not that 
differentiated and the R&D process is efficient. Less intense competition modes, such 
as  Cournot  competition,  may  thus  sometimes  result  in  higher  consumer  surplus, 
compared to more intense competition modes, such as Bertrand competition.  
4.3.3.4. Welfare 
As producer surplus is always higher under Cournot competition than under Bertrand 
competition (Proposition 4.2), the result in Proposition 4.3 carries over to total surplus 
as  both  consumer  and  producer  surplus  are  then  higher  with  competition  over 
quantities than with competition over prices: 
 
Proposition  4.4.  With  R&D  competition,  total  surplus  is  higher  under  Cournot 
competition  than  under  Bertrand  competition  when  the  R&D  process  is  efficient, 
spillovers are high and products are not that differentiated.   
 







), it is still possible 
that  total surplus under Cournot  competition exceeds  total surplus under Bertrand 
competition.  In  that  case,  consumer  surplus  is  lower  when  firms  compete  over 
quantities  (Proposition  4.3).  But  this  lower  consumer  surplus  is  then  more  than 
compensated for by the higher producer surplus under Cournot competition, provided 
strict positive technological spillovers. After all, when there are no spillovers, total   139 
surplus is always higher with Cournot competition compared to Bertrand competition, 
as is formalized in Proposition 4.5.  
 
Proposition 4.5. With R&D competition, total surplus is always higher with Bertrand 
competition  than  with  Cournot  competition,  provided  that  there  are  no  spillovers 
(E=0) and that the R&D process is not that efficient.  
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
   
When input spillovers are absent, the traditional welfare comparison emerges in case 







). However, for positive 
input  spillovers  the  difference  in  R&D  investment  incentives  under  Cournot  and 
Bertrand competition becomes more pronounced. Indeed, a threshold value of the 
input  spillover  exists  beyond  which  total  surplus  is  larger  if  firms  compete  over 
quantity rather than over price: 
 








), total surplus can be higher under Cournot than under Bertrand 
competition  when  the  spillover  is  sufficiently  high  and  the  R&D  process  is  still 
sufficiently efficient.  
 
Proof. See Appendix.  
 
Technological  spillovers  carry  a  positive  externality  that  raises  total  surplus.  The 
combination  of  large  R&D  investments  and  strong  technological  spillovers 
contributes in particular to total surplus. Hence, as under Cournot competition R&D 
investments  exceed  those  under  Bertrand  competition,  total  surplus  can  be  larger 
under quantity competition when the input spillover is strong enough, provided that 
the R&D process is not that efficient (as in A1), but still efficient enough. When the 
R&D  process  is  rather  inefficient,  total  surplus  is  always  higher  under  Cournot 
competition.     140 
4.4. R&D cooperation 
In this section, it is analyzed whether the observed tendencies with R&D competition 
still apply when firms are allowed to cooperate in R&D before competing on the 
market. R&D cooperation is here defined as the coordination of strategies, without 
increasing the spillovers
81. Again, both the Bertrand and Cournot game are solved by 
backward induction. Regularity conditions determine the admissible parameter space 
in which the performance of Cournot and Bertrand markets needs to be compared. 
Note that it is assumed that R&D cooperation never leads to collusion on the output 
market, although some studies show that cooperation in R&D makes it more likely 
that firms collude on the product market (Martin, 1995; Suetens, 2008).  
4.4.1. Market equilibria 
4.4.1.1. Second-stage Bertrand competition 
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Inserting (4.23) into (4.5) and maximizing the resulting sum of firms’ profits over 
R&D investments results in the following cost reduction
83, 
84: 
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and concomitant total output: 
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Single-firm equilibrium profits then equal: 
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81 In the terminology of chapter 2, firms form an R&D cartel.  
82 A hat refers to a conditional equilibrium outcome. 
83 A tilde refers to an unconditional equilibrium expression; superscript B stands for second-stage 
Bertrand competition. 
84 The concomitant second-order conditions are dealt with below.   141 
where  i ￿ 2 B B Q q = . Consumer surplus and total surplus are then respectively given by: 
j ( ) ￿ ( )
2
1 B B CS q θ = + ,  (4.27) 
and: 
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−
.  (4.28) 
4.4.1.2. Second-stage Cournot competition 
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Maximizing  the  sum  of  both  firms’  profits  over  R&D  investments  after  inserting 
(4.29) into (4.5) yields as cost reduction and concomitant total output level
85: 
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and: 
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Single-firm profits are given by: 
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with  i ￿ 2 C C Q q = .  Consumer  surplus  and  total  welfare  under  second-stage  Cournot 
competition then equal: 
j ( ) ￿ ( )
2
1 C C CS q θ = + ,  (4.33) 
and: 
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85 Superscript C stands for second-stage Cournot competition.   142 
4.4.2. Regularity conditions 
The R&D stage gives rise to four regularity conditions. In addition to the two second-
order  conditions,  post-innovation  costs  have  to  be  positive.  The  second-order 
conditions under Bertrand and Cournot competition are, respectively: 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
1 2 2
4 1 1
β θ θβ β θ β θ
γ
θ θ β
  + − − + − −     ≥
− − +
,  (RR1) 
and: 
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.  (RR4) 
One of these regularity conditions RR3 is redundant as is shown by the following 
Lemma. 
 
Lemma 4.4. One of the four regularity conditions can be ignored as this condition is 
less  binding  than  the  three remaining regularity conditions.  More specifically, the 
parameter space is bounded by regularity conditions RR1, RR2 and RR4. 
Proof. It is immediate that RR4 dominates RR3. 
4.4.3. Cournot versus Bertrand 
4.4.3.1. R&D investments 
Comparing the effective R&D efforts of the different competition modes leads to the 
following Proposition.  
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Proposition  4.7.  When  firms  cooperate  in  R&D,  their  R&D  investments  and 
concomitant cost reductions are always larger with Cournot competition than with 
Bertrand competition. 
 
Proof. ￿ ￿ ( )
2 2 3 2 (1 )(4 ) (1 ) 0 C B y y a c γ β θ θ θ > ⇔ − + − − > , or  1 β > − . 
  Moreover,￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
C B C B y y x x > ⇔ > .  
 
According to Proposition 4.7, R&D activity is higher under Cournot competition than 
under Bertrand competition when firms invest cooperatively in cost-reducing R&D 
prior  to  competing  on  the  market.  This  result  replicates  the  findings  with  R&D 
competition  in  the  first  stage,  both  for  output  (Qiu,  1997)  and  input  spillovers 
(Proposition 4.1), by which the ranking of R&D activity under Cournot and Bertrand 
competition  turns  out  to  be  robust  for  the  introduction  of  R&D  cooperation. 
Decomposing the total R&D effect in a strategic, a spillover, a size and a cost effect 
can again help to explain this tendency.  
 
For Cournot competition, this decomposition of the R&D effect on total profits yields 
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So, apparently, when firms cooperate in R&D, not only the sign of the spillover, size 
and cost effects are the same under Cournot and Bertrand competition, but now the 
sign of the strategic effect is also the same. However, with R&D cooperation, the 
strategic and spillover effects each consist of two terms and analyzing the sign of 
these two terms explains why firms invest more in R&D under Cournot than under 
Bertrand competition. Note first that, for both Cournot and Bertrand competition, the 
cost effect is negative and the size effect is positive. Furthermore, note that, due to the 
cooperation in R&D, the impact on rival’s output is also taken into account by the 
investing firm. Thus, the investing firm does not only take into account the impact of 
its R&D investments on its own profits, but also the impact on the profits of its rival. 
This is reminiscent of the internalization of the combined profits externality.  
 
Contrary to R&D competition, the strategic effect with Cournot competition is now 
negative, as the negative second term dominates the positive first term. The first term 
of the strategic effect represents the positive effect of an investment by firm i on its 
own profits. After all, just like with R&D competition, an investment in cost-reducing 
R&D rewards firm i with a larger market share and hence higher profits. As a result, 
the investing firm has an incentive to increase its R&D investments. However, due to 
the increase in output of firm i, the profits of its rival are negatively affected by 
investments in R&D, which is now taken into account by the investing firm, due to 
the  coordination  of  R&D  strategies.  This  negative  effect  on  R&D  investments  is 
represented by the second term of the strategic effect.   
 
With Bertrand competition, the strategic effect is negative as  its two  constructing 
parts are negative. After all, an increase in the R&D investments of firm i incites both   145 
firms i and j to cut down their prices, by which both firms’ profits are reduced. The 
negative effect on the own profits of the investing firm i reduces its incentives to 
invest in R&D and is represented by the first term of the strategic effect. Moreover, 
incentives are further discouraged by the negative effect on profits of the rival, which 
is represented by the second term of the strategic effect. 
 
With Cournot competition, the spillover effect is also negative. Just like with R&D 
competition, part of firm i’s R&D spills over to its rival firm j, by which the latter’s 
production efficiency is raised and, hence, output increases. This increase in output of 
firm j has a negative impact on the profits of the investing firm i but a positive effect 
on firm j’s profits. The former effect is represented by the second term of the spillover 
effect and is thus negative while the latter effect is positive and captured by the first 
term of the spillover effect. In total, the spillover effect is negative.  
  
When there is Bertrand competition, the spillover effect is negative as well. Firm i is 
again discouraged to invest in R&D as a rival can free ride on the investing firm’s 
R&D efforts. Due to this free riding, the rival firm j lowers its price, by which firm i 
reduces its price as well. Consequently, the spillover effect is negative as an increase 
in the investments of firm i reduces both firm i’s profits (second term of spillover 
effect) and firm j’s profits (first term of spillover effect).   
 
Thus, the higher R&D activity with Cournot competition is due to the positive sign of 
first term of the strategic effect and the first term of the spillover effect. In short, this 
difference in R&D investments is a result of the fact that Cournot competition is less 
intense  compared  to  Bertrand  competition.  After  all,  quantities  are  strategic 
substitutes  in  Cournot  markets  and  prices  are  strategic  complements  in  Bertrand 
markets.  Consequently,  an  aggressive  move  by  one  firm  incites  a  less  aggressive 
move by its rival in Cournot markets but the rival will behave aggressively as well 
when  firms  compete  with  prices.  Thus,  R&D  investments  are  more  profitable  in 
Cournot markets than in Bertrand markets. In other words, with Bertrand competition, 
cost-reductions  are  transferred  much  more  to  consumers  than  with  Cournot 
competition.  
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To  continue,  the  actual  difference  in  R&D  activity  that  leads  to  the  ranking  in 
Proposition 4.7 is closely related to the efficiency of the R&D process. That is: 
 
Lemma 4.5. With R&D cooperation, the difference in R&D activity between Cournot 
and Bertrand competition is larger, the more efficient the R&D process is. 
 
Proof. First note that  
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A larger R&D efficiency may thus increase the wedge between Cournot and Bertrand 
incentives.  Note  furthermore  that,  just  like  with  R&D  competition,  the  difference 
between  Cournot  and  Bertrand  investment  incentives  increases  when  products 
become more substitutable and when spillovers are larger.  
4.4.3.2. Profits 
From Proposition 4.7, it is known that firms invest more in cost-reducing R&D in 
Cournot  than  in  Bertrand  markets.  All  else  equal,  these  larger  R&D  investments 
would yield lower profits with Cournot than with Bertrand competition. However, the 
cost  reductions,  resulting  from  the  R&D  investments,  always  compensate  for  the 
higher  R&D  investments  with  Cournot  competition  by  which  profits  are  always 
higher  when  firms  compete  with  quantities.  The  ranking  of  profits  with  R&D 
cooperation is thus the same as for R&D competition. Proposition 4.8 formalizes.  
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Proposition 4.8. With R&D cooperation, profits are always higher with Cournot than 
with Bertrand competition.  
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From Proposition 4.8, it thus follows that producer surplus, with R&D cooperation in 
stage  one,  is  always  higher  under  Cournot  competition  than  under  Bertrand 
competition. As both firms are better off with Cournot competition, it would thus be 
in their interest to commit to Cournot competition. However, as was argued in section 
4.3.3.2, it may be hard or impossible for firms to credibly do so.  
 
As will become clear below, post-innovation production costs can be that much lower 
under  Cournot  competition  than  under  Bertrand  competition  by  which  the  larger 
producer surplus can exceed the reduction in consumer surplus in Cournot markets 
compared  to  Bertrand  markets.  Consequently,  total  welfare  can  be  higher  with 
Cournot  competition  than  with  Bertrand  competition.  However,  first,  consumer 
surplus is analyzed before total surplus is looked at. 
4.4.3.3. Price 











  (AA1) 
If assumption AA1 holds, the R&D process is relatively ‘efficient’, as small values 
for J imply large cost reductions in unit costs for a given amount of R&D inputs (see 
section 4.2). A high efficiency of the R&D process corresponds to situations where 
post-innovative costs under Cournot competition are particularly low in comparison to   148 
post-innovation costs under Bertrand competition, as was indicated by Lemma 4.5. As 
will be shown below this has an important implication. First note that assumption 
AA1 does not rule out the existence of equilibria: 
 
Lemma 4.6. The set where regularity conditions RR1, RR2, RR4 and assumption 
AA1 hold is not empty. 
 
Proof.  For  AA1  and  RR4  to  hold  jointly  it  is  required  that  ( ) ( ) 1 2 / 2 θ θ < < + − a c   or 
( ) ( ) 2 a c a c θ − < + . Indeed, a and c can always be chosen such that this inequality 
holds.  For  AA1  and  RR1  to  hold  jointly  it  is  required  that 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
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Figure 4.2 displays the admissible parameter space and assumption AA1 for particular 
values for a, c and J. Note that from the proof of Lemma 4.6 it follows that f￿ ￿-
g￿ ￿!￿￿￿￿ H]0,1[. Hence, under assumption AA1 the admissible parameter space is 
defined by conditions RR1 and RR4. 
 
Now, the main result of the analysis with R&D cooperation in the first stage and 
Bertrand or Cournot competition in the second stage can be stated: 
 
Proposition 4.9. With R&D cooperation, prices are lower under Cournot competition 
than under Bertrand competition when the R&D process is efficient, spillovers are 
high and products are not that differentiated.  
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Proof.  Lower  prices  obtain  under  Cournot  competition  than  under  Bertrand 
competition if  i i
C B Q Q > , or  ( ) ( )
2 1 / 4 γ β θ < + − . 
 
Figure 4.2. Comparing consumer surplus with Cournot and Bertrand competition under assumption 
AA1 and regularity conditions RR1 and RR4 (a=100, c=70, J=0.5) with R&D cooperation.  
 
Proposition  4.9  conveys  another  new  message.  In  a  duopoly  with  substitutable 
products,  prices  can  be  lower  under  Cournot  competition  than  under  Bertrand 
competition. This happens when post-innovation costs under Cournot competition are 
sufficiently  below  post-innovation  costs  under  Bertrand  competition,  or,  in  other 
words, when the difference between R&D investments under Cournot competition 
and Bertrand competition is sufficiently high. Considering the admissible parameter 
space  in  Proposition  4.9,  this  is  the  case  when  the  R&D  process  is  efficient, 
technological spillovers are substantial and products are not that differentiated. It is 
precisely  under  these  circumstances  that  Cournot  firms  invest  much  more  than 
Bertrand  firms  and  hence  the  difference  between  cost  reductions  in  Cournot  and 
Bertrand competition is the largest. Due to these large differences in effective cost 
reductions, ex post unit costs with Cournot competition are that far below ex post unit 
costs under Bertrand competition by which it is possible that Bertrand prices exceed 
Cournot prices. Moreover, note that when prices are lower with Cournot competition, 
the  reverse  is  true for  consumer  surplus.  Thus,  consumers  can  be  better  off  with 
Cournot than with Bertrand competition.  
 
In addition, note that condition (AA1) is more likely to hold the￿ODUJHU￿LV￿ ￿￿Indeed, 
because  of  the  combined  profits  externality,  an  R&D  cooperative’s  incentives  to 
LQYHVW￿LQ￿5￿'￿DUH￿LQFUHDVLQJ￿LQ￿ ￿￿7KH￿VWURQJHU￿is then the technological spillover, the 
more exemplified the difference in R&D investment incentives between Cournot and   150 
Bertrand  competition  is.  Hence,  the  larger  the  difference  in  post-innovation 
production costs will be. 
4.4.3.4. Welfare 
From Proposition 4.8, it is known that producer surplus is always higher with Cournot 
competition than with Bertrand competition. Combining this finding with Proposition 
4.9 implies that total surplus can be higher with quantity competition than with price 
competition. The welfare comparison for the entire parameter space is as follows: 
 
Proposition 4.10. With R&D cooperation, the following applies to the comparison of 
total surplus with Cournot and Bertrand competition: 
(i)  Total  surplus  is  higher  with  Cournot  competition  than  with  Bertrand 
competition when the R&D process is efficient, spillovers are high and 
products are not that differentiated. 
(ii)  When the R&D process is not that efficient, total surplus can still be higher 
with Cournot competition than with Bertrand competition, provided that 
the R&D process is still efficient enough. 
Proof. See Appendix 
 
Part (i) in Proposition 4.10 is the new message in terms of welfare when product 
market competition is preceded by cooperative investments in cost-reducing R&D. 
Whenever under Cournot competition price is lower than under Bertrand competition, 
the reverse holds for total surplus. As producer surplus is always higher with Cournot 
competition  and  consumer  surplus  can  also  be  higher  when  the  R&D  process  is 
efficient,  it  is  clear  that  also  total  surplus  can  be  higher  with  an  efficient  R&D 
process.  This  result  is  not  without  policy  implications.  In  particular,  lower 
competition intensity (i.e. Cournot competition) can be beneficial for society, even if 
the market competition is preceded by a stage of cooperative R&D. After all, the 
lower competition  intensity not only  stimulates  R&D investments, final consumer 
prices could also be reduced substantially, even below the level that would emerge 
under  a  higher  intensity  of  competition  in  the  product  market  (i.e.  Bertrand 
competition). Part (ii) indicates that when prices are higher with Cournot than with 
Bertrand competition, total surplus can still be higher with Cournot competition as the 
higher producer surplus compensates for the lower consumer surplus.    151 
4.5. Implications and concluding remarks 
In this chapter, is has been shown that for a duopoly with substitutable goods, cost-
reducing R&D investment incentives are always higher in Cournot markets than in 
Bertrand markets. After all, under Bertrand competition, much more of the benefits of 
any cost reduction is given to consumers than under Cournot competition, by which 
Bertrand firms are less  eager to  invest  in R&D  compared to  Cournot firms. This 
finding contributes to one of the most debated issues in the literature on innovation, 
namely the impact of the degree of product market competition on the incentives to 
engage in R&D activities. This is more or less in line with Schumpeter’s argument 
that less intense market competition (here Cournot competition) is associated with 
more R&D activity.  
 
To continue, the study here shows that prices can sometimes be lower with Cournot 
than  with  Bertrand  competition.  After  all,  when  the  R&D  process  is  efficient, 
spillovers are substantial and products are not that differentiated, the investments and 
concomitant cost reductions with Cournot competition are that much higher compared 
to Bertrand competition by which prices can be lower under Cournot competition than 
under Bertrand competition. This may occur both with R&D competition and R&D 
cooperation. Consequently, consumer surplus and total surplus are sometimes higher 
with Cournot  competition than with Bertrand competition. Thus, Cournot markets 
can,  under  certain  conditions,  outperform  Bertrand  markets,  both  in  terms  of 
innovative activity (higher R&D investments) and, what is new, welfare (higher total 
surplus). 
  
On the one hand, the theoretical findings here may be used in a positive way as they 
help to explain some empirical observations. For example, as was mentioned in the 
introduction of this chapter, the semiconductor industry, in which there is competition 
with  quantities  (due  to  capacity  constraints)  and  in  which  spillovers  tend  to  be 
significant (De Bondt and Veugelers, 1989; Gruber, 1998), is characterized by very 
R&D  intensive  firms  (see  a.o.  Irwin  and  Klenow,  1996).  Part  of  these  R&D 
investments aims at reducing their manufacturing costs. Due to these high investments 
in  cost-reducing  R&D,  prices  in  the  semiconductor  industry  have  been  declining   152 
sharply to a current level which is rather low (Aizcorbe, 2002), which is thus in line 
with the findings of this chapter.  
 
On the other hand, the theoretical findings of this chapter may also be used in a 
normative way as they can be used to inspire policy makers. As firms in Cournot 
markets are more willing to invest in R&D than in Bertrand markets, an obvious 
policy  instrument  to  increase  private  R&D  investments  might  be  imposing 
competition with quantities. However, caution is called for here. Firstly, it is quite 
hard for governments to impose Bertrand or Cournot competition to a certain industry 
as  the  competition  mode  usually  results  from  the  underlying  technology.  More 
specifically, capacity constraints tend to drive the competition mode. When capacity 
constraints  are  strong,  it  is  hard  to  expand  capacity  overnight  and  Cournot 
competition prevails, which is for example the case in the agricultural industry. After 
all,  it  is  just  impossible  to  increase  the  harvest  of  potatoes  overnight.  In  other 
industries, capacity is very flexible, which is for example the case in the market for 
downloadable music. As has been explained, in this kind of industries, it is hard or 
impossible  for  firms  to  commit  to  a  certain  capacity.  Secondly,  switching  from 
Bertrand to Cournot competition may result in sacrificing social welfare for more 
innovative activity (except for the case where total surplus is higher with Cournot 
competition). 
 
Consequently, other policy instruments might be more appropriate to increase R&D 
investments when there is Bertrand competition
86. The finding that investments are 
lower  in  Bertrand  markets  compared  to  Cournot  markets  suggests  that  the 
implementation of policy instruments should be dependent on the market competition 
mode. Previous studies indeed illustrate that policy instruments need to be tailored to 
the  market  competition  mode.  Poyago-Theotoky  (2003),  for  example  argues  that 
emission taxes and the effectiveness of R&D subsidies are different under Cournot 
and Bertrand competition when the product market competition is preceded by a stage 
of investments in emission reducing R&D. Moreover, in strategic trade policy models, 
it has been shown that the optimal level of certain instruments, such as subsidies, 
                                                 
86 From previous studies, it is known that R&D investments with Cournot and Bertrand competition are 
smaller than the social optimal investments.   153 
quotas, tariffs and taxes, depends on the competition mode (Eaton and Grossman, 
1986; Maggi, 1996).   
 
The  model  here  could  be  extended  to  further  examine  the  dependency  of  certain 
policy instruments on the competition mode. For example, it could be analyzed how 
the optimal levels of R&D subsidies are related to Bertrand or Cournot competition. 
Moreover, it could then be analyzed whether these R&D subsidies reduce or even 
remove the wedge between Bertrand and Cournot investments.  
 
Finally, attention should also be paid to some limitations of this study. Firstly, the 
spillover is assumed to be symmetric. However, as argued in the second chapter of 
this dissertation, spillovers, in general, tend to be asymmetric. Secondly, the analysis 
could be extended to the scenario where there are more than two firms investing in 
R&D and competing on the product market.     154 
4.6. References 
Aizcorbe,  A.  (2002),  “Why  are  semiconductor  prices  falling  so  fast?  Industry 
estimates and implications  for productivity measurement”, Federal Reserve  Board 
Finance and Economics Discussion Series Paper 2002-20.  
 
Amir,  R.  (2000),  "Modelling  imperfectly  appropriable  R&D  via  spillovers", 
International Journal of Industrial Organization 18, pp. 1013-1032. 
 
Bester,  H.  and  Petrakis,  E.  (1993),  “The  incentives  for  cost  reduction  in  a 
differentiated industry”, International Journal of Industrial Organization 11, pp. 519-
534.  
 
Breton, M., Turki, A. and Zaccour, G. (2004), "Dynamic Model of R&D Spillovers, 
and Efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot Equilibria", Journal of Optimization Theory 
and Applications 123, pp. 1-25. 
 
Bulow,  J.,  Geanakoplos,  J.  and  Klemperer,  P.  (1985),  "Multimarket  oligopoly: 
strategic substitutes and complements", Journal of Political Economy 93, pp. 488-
511. 
 
Cellini,  R.,  Lambertini,  L.  and  Ottaviano,  G.  (2004),  "Welfare  in  a  differentiated 
oligopoly with free entry: a cautionary note", Research in Economics 58, pp. 125-133. 
 
Cheng  (1985),  "Comparing  Bertrand  and  Cournot  Equilibria:  A  Geometric 
Approach", RAND Journal of Economics 16, pp. 146-152. 
 
Cohen, W.M. and Levinthal, D.A. (1989), "Innovation and learning: the two faces of 
R&D", The Economic Journal 99, 569-596. 
 
Cummings,  M.L.  “The  double-edged  sword  of  secrecy  in  military  weapon 
development,” IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, Winter 2003/2004. 
   155 
d’Aspremont, C. and Jacquemin, A. (1988), “Cooperative and Noncooperative R&D 
in Duopoly with Spillovers”, American Economic Review 78 pp. 1133-1137.  
 
De Bondt R, 1989, in De Bondt R, Veugelers R, ed.:Referatenboek 23ste VWEC, 
Leuven Universitaire Pers, Leuven, pp. XIX - XXXIII. 
 
Eaton,  J.  and  Grossman,  G.  (1986),  “Optimal  Trade  and  Industrial  Policy  under 
Oligopoly”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 101, pp. 383-406. 
 
Fudenberg, D. and Tirole, J. (1984), “The Fat-Cat Effect, The Puppy-Dog Ploy and 
the Lean and Hungry Look”, American Economic Review 74, pp. 361-366.  
 
Geroski,  P.A.  (1995),  "Do  spillovers  undermine  the  incentive  to  innovate?",  in 
Economic approaches to innovation, edited by Dowrick, S., Alderschot (UK): Edward 
Elgar. 
 
Gerschbach, H. and Schmutzler, A. (2003), "Endogenous spillovers and incentives to 
innovate", Economic Theory 21, pp 59-79. 
 
Gruber,  H.  (1998),  “Learning  by  Doing  and  Spillovers:  Further  Evidence  for  the 
Semiconductor Industry”, Review of Industrial Organization 13, pp. 697-711.  
 
Häckner,  J.  (2000),  "A  note  on  price  and  quantity  competition  in  differentiated 
oligopolies", Journal of Economic Theory 93, pp. 233-239. 
 
Hinloopen,  J.  (2007),  “Stability,  strategic  substitutes,  strategic  complements”, 
Working paper.  
 
Hinloopen,  J.  (2003),  "R&D  Efficiency  Gains  due  to  Cooperation",  Journal  of 
Economics 80, pp. 107-125. 
 
Hinloopen,  J.  (1997),  “Research  and  Development,  Product  Differentiation  and 
Robust Estimation”, University of Copenhagen.  
   156 
Irwin,  A.A.  and  Klenow  P.J.  (1996),  “High-tech  R&D  subsidies.  Estimating  the 
effects of Sematech”, Journal of International Economics 40, pp. 323-344. 
 
Irwin,  A.A.  and  Klenow,  P.J.  (1994),  “Learing-by-doing  in  the  Semiconductor 
Industry”, Journal of Political Economy 120, pp. 1200-1227. 
 
Kaiser, U. (2002), "Measuring knowledge spillovers in manufacturing and services: 
an empirical assessment of alternative approaches", Research Policy 31, pp. 125-144. 
 
Kamien,  M.,  Muller,  E.  and  Zang,  I.  (1992),  "Research  joint  ventures  and  R&D 
cartels", American Economic Review 82, pp. 1293 - 1306. 
 
Lin, P. and Saggi, K. (2002), "Product Differentiation, Process R&D and the nature of 
market competition", European Economic Review 46, pp. 201-211. 
 
López, M. C. and Naylor, R. A. (2004), "The Cournot--Bertrand profit differential: A 
reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining", European Economic 
Review 48, pp. 681696. 
 
Maggi, G. (1996), “Strategic Trade Policies with Endogenous Mode of Competition”, 
American Economic Review 86, pp. 237-258.  
 
Martin, S. (1995), “R&D joint ventures and tacit product market collusion”, European 
Journal of Political Economy 11, pp. 733-741. 
 
Mukherjee, A. (2005), "Price and quantity competition under free entry", Research in 
Economics 59, pp. 335-344. 
 
Poyago-Theotoky,  J.  (2003),  “Optimal environmental  taxation,  R&D  subsidization 
and the role of market conduct”, Finnish Economic Papers 16, pp. 15-26. 
 
Qiu, L.D. (1997), "On the dynamic efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria", 
Journal of Economic Theory 75, pp. 213-229. 
   157 
Singh, N. and Vives, X. (1984), "Price and quantity competition in a differentiated 
duopoly", RAND Journal of Economics 15, pp. 546-554. 
 
Suetens,  S.  (2008),  “Does  R&D  cooperation  facilitate  price  collusion?  An 
experiment”, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 66, pp. 822-836.  
 
Symeonidis,  G.  (2003),  "Comparing  Cournot  and  Bertrand  equilibria  in  a 
differentiated  duopoly  with  product  R&D",  International  Journal  of  Industrial 
Organization 21, pp. 39-56. 
 
Vives, X. (1985), "On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product 
differentiation", Journal of Economic Theory 36, pp. 166-175. 
 
Zanchettin,  P. (2006), "Differentiated duopoly  with asymmetric costs", Journal of 
Economics & Management Strategy 15, pp. 999-1015.   158 
Appendix 
Decomposition of R&D incentives with R&D competition in the first stage 
A. Cournot Competition 
The second-stage profits of firm i equal: 
  i i i x π Π = − ,                 
with  ( ) i i i i i p q c y q π = − − . 
The first order condition for firm i in the production stage when firms compete with 
quantities is:  
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which can be simplified to:    159 
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B. Bertrand competition 
The second-stage profits of firm i equal: 
  i i i x π Π = − ,               
with  ( ) i i i i i p q c y q π = − − . 
The first order condition for firm i in the production stage when firms compete with 
prices is:  
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In the first stage, the first order condition is:    161 
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Differentiating the first order conditions of the production stage to xi yields:   
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Proof of Proposition 4.5. 
First not that: 
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When  0 β = , regularity condition R5 is most binding. Label the resulting threshold 
value  on  the  efficiency  parameter * y .  The  result  then  follows  as 
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− = − = , (see also figure 4.3). 
Proof of Proposition 4.6. 
This proof is a general version of that in the previous section Proof of Proposition 4.5 
of this appendix. Observe that:  
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Only  the  larger  root  needs  to  be  considered  as 
{ } ( ) { } ( ) { } 1 1 , 0 1
min * lim * 0 θ β θ β
γ γ θ γ γ θ
→ =
− = − = ,  
where J* is the threshold value induced by R7. Label this larger root ( ) γ θ . Then 
observe  that  { } ( ) { } ( ) , 0 0.5
min lim 0 θ β θ β
γ θ β γ θ β
→ =
∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = .  This  gives  rise  to  the 
different lines as drawn in figure 4.3 for different values of E. Obviously, for any 
( ) γ γ θ <  we are in situation (i) while situation (ii) emerges for any ( ) γ γ θ > . The rest 
of the proof then follows.  
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Figure 4.3. ( ) , , G γ β θ for different levels of R&D input spillovers: a=100, c=70 and T=0.9.  
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By using the first order condition of the production stage, further rewriting brings:   
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π π π π ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂Π
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∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
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It is known that: 
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 (second order conditions), 
 
2 2 2 2
2 2
j j i i
i j i j i j q q q q q q
π π π π ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= < =
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
(stability condition strategic substitutes).  
 
This information satisfies to derive the signs of the strategic, spillover, size and cost 
effect.  
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B. Bertrand Competition 
The second stage profits are: 
  ( ) i i i i i i p q c y q x Π = − − − , 
  with  ( ) i i i i i p q c y q π = − − . 
The first order condition for firm i in the production stage when firms compete with 
prices is:  
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Furthermore, it is known that  
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In the first stage, the first order condition is:  
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Using the first order conditions of the production stage:  
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Differentiating the first order conditions of the production stage to xi yields:   
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(stability  condition  strategic  substitutes). 
This information satisfies to derive the signs of the strategic, spillover, size and cost 
effect.  
Proof of Proposition 4.10 
First,  note  that  (i)  is  a  direct  consequence  of  combining  Proposition  4.8  with 
Proposition 4.9.    173 
 
For (ii), observe that:  
    j j ( ) ( )
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where  ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2 2 1 4 2 1 1 B γ θ θ θ θ β Φ = − − − + − + , 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2
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2 2 2 4 4 2 2
2 2 4 2 2
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  − − − + − − + ∆    
. 
Again, the related function  ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2 2 , , , , 4 G F γ β θ γ β θ γθ θ   = −  
 
 is considered. It 
follows that  j j ( ) ( ) ( ) , , B C sign TS TS sign G γ β θ − = .  
 
Note that  ( )
2
1 2 3 , , G g g g γ β θ γ γ = + + ,  
where   ( ) ( ) ( )( )
4 2 2 2
1 4 1 1 4 2 g θ θ θ θ θ = − − + − − , 
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Then,  note  that  ( ) , , G γ β θ is  strictly  convex  in  J  as  ( )
2 2
1 , , 2 0 G g γ β θ γ ∂ ∂ = >  
(indeed:  { } 1 1
1
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= = ). Moreover, 
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Only  the  larger  root  needs  to  be  considered  as 
{ } ( ) { } ( ) { } 1 1 , 0 1
min * lim * 0 θ β θ β
γ γ θ γ γ θ
→ =
− = − = ,    174 
where J* is the threshold value induced by R2. Label this larger root ( ) γ θ . Then 
observe that  { } ( ) { } ( ) , 0 0.5
min lim 0.25 θ β θ β
γ θ β γ θ β
→ =
∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ = . This gives rise to the 
different lines as drawn in Figure 4.4 for different values of E. Obviously, for any 
( ) γ γ θ <  we are in situation (i) while situation (ii) emerges for any ( ) γ γ θ > . The rest 
of the proof then follows.  
 
 
Figure 4.4.  ( ) , , G γ β θ for different levels of R&D input spillovers: a=100, c=70 and T=0.9.  
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5. General Conclusion 
In this thesis, the role played by technological spillovers in firms’ decisions to invest 
in R&D has been explored in three related studies. In the first two studies, attention 
has explicitly been devoted to the impact of spillovers on the comparison of efforts of 
leading  and  following  firms.  More  insights  into  the  process  of  technological 
leapfrogging or leadership persistence have been obtained. The last study has shed 
more light on the impact of competition intensity on R&D investment incentives.  
 
In the first study, the impact of market leadership on innovative incentives has been 
analyzed  in  a  static  four  stage  strategic  investment  model.  More  specifically,  an 
industry with (persistent) market leaders (e.g. Intel) and market followers is analyzed 
and it is assumed that the market leaders decide upon their R&D investments before 
the market followers. Furthermore, leaders and followers are allowed to cooperate in 
R&D. The cost-reducing R&D investments are accompanied by either symmetric or 
asymmetric technological spillovers. 
 
Firstly, the findings of this study contribute to a better understanding of the impact of 
knowledge  spillovers  on  R&D  incentives  when  sequential  moves  are  taken  into 
account.  Some  remarkable  differences  with  the  familiar  two  stage  models  are 
detected. Indeed, when spillovers are symmetric, an increase in the spillover does not 
necessarily increase investments of cooperating leaders and cooperating followers in 
an R&D cartel. After all, cooperating leaders’ investments are in general discouraged 
by  an  increase  in  the  spillover,  due  to  the  negative  impact  on  their  investments, 
resulting from the leakage of knowledge to the followers. Only in the rare case in 
which  more  than  half  of  the  industry’s  firms  would  be  a  leader,  their  R&D 
investments would increase in the symmetric spillover when they would cooperate in 
an R&D cartel. Moreover, R&D cartelized followers’ investments can also decrease 
in the symmetric spillover.  
 
Secondly, further contributions to the Schumpeterian debate are provided by looking 
at the role played by spillovers in the comparison of R&D investments of leaders and 
followers. It is shown that this comparison and, hence, the technological leapfrogging   176 
opportunities for followers, depend to a large extent on the free riding opportunities of 
followers on the efforts of the leaders. In other words, the spillover from the leaders to 
the followers is a crucial factor in the process of technological leapfrogging; the larger 
is  the  spillover  from  the  leaders  to  the  followers,  the  more  likely  it  is  that 
technological leapfrogging takes place. Consequently, the leaders want to minimize 
and the followers want to maximize the spillovers from the former to the latter.  
 
For example, labour mobility is often argued to be an important source of knowledge 
spillovers (see for example Geroski, 1995). Consequently, leaders’ ability to prevent 
employees from leaving and follower’s capabilities to attract leaders’ R&D personnel 
will tend to play a major role in the process of technological leapfrogging. In the end, 
this may result in bidding for R&D personnel (Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2003).  
 
Our study moreover illustrates that also R&D cooperation may play an important role 
in the process of  technological  leapfrogging. On the  one hand,  leaders may deter 
technological leapfrogging by combining R&D forces, provided that the cooperating 
leaders  increase  knowledge  sharing.  On  the  other  hand,  R&D  cooperation  among 
followers may stimulate technological leapfrogging, on the condition that they fully 
share knowledge. R&D cooperation is thus always effective for leaders in reducing 
leapfrogging opportunities when they form an RJV cartel. Analogously, an RJV cartel 
among followers may always increase leapfrogging opportunities. It could thus be 
argued that both leaders and followers would like to cooperate in an RJV cartel as it 
strengthens  their  competitive  position.  Unfortunately,  the  question  concerning  the 
impact  of  R&D  cooperation  of  both  leaders  and  followers  on  the  process  of 
technological leapfrogging remains unanswered here.  
 
Important  insights  are  furthermore  gathered  into  the  effectiveness  of  R&D 
cooperation on firms’ R&D investments and welfare. In line with previous studies, 
such as the seminal work of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and Kamien et al. 
(1992), the comparison of R&D competitive and R&D cooperative investments of 
leaders  and  followers  is  driven  by  critical  spillover  levels.  Put  differently,  R&D 
cooperation among leaders (followers) in an R&D cartel only results in higher R&D 
investments, compared to R&D competition, when the spillover is sufficiently large. 
Important to mention is that these critical spillovers are not necessarily the same as in   177 
the  traditional  two  stage  games  with  simultaneous  moves.  Indeed,  the  critical 
spillovers for the leaders can be relatively high, especially when there are only a few 
leaders.  
 
The  study  moreover  shows  that  the  same  critical  spillovers  determine  the  social 
desirability of R&D cooperation. Indeed, the findings reveal that R&D cooperation is 
only  beneficial  for  society  when  it  results  in  higher  R&D  investments  of  the 
cooperating firms. In this regard, it has been pointed out that government intervention 
critically hinges on the industry structure, i.e. the number of leaders and followers. 
When there are a lot of leading firms, society is best off when these leading firms 
cooperate  in  an  RJV  cartel.  However,  it  is  most  common  that  only  a  few  firms 
dominate the market. In that case, it is best to favour R&D cooperation of only the 
small following firms.  
 
Whereas the model of the first study is static, as investments occur only once, a more 
dynamic model is analyzed in the second study. In this model, firms compete for the 
market by investing continuously in R&D. More specifically, one incumbent and one 
or more entrants race to be the first to innovate (a new product or a new technology) 
and the winner  of the race is  rewarded with a prize, namely a patent. The R&D 
process is furthermore characterized by uncertainty as increasing investments only 
increase the probability of winning the race. However, an important assumption in the 
study here is that patents may not always work as prescribed by theory. Consequently, 
the winner of the race may not always be able to appropriate the full value of the 
innovation, as, due to imperfect patents, losers of the race may also reap some of the 
fruits of the innovation. Finally, both settings with exogenous entry (given number of 
entrants) and free entry (endogenously determined number of entrants) are looked at. 
 
After all, previous literature demonstrates that the distinction between exogenous and 
endogenous entry plays an important role in the process of technological leapfrogging 
or  leadership  persistence  in  patent  races  with  winner-takes-all.  Indeed,  with 
exogenous entry, the incumbent always invests less than the entrant when there is 
winner-takes-all by which  leadership persistence is more likely than technological 
leapfrogging (Reinganum, 1985). With endogenous entry and winner-takes-all, Etro   178 
(2004)  finds  that  the  incumbent  always  invests  more  than  the  entrants  and  thus, 
leadership persistence tends to be the rule.   
 
The findings of our study illustrate that, besides the distinction between exogenous 
and endogenous entry, reward sharing plays also an important role in the process of 
technological  leapfrogging  or  leadership  persistence.  With  exogenous  entry,  it  is 
possible that the incumbent invests more than the entrants. More specifically, when 
entrants commit to sharing rewards with other entrants, the incumbent invests more 
than the entrants when the reward sharing is sufficiently large. Thus, with exogenous 
entry,  leadership  persistence  is  in  some  cases  more  likely  than  technological 
leapfrogging.  
 
When  there  is  endogenous  entry,  the  incumbent  generally  invests  more  than  the 
entrants. However, when a winning incumbent has to share the prize of the innovation 
with losing entrants, the latter tend to invest more than the former when the reward 
sharing is sufficiently large and thus, technological leapfrogging is not impossible in 
patent races with endogenous entry.  
 
It  has  furthermore  been  demonstrated  that  both  the  incumbent  and  the  entrants 
overinvest  in  R&D  compared  to  the  socially  optimal  expenditures  on  R&D.  A 
possible policy in order to reduce the incumbent’s and the entrants’ investments might 
be the taxation of R&D. Remark that the optimal taxation will (probably) depend on 
the level of reward sharing, which in turn differs across industries.  
 
The third and last study of this thesis deals with the comparison of the economic 
performance of Cournot and Bertrand competition when the market competition stage 
is preceded by a stage of competitive or cooperative investments in cost-reducing 
R&D in the presence of input spillovers. This study closely relates to that of Qiu 
(1997). However, there are two  important  differences. Firstly, input spillovers are 
considered here, whereas Qiu (1997) assumes output spillovers. Secondly, Qiu (1997) 
only analyzes R&D competition while in this study both R&D competition and R&D 
cooperation are looked at. 
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The  study  firstly  shows  that,  both  with  R&D  competition  and  R&D  cooperation, 
duopolists invest more in R&D when they compete with quantities (Cournot) than 
with prices (Bertrand). In other words, less intense competition modes (Cournot) can 
yield  larger  R&D  investments  compared  to  more  intense  modes  of  competition 
(Bertrand). The reasoning behind this is that cost reductions are transferred much 
more to consumers under Bertrand competition than under Cournot competition, by 
which R&D incentives are lower under the former than under the latter competition 
mode. It has furthermore been indicated that the difference between R&D investments 
under Cournot and Bertrand is larger, the less products are differentiated, the larger 
the spillover is and the more efficient the R&D process is.  
  
These higher investments under Cournot compared to Bertrand competition are not 
without  consequences  for  the  comparison  of  consumer  surplus  and  welfare  under 
these two competition modes. Indeed, when spillovers tend to be larger, products are 
not that differentiated and the R&D process is efficient, the R&D investments and 
concomitant cost-reductions with Cournot competition can be that much higher than 
with Bertrand competition by which prices can be lower under the former competition 
mode than under the latter. Thus, consumers can be better off with Cournot than with 
Bertrand competition. Keeping in mind that producer surplus is always larger under 
Cournot  than  under  Bertrand  competition,  it  is  then  easy  to  understand  that  total 
surplus,  as  the  sum  of  consumer  and  producer  surplus,  can  also  be  higher  with 
quantity than with price competition. 
 
This study illustrates that the effectiveness of R&D policy instruments might depend 
on the competition intensity in industries. After all, less intense competition modes 
might result in larger R&D efforts than more intense competition modes. As there is, 
with  both  competition  modes,  underinvestment  in  R&D,  R&D  subsidies  should 
probably be higher in markets with Bertrand competition.  
 
All in all, the findings of this thesis clearly show that appropriability problems can 
influence  the  comparison  between  leaders’  and  followers’  R&D  investments 
dramatically. The last study contributes to a better understanding of the impact of 
market structure on firms’ R&D incentives.   
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Before  closing,  it  might  be  interesting  to  point  to  some  possibilities  for  further 
research.  It  would  be  interesting  to  analyze  how  technological  leapfrogging 
opportunities would be affected when both leaders and followers would cooperate in 
R&D in the setting of the first study. Moreover, in some industries, for example in the 
pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, it is not uncommon that R&D cooperation 
takes  place  between  large  and  small  firms  (see  for  example  Roijakkers  and 
Hagedoorn, 2006). Therefore, the model could also be used to evaluate the impact of 
R&D cooperatives between large and small firms. While doing so, more asymmetry 
between leaders and followers could be taken into account by assuming lower ex ante 
unit costs and/or a more efficient R&D process for leaders.  
 
Furthermore, although the sequence of play in the first study can be observed in some 
industries, it is however also possible that, in other industries, other sequences of play 
prevail. For example, it could well be the case that market leaders prefer an imitative 
strategy.  It  would  therefore  be  worth  the  effort  to  endogenize  the  innovator  and 
imitator roles, given the Stackelberg scenario on the output market.  
 
The second study could be extended to the case in which entrants coordinate their 
R&D strategies (by maximizing joint profits). After all, we know from the first study 
that  R&D  cooperation  among  followers  may  enhance  technological  leapfrogging 
opportunities of followers. By introducing an R&D cartel among entrants, it would 
then be possible to evaluate whether technological leapfrogging is also more likely in 
settings in which there is dynamic competition for the market. A logical next step is 
then to consider patent races with two or more incumbents and R&D cartelization 
between these incumbents. Introducing R&D cartelization in patent races may also be 
interesting  from the social planner’s perspective as  it  may  indicate whether R&D 
cooperation  yields  higher  or  lower  investments  compared  to  R&D  competition. 
Moreover, other reward sharing scenarios could be analyzed. After all, it may be clear 
that the reward sharing scenarios analyzed in this study are not the only possible 
scenarios.  
 
The third study could firstly be extended to the case to an industry with n firms. The 
impact  of  the  number  of  firms  on  R&D  investments  in  Cournot  and  Bertrand 
competition could then be compared with the findings of Aghion et al. (2006) who   181 
claim that there is an inverted U-shape relation between the level of competition and 
the innovative activities of firms. Finally, it would be interesting to compare R&D 
investments, profits and welfare when firms decide sequentially on output and prices.   182 
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